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For Usaan and Zuha, the light in my life 
…. and for Shoaib the challenge in my life 
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The only tyrant I accept in this world is the "still small voice" within me. And 
even though I have to face the prospect of being a minority of one, I humbly believe 
I have the courage to be in such a hopeless minority. 
- Mahatma Gandhi 
(Quoted in: “The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology of His Writings on His Life, Work, and 
Ideas”, edited by Fischer, L. (2002:160) 
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Introduction 
 
 “I have enough work to engage my whole family in this trade now. It was not 
always like this, I have had to fight long and hard to get my family [husband] 
on my side. I have been with Kashf [microfinance Institute] for four years but 
I could have expanded earlier... It took me four to five years to convince my 
husband that a loan from them [Kashf] would not ruin or embarrass us as he 
feared... he subsequently gave in and now says that I was right all along.” 
(Microfinance client and self-employed shoe maker from Lahore, North 
Punjab, Pakistan) 
 “I want to have a loan to invest in my family business and support myself 
and my two small daughters, but since my husband has deserted us and as a 
married woman I do not have a male nominee to sign my loan application ....I 
do not qualify for a loan.” (Young, skilled bangle maker; she is dependent on 
her parents, who run a small bangle-making business from their home in 
Muzaffarpur, Bihar, India) 
The above statements from interview subjects in India and Pakistan represent some of the 
difficulties facing women who are targeted by microfinance institutions (MFIs), and which in 
turn pose challenges to the performance of these MFIs. This thesis analyses the conflict of 
preferences of various communal groups and actors within the operational spheres of MFIs 
and their clients; and how the fear of persecution, stigma or sanctions (both real and 
perceived) from these communal groups and actors can affect the operations of MFIs. Besides 
the analysis of the conflict of preferences at the aggregate household level and within the 
social and political milieus of the communities, this thesis also investigates women’s roles as 
clients of microfinance institutions while remaining embedded in their households and 
communities. One of the focal points of the analysis is the role that the familial and social 
spheres of these women play in their decision to take out a loan and become an MFI client, 
and in their journey toward some level of financial independence. The empirical analysis 
focuses on uptake of loans provided to women by two South Asian MFIs, one based in India 
and the other in Pakistan. Both MFIs are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that 
exclusively target women as clients.  
Researchers and practitioners alike increasingly realise that macroeconomic 
infrastructures and conditions alone cannot enable success in the microfinance sector, nor is it 
sufficient to explain that success. Closely associated factors like social institutions, cultures, 
norms and the “social life of microcredit” increasingly shape the demand for microfinance 
(Morvant-Roux et al. 2013; see also Fernando 2006). The “social life of microcredit” refers to 
16 
 
how various social actors within the MFIs’ milieus engage with microcredit (Ibid: 302). 
Money and finance are social institutions in that their access and use depends on conventions, 
norms and formal rules; thus, money and finance create a permanent tension between the 
individual and the group, between personal aspirations and collective responsibilities (Guerin 
et al. 2011: 102, see also Guerin 2006). This ongoing tension takes several forms – as a means 
of relating to the group or creating interpersonal bonds of dependence and domination. 
Inclusion and membership in diverse social groups that range from the customary (family, 
ethnicity, caste, gender, religion) to the constructed (professional, neighbourhood, associative 
groupings) is constantly evolving (Ibid: 103). MFIs’ social embeddedness is a major factor in 
distinguishing them from other contemporary financial institutions, but this means that they 
have to understand and evolve with their social settings and keep pace with the monetarisation 
of these societies.  
As an example of how social embeddedness can determine the success or failure of 
MFI operations, the lending mechanisms that most MFIs employ, such as group lending, 
expect the borrowers to know one another and help a group member facing a temporary 
difficulty in payment. This practise rests on the assumption that social networks of clients can 
put pressure even on the most recalcitrant of borrowers to pay back their due instalments. The 
power of shame inside the community in case of default is enough for many not to miss 
payment (Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 167). Public shaming in case of loan default in face to 
face, mostly rural, communities has often resulted in heightened strife and dishonour for 
community members; who then try to regulate their fiscal behaviour accordingly (Karim 
2011: xviii, see also Ashraf 2014). Thus, in abiding by certain norms and acceptable codes of 
conduct, and by avoiding actions that can lead to shame or ostracism, the members of the 
community sustain social institutions, and hence guarantee the conservation of social 
conventions (see Schweizer 1996).  
Microfinance services are perceived and received differently by different 
communities, depending on prevailing norms and practices within these communities. A 
qualitative study of microfinance services in Morocco by Morvant-Roux et al. explores how 
people build and negotiate multiple meanings and understandings of microcredit which in turn 
shape the way they experience, use, misuse or reject MFI services (2013: 303). According to 
the study, local culture and religious norms are one major hindrance to borrow as many are 
reluctant to borrow (Ibid: 306). For example, the authors describe how indebtedness is 
perceived by many in these communities as something parallel to not being in control of your 
life and thus a matter of dishonour. “Not being in debt is a matter of honour….indebtedness 
17 
 
implied that the head of a household had failed to meet his family’s material needs” (Ibid: 
306, see also Ashraf 2014). It also becomes a religious issue for many as “...only those who 
have paid their debts are allowed to go on Pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of 
Islam [according to the Quran]” (Ibid).  
Similarly, cultures and regimes that forbid conventional interest rate or under systems/ 
regimes that forbid/ promote certain market forms would hardly be defined as microfinance 
friendly (see Hes and Polednakova 2013, Karim 2011 and Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013). 
Contemporary microfinance can face challenges in communities and societies where 
ideological or religious beliefs clash with the products that they have to offer. For example, 
the practice of loans against interest is prohibited in Islam, and Muslim communities may 
resist conventional microfinance for fear of violating religious injunctions (Hassan et al. 2013: 
359). In a 2007 global survey on Islamic microfinance, CGAP revealed that some 72% of 
people in Muslim countries refrained from using interest based microfinance services, citing 
religious injunctions against interest payment (Karim et al. 2008). Statistics compiled by 
another study show that around 155.5 million adults are not integrated into the microfinance 
market, simply due to the fact that they live under Islamic (Sharia) Law in countries including 
Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen, all of which ban conventional 
microfinance due to the practice of charging interest (Hes and Polednakova 2013: 26).  
The role of MFIs within the communities they serve constitutes more than just the 
provision of credit to a targeted disenfranchised section of the population, and tend to disturb 
existing social relationships that are integral to the hierarchical structured constellations of 
class, caste and gender relations (Taylor 2011: 485; see also Mosse 2005 and Guerin 2006). 
Taylor (2011) demonstrates how MFI operations were plagued by the obstructive actions of 
rich landlords, merchants and moneylenders in an agrarian rural community in Andhra 
Pradesh, India. Taylor’s analysis of microfinance crisis areas in India shows that relationships 
of power between different social classes, castes and gender hierarchies, embedded in webs of 
credit and labour relations between MFI clients and the powerful actors listed above, resulted 
in the proliferation of debt traps that hampered MFI operations (Ibid: 501).  
This thesis seeks to address the question of to what extent, how, and under which 
conditions the social life of MFI clients, has an effect on MFI outreach and sustainability. 
This overarching theme of inquiry is broken down into 6 smaller questions, which are listed 
below. Following this introduction, in Chapter 1 I provide a review of relevant literature on 
microfinance and the important aspects of the social life of MFIs and their clients.  
18 
 
Chapter 2 will present a theoretical framework to analyse the preferences and incentives 
of the key stakeholder groups and actors that affect the operations of MFIs within their 
political and socio-economic environments. For this chapter, I mostly rely on Knight and 
Ensminger’s (1988) bargaining framework for the emergence and change of social norms that 
have distributional consequences for the actors.  
 In Chapter 3, I elaborate a methodological framework that will address the country 
context, including social and cultural institutions, history and traditions, sampling 
methodology, and rationale for case selection. The chapter will also illustrate a systematic 
methodology to understand the pressures from different actors that the households and the 
women within these households face and deal with for want of an MFI loan. 
Chapters 4 and 5 analyse and address key research questions, including if the fear of 
persecution/stigma or sanctions from various actors within a community are dissuading 
potential clients from MFI membership (Q1). The chapters will also seek to determine 
whether any interventions from various local actors within the working areas of MFI affect 
the MFIs’ operations (Q2), and if opposition to MFIs at domestic level from male guardian 
and family, is a deterrent for women who want to opt for MFI membership (Q3). Chapter 4 
focuses on the case of India, while Chapter 5 examines the case of Pakistan. In the wake of a 
delinquency crisis of the microfinance sector in 2008-9 in the case of Pakistan, Chapter 5 will 
also examine the special case of interventions from several local actors that served as a 
catalyst in causing mass mobilisation and default within the areas of MFI operations, causing 
damage to the whole sector.  
 In Chapter 6, I compare the findings from both the countries and analyse how women 
clients of the MFI in India differ from their counterparts in Pakistan (Q4). The comparison 
will also examine if MFIs and their clients face the same set of problems or difficulties from 
within the social and communal milieus in different set ups or countries (Q5). And finally to 
see if communal, social and domestic circles for the clients in both the countries have the 
same (or different) effect on their decision making process of opting for a microfinance loan 
(Q6).  
Chapter 7 will provide a summary of the most important findings and present 
suggestions for policy implications. 
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1 Literature Review, Background and Concepts 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The past several decades have witnessed ups and downs for the microfinance sector. 
Microfinance was proclaimed to be a panacea for world poverty by scholars and practitioners 
alike: moving millions out of extreme poverty, empowering women through financial 
independence that in turn was reflected in better health and education outcomes for their 
children and families (The Guardian 2012). Perhaps the biggest achievement of the 
microfinance movement is that it has proved that the poor, too, are bankable, and has 
compelled scholars and practitioners to rethink banking principles. Microfinance institutions 
were originally concentrated in Asia and Latin America, and the perseverance of pioneers in 
these regions has demonstrated the viability/possibilities of this unconventional mode of 
banking. According to a paper produced by the Microcredit Summit Campaign, “…as of 
December 2012, 3,718 microfinance institutions reported reaching 203,509,307 clients” 
(Reed 2014: 60). The number of clients that MFIs serve today is an acknowledgement that the 
market for small-scale finance is huge. The long term effects of microfinance in developing 
countries have been slow to emerge, but are encouraging. Findings from a nationwide study in 
Bangladesh show that over a period of 19 years (1990 – 2008), about 1.8 million microcredit 
client households, affecting almost 9.43 million family members, had moved above the $1.25 
a day poverty threshold1 (Reed 2011). A similar study in India revealed that in the period 
from 1990 to 2010, about 9 million households involved in microfinance rose above the $1.25 
a day threshold, directly affecting 45 million family members (Maes and Reed 2012).  
Empirical evidence from studies on the positive impacts of microfinance is plentiful. 
Several macro-level studies verify that microfinance is a significant instrument for poverty 
reduction (Imai et al. 2012, Ahlin et al. 2011 and Kai and Hamouri 2009). In addition, several 
studies verify that microfinance can empower women (Devi 2014, Hulme and Arun 2011, 
Kim et al. 2007 and Holvoet 2005), increase child school enrolment (Pitt and Khandker 1998 
and Odell 2010), lead to reduced violence against women (Hashemi et al. 1996 and Kim et al. 
2007), positively affect the use of contraceptives (Schuler et al. 1997) and have a positive 
impact on the well-being of the household in general (Imai et al. 2010). 
                                                          
1
 The study simply estimates the change in status of microcredit client households between 1990 and 2008, when 
compared with their status during the time of the first loan received by any member of the household (Reed 
2011). 
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There is, however, a growing tendency toward caution in interpreting the empirical 
evidence drawn from impact studies on microfinance across the world. For example, re-
examining one of the most noted studies of microfinance impact, by World Bank economists 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) on microfinance in Bangladesh, Roodman and Morduch (2009) find 
results that contradict the original findings of the study, concluding that the positive impact 
reported by the authors was inconclusive, casting doubts on the reports of widespread benefits 
from microfinance.2 In the wake of these findings, further evidence from randomised control 
trials (RCTs) also suggests results that partially contradict claims that microfinance alleviates 
poverty through income generation activities of the poorest households. In their field study of 
microfinance in Philippines Karlan and Zinman (2009) find that increased access to 
microcredit leads to less investment in the targeted businesses. In their randomised evaluation 
of the effects of introducing microcredit in a new market in India Banerjee et al. (2013) found 
that while microcredit succeeds in affecting household expenditure and creating and 
expanding businesses, this approach has no discernible effect on education, health, or 
women’s empowerment. Others have challenged microfinance impact studies for having 
weak methodologies and inadequate data (Duvendack et al. 2011). Bateman and Chang 
(2012) postulate that earlier impact studies of microfinance were undertaken, and the results 
camouflaged, by the MFIs themselves, and by other microfinance advocacy bodies in dire 
need of funding from donors. This further leads them to assume that the claims of such 
studies from microfinance advocacy groups “….are almost all… massively exaggerated, and 
often openly false claims made relating to the power of microfinance”. (Ibid: 16-17; see also 
Roodman 2011 and Hulme and Maitrot 2014).  
In light of this mass of contradictory empirical evidence, it seems advisable to be 
cautious of uncritical praise for the effects of microfinance, but also of excessive scepticism. 
The aggregated results of these studies should not be taken as a standard measure for final or 
conclusive statements on the state of microfinance globally. The authors presenting positive 
outcomes for MFI clients acknowledge that more discussion is needed on the methods applied 
in the evaluation of MFIs (Roodman and Morduch 2009) and some suggest that RCT 
methodologies simply cannot measure the long term effects of the programs in the samples 
(Banerjee et al. 2013). The heterogeneity of the MFIs and extreme variations in the country 
demographics, political systems, social settings, cultural backgrounds and institutions make 
global comparisons of impact studies difficult. The incentives and interests of various 
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 Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011) have likewise tested the results of Pitt and Khandker (1998) and back 
Roodman and Morduch (2009) in their conclusions that there is no convincing evidence of microfinance benefits 
to the poorest especially when the women are targeted. 
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stakeholders, as well as the context in which they are embedded, play an important role in the 
MFIs operations. 
More than ever, the microfinance sector is of significant interest to practitioners and 
policy makers focussed who seek to increase financial inclusion among low income segments 
of globally linked markets (Giesbert 2013 and Prahalad 2005). Yet creating a client-friendly 
culture of microfinance service provision that sincerely takes into account an understanding of 
the worlds of its clientele is a difficult task. Much depends on institutional infrastructures, 
cultural and social norms and the interpersonal relationships that persist in all communal and 
familial interactions. This thesis aims to better understand, on the basis of empirical evidence, 
the complex process of clients’ decision-making in opting for MFI loans, in the context of 
their familial and communal roles. This understanding could enable MFIs to develop 
successful outreach strategies and sustainable solutions for their clientele, as well as making it 
possible for the clients, particularly the poor, and especially poor women, to obtain more 
appropriate services.  
1.2 Background and concepts 
1.2.1 What is microfinance  
 
In the mainstream literature, the term microfinance primarily refers to microcredit, 
although it entails much more than just credit, encompassing insurance, savings, and 
remittances. Karlan and Goldberg (2011) define microfinance as the provision of small-scale 
financial services to low-income people normally deprived of access to mainstream banks 
(2011: 20). MFIs can be banks, credit unions, non-bank financial intermediaries or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Appendix 1 lists and describes the types of institutions 
and micro-lending sources that exist.  
The central idea behind microfinance is to provide working capital to populations that 
are typically unbanked and economically weak, usually for small income generating 
businesses, in order to benefit the borrowers and their families by reducing their poverty level. 
Ideally microfinance is expected to reach out to populations that lack the capital to execute 
their entrepreneurial plans to achieve self-sufficiency. Characterised mostly by group lending 
models where social collateral3 and peer pressure is used as a means to induce loan repayment 
in the absence of any other collateral, MFIs have designed and evolved institutional structures 
that are mobile and decentralised to bring their services to regions where they are needed. 
                                                          
3
 Social collateral is a trust mechanism through which a borrower’s reputation, or the social networks to which 
they belong, take the place of traditional physical or financial collateral (Bastelaer 2000). 
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Historically, the institutionalised microfinance in the form of locally established, non-
commercial financial credit associations, with only local funding through member deposits, 
like that of the Raiffeisen Bank of Germany in the 1850s (see Guinnane 2011 for an overview 
of early German credit cooperatives). More informal forms of microfinance, such as rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), existed worldwide, with small regional 
differences, long before the European credit cooperatives took shape (see Armendáriz and 
Morduch 2007). Both the formal and informal predecessors of contemporary microfinance 
had much in common: they were local initiatives with members usually hailing from the same 
communities, mostly low income individuals, and free of any state or external assistance. 
Historically, informal microfinance sources differed from their institutionalised counterparts 
in a way that makes them similar to contemporary MFIs: high participation by, and explicit 
focus on, women. Similar to the present-day microfinance industry’s focus on lending mostly 
to women, ROSCAs were pre-dominantly joined by women in Asia and Africa, whereas the 
institutionalised credit unions normally had a male clientele.4  
Typically, microfinance is associated with the less developed part of the world, mostly 
because the demand for such services is higher and the possible impacts more profound 
(Hudak 2010). The hype touting microfinance as the solution to world poverty rose steadily 
for three to four decades. However, the climax came in 2005, when the United Nations 
Organization (UNO) declared that year the “international year of micro credit”. The following 
year saw the Nobel Peace Prize Award awarded jointly to the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh 
and its founder Muhammad Yunus for “…Their efforts to create economic and social 
development from below” (The Nobel Foundation 2006). This brings us to the issue of 
microfinance’s popularity among academics and practitioners as a policy tool for poverty 
alleviation and women’s emancipation alike. 
1.2.2 Microfinance as a development tool and the targeting of women 
 
For the poor lacking the cushion of savings in times of financial crunch, credit is often 
the only way out. They may turn to their next of kin or to informal commercial lenders – local 
traders, employers and landlords, commodity wholesalers, pawnbrokers and moneylenders of 
various types – reported to offer credit at interest rates as high as 200 – 400% per annum 
(Robinson 2001: 13). In the 1960s, the most widely used tool to address the need of capital 
for the poor, mostly in the agricultural sector, was subsidised rural credit schemes run by the 
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 See Ardener (1964) and Ardener and Burman (1995) for a good overview of composition of ROSCAs and 
gender in many Asian and African countries 
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state. However, their poor performance and failure to reach the real poor led to programs by 
private operators and NGOs (see Holt and Ribe 1991 and Armendariz and Morduch 2007). 
These private operators and NGOs experimented with micro-loans for the micro-enterprises 
of the most vulnerable groups within the population, mostly women; they were active in many 
parts of the world, but particularly so in South Asia and Latin America (Helms 2006, see also 
Hudak 2010). These experimental micro-credit programs of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
examples of which include the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) Bank of India and Americans for Community Cooperation in Other 
Nations (ACCION) of Latin America, were the pioneers of modern day MFIs.   
Through the 1980s and 1990s, the private ventures and small NGOs became 
formalised into financial institutes and large multinational NGOs. Striving to promote small 
scale lending, the focus shifted even more to women after results demonstrated that women 
had much higher repayment rates (Hossain 1988, Khandker et al. 1995, Armendariz and 
Morduch 2007 and D’Espallier et al. 2009). With the rise of neoliberal paradigms of 
development favouring the withdrawal of state from welfare policies over the decades, 
together with the unpopularity of prior state initiatives for subsidised credit programs, the 
time was right for developmental schemes based on entrepreneurship, competition and 
efficiency to take the lead. 
At the turn of the millennium the UNO outlined eight overarching Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), promising to end extreme poverty and the betterment of human 
existence (United Nations Millennium Development Goals 2012). Appendix 2 lists the eight 
MDGS and their respective targets. Evidence from recent macro-level studies indicates that 
microfinance significantly reduces poverty (Imai et al. 2012, Ahlin et al. 2011 and Kai and 
Hamouri 2009). Furthermore, impacts are shown to be greater when women are targeted as 
recipients of welfare policies, be it aid or credit, because their motivation for economic 
independence is different than those of men. With economic strength women’s bargaining 
power within the household increases, which in turn leads to women taking decisions to 
invest their income in their households for the wellbeing of children and families (Mahoney 
2014, Devi 2014, Kristof & WuDunn 2009, Khandker 2003, Deshpande and Burorjee 2002, 
see also Skoufias 2001). Thus, like a glove that fits the hand perfectly, microfinance offers all 
the attributes of a strong strategy for reaching the MDGs, as it aims for inclusive financial 
systems for the economically weak and predominantly targets women as clients. Empirical 
evidence, though contested, is still optimistic that microfinance empowers women (Devi 
2014, Hulme and Arun 2011, Kim et al. 2007 and Holvoet 2005), increase child school 
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enrolment (Pitt and Khandker 1998 and Odell 2010), lead to reduced violence against women 
(Hashemi et al. 1996 and Kim et al. 2007), positively affect the use of contraceptives (Schuler 
et al. 1997) and have a positive impact on the well-being of the household in general (Imai et 
al. 2010). 
Given this background, a lot of developmental aid money has flown into the 
microfinance sector from various international aid organizations to support the movement of 
poverty alleviation and/ or achieve the MDGs. Still, several sceptics doubt that microfinance 
really alleviates poverty. They argue that the impact of microfinance is miniscule, as loans are 
mostly misused and benefit very few in the long run, and that microfinance is actually a 
political barrier to sustainable economic and social development (Banerjee et al. 2013, 
Bateman and Chang 2012 and Karim 2011). The strongest argument against microfinance, 
however, is based on the grounds that microfinance is not sustainable when targeting the ultra 
poor, and that most MFIs will not be able to sustain themselves without infusions of external 
funds being pumped (Morduch 2000). This sustainability drive had led many MFIs to adopt a 
strategy of commercialization to attract more capital and increasing interest rates to offer 
sustainable services to more clients (Helms 2006). At the same time, devastating microfinance 
delinquency crises between 2008 and 2010 in many countries, including Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Pakistan, Bosnia, India, and Nigeria brought a wave of bad publicity to the 
microfinance sector (Microfinance Focus 2011). The causes of these “microfinance 
meltdowns” are numerous, ranging from over-indebtedness and oversupply of microcredit 
services to politically motivated groups disrupting MFI services. This chapter will address the 
sector crisis in detail in a later section. The next section, however, will highlight the debate on 
how to measure MFI success criteria, particularly sustainability and outreach, which has been 
particularly prominent in the microfinance sector in the recent years. 
1.2.3 Sustainability, outreach and subsidies 
 
Sustainability of microfinance services5 means continued operations of the MFIs and 
thus a permanent provision of financial services to the poor (Helm 2006: 56), whereas 
outreach is simply increasing the number of clients using MFI services.6 For MFIs, the two 
major objectives are maximum outreach and sustainability of their operations. Sustainable 
microfinance is often argued to be a major challenge when the target groups are the ultra poor. 
This usually posits a trade-off between reaching out to a large number of poor people, and 
                                                          
5
 Sustainability is the capability of an MFI to cover its operating costs with revenues without external funds or 
subsidies. 
6
 The literature covers various dimensions and aspects of outreach, including breadth, depth and scope of 
outreach. For a good overview see Vento 2006 and Schreiner 2002. 
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permanent access to services from financially viable MFIs; the most threatening scenario 
presented is that loans would get bigger and more expensive to cover costs, causing MFIs to 
drift away from a social mission of poverty alleviation towards commercialization (see Hulme 
and Mosley 1996; Conning 1999; Paxton, Graham and Thraen 2000; Zeller 2003). To avoid 
this dilemma, the microfinance movement has been hugely reliant on subsidies from donors, 
governments, charities and concerned individuals. This has attracted substantial criticism, 
however, especially as some MFIs are indeed able to reach poorer clients at the low end while 
still covering their full cost of transactions (Microbanking Bulletin 2003: 69-74, see also 
Armendariz and Morduch 2007).  
Advocates have emphasised the use of “smart subsidies” as interventions aimed at 
minimizing distortions, mis-targeting and inefficiencies, and optimizing social benefits. 
Examples of smart subsidies include subsidizing start-up costs instead of ongoing operations, 
as well as short term subsidization of very poor clients who might not be able to afford loans 
at market rate (Armendariz and Morduch 2007). Others have argued that although reaching 
out to the ultra poor does not necessarily conflict with commercialization and sustainability, 
operations that target poorer clients may take longer to cover costs and become sustainable. 
Helms’s (2006) analysis of data from 2003 on 231 MFIs reporting to the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX)7 shows no significant relationship between loan size (proxy for 
the level of poverty) and profitability. Of the 139 sustainable MFIs reported, almost 30% were 
MFIs targeting the poorest clients with the highest profits amongst the sustainable MFIs 
(Helm 2006: 47). However, recent evidence does point to a shift in the microfinance sector, 
from subsidy-dependence toward financial self-reliance. This shift to self-sustainability comes 
at a cost, as the poor are targeted less by self-sustainable MFIs.  
Table 1 reports data for all MFIs reporting to the MIX over a period of ten years. The 
table shows that there is a trend of more MFIs becoming operationally self-sufficient 
(hereafter OSS). On average over the past ten years, there has been an increase of one 
percentage point per year in the number of MFIs that self-report as OSS. Another indicator is 
that the OSS median for non-OSS MFIs is also seen to be rising, meaning that even MFIs that 
are not self-sufficient, tend to cover more of their costs in 2012 than in 2002. Though MFIs 
reporting to the MIX Market are on average more profitable and committed to sustainability 
(Helm 2006: 45, see also Morduch and Armendariz 2007: 232), the average loan size per 
borrower has increased in size 140% over the past twelve years. While over time the clients of 
                                                          
7
 Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) is a business information provider in the microfinance sector. MIX 
collects and validates financial and social performance data from MFIs worldwide in addition to business 
information from networks, service providers, funders and investors. 
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most MFIs progress to bigger loans, the percentage growth of the average loan size, including 
all first time borrowers, is still very high relative to the client base. This means that the client 
base of the MFIs reporting to the MIX Market is not the ultra poor. 
Table 1.1: Cross Market Analysis of MFIs over time 
Year Total 
MFI 
count  
(N) 
MFIs 
Operationally 
self-sufficient 
(OSS)  
MFIs not 
operationally 
self-sufficient 
(non-OSS) 
OSS 
(median) of 
non-OSS 
MFIs 
Percentage of 
MFIs that 
have attained 
OSS  
Average loan 
balance per 
borrower 
(USD)* 
2002 494 295 199 71% 60% 220 
2006 1199 868 331 74% 72% 268 
2012 1051 824 244 82% 78% 529 
 Source: Microfinance Information Exchange (Mix Market): Cross Market Analysis 2014 
* For both MFIs that are operationally self-sufficient and those not operationally self sufficient 
 
 
The literature on microfinance often mentions the potential relations between the two 
major objectives of MFI, outreach and sustainability. With respect to the relation between 
these two objectives, the literature can be divided into two pools or schools of opinion. 
Authors in one pool argue that a trade-off is unavoidable (Hulme and Mosley 1996, Heidhues 
et al. 2002, Dichter and Harper 2007, Annim 2009, Hermes and Meesters 2011), while a 
second group of authors suggests that the two objectives have mixed or complementary 
effects on each other (synergy effect) (Otero and Rhyne 1994; Christen et al. 1995, Cull et al. 
2007, Kar 2010, Zerai and Rani 2012).  
Trade-off Pool: 
Arguments for a trade-off among the two main objectives can be summed up as 
follows: 
A) Outreach has a negative effect on sustainability 
With the rise in the number of clients and in the number of loans, operating costs 
(including salaries and administrative costs, screening costs, monitoring costs, depreciation of 
fixed assets, the cost of the loans and principal lost to default) rise as well (von Pischke 1996, 
p 226; see also Armendariz and Morduch 2007:243-244). The underlying assumption is that 
the greater the outreach, the higher the number of poor people being covered. Poor people 
usually get smaller loans. At the same time, the smaller the size of the loan, the costlier it is. 
Closely related to this argument is the lending mechanism of the MFIs. MFIs that usually opt 
for group lending serve more (poor) clients, but also suffer from poor loan recovery as yield 
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increases, and this hinders the objective of sustainability (Heidhues et al. 2002; Cull et al. 
2007, Annim 2009 and Hermes et al. 2011). 
B) Sustainability has a negative effect on outreach 
 
Sustainable MFIs tend to cover a major part of their costs by increasing the rate of 
interest on the loans issued. Many authors argue that this leads to curtailing outreach, as many 
clients are not then able to afford the loans (Zeller 2003; Dehejia et al. 2005; Cull et al. 2007; 
Mersland and Strom 2010; Hermes et al. 2011 and Cull et al. 2011b). Many authors refer to 
this phenomenon as commercialization. They argue that fewer (and richer) clients will be 
targeted through individual loans in contrast to group lending; while group lending is less 
profitable and negatively affects sustainability, it is more effective in reaching poor clients 
(Heidhues et al. 2002; Mersland and Strom 2010). 
Synergy effect pool 
The arguments for complementarity between outreach and sustainability can be 
summarised as follows: 
C) Outreach has a positive effect on sustainability 
 
Though not explicitly taken up in the literature, there are hints that outreach might in 
fact positively affect sustainability (Wokadala 2008). As opposed to the arguments mentioned 
under (A), this notion is based on the idea that MFIs with significant outreach usually tend to 
increase their gross income and profitability from the increase in client volume. This 
enlargement brings with it diversification of risk (spreading out investments). It also allows 
diversification of the client base, so that MFIs can potentially serve the rich as well as the 
poor, possibly enabling cross subsidization.8 This underscores a different understanding of 
“outreach” as outreach to a varied clientele, as compared to (A) where “outreach” is 
understood as outreach to the poor. 
D) Sustainability has a positive effect on outreach 
 
Under this paradigm, MFIs aiming for sustainability (in the long run at least) will 
come up with better products and demand-oriented approaches. They can increase their 
efficiency with cost-reducing information systems, new lending technologies, and other such 
measures that achieve economies of scale, and that supplement their outreach. Moreover, 
MFIs perceived as sustainable may attract more clients because they see it worthwhile to 
                                                          
8
 However, this was tried and proved futile by the Unit Desas of BRI, one of the largest MFIs in Indonesia 
(Robinson 2001). 
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become and stay a customer (Christen et al. 1995; Otero and Rhyne 1994; Meyer 2002 and 
Zeller 2003). This is true in the long run for MFIs that have enriched and diversified their 
product line over time. They can then attract a larger client base with more diverse service 
demands, such as for savings and insurance products (Robinson 2001; Sievers and 
Vandenberg 2007).  
!"#$%##"&'(
 
The argument that sustainability affects outreach negatively, by restricting loans to 
individuals accepting a higher interest rate, is well grounded, as presented in (B). However, 
arguments in (A) that assume smaller loans, in combination with group lending, reach the 
poorest borrowers is a little confusing. Whether the poor are served or the rich, the core issue 
lies in defining who the clients are – rich or poor –  and not outreach. Others have referred to 
the level of poverty of the clients being served as the “depth” of outreach (Schreiner 1998 and 
2002), and can be best served via group lending. As the MFIs evolve, however, diversification 
of lending mechanisms in addition to group lending is eventually unavoidable to keep older 
clients graduating to individual loans. Thus the degree of poverty of clients may affect 
sustainability, but outreach as such has little impact on sustainability. 
In practice, it is difficult to support the arguments for outreach positively effecting 
sustainability. As Zeller (2003) rightly notes, MFIs that claim maximum outreach without any 
external financial support (subsidies) in the long run have been very few and many continue 
to receive subsidies to support their client base. As outlined in (C), the issue of risk 
diversification is rather difficult for all MFIs, as they serve a restricted geographical area with 
a comparatively homogeneous demography. Then, as in the case of (A), the question of rich 
or poor clients does not really concern outreach, but rather reflects who is served. With 
respect to the argument that sustainability has a positive effect on outreach, there is evidence 
that backs the premise that MFIs with a diversified product base have obtained a large 
percentage of their funds through deposits of their savings customers and have reached more 
clients in the long run (Robinson 2001, Zeller 2003 and Vento 2006). This important funding 
source can be obtained at a lower cost than commercial debt and due to its denomination in 
local currency; it makes MFIs that avail themselves of this source less vulnerable to economic 
crises than MFIs with a large share of foreign currency debt (Robinson 2001 and Zeller 2003). 
 Summary 
It appears that there is a stronger case for a potential effect of sustainability on 
outreach than vice-versa. However, this effect could be either negative or positive – there are 
good arguments for both.  
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For the thesis, the dependent variable is MFI loan uptake by the women in the 
households. This is important for MFIs because it affects outreach and encompasses the 
performance of MFIs in general, including with regard to sustainability. Given the assumption 
that interventions by various actors within the socio-political milieus of MFIs (these constitute 
the independent variables, as will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2) could cause 
hardships for MFIs and their clients in the communities and familial spheres. The effects of 
these interventions would certainly affect both outreach and sustainability of MFIs in the 
short and long term. Interventions from potential external agents pose a constant threat to the 
smooth and continued supply of services – in other words, to the sustainability of the MFIs. 
This will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 by the case of Pakistan, where in 2008 such 
interventions got out of control, enormously hampering the operations of MFIs, damaging 
their sustainability, and causing a crisis for the whole sector.  
1.3 Reviewing the literature on microfinance and its relevance to research questions 
1.3.1 The Sector Crisis 
 
The last two decades have seen the microfinance sector evolve and grow, so that today it 
is a far ranging and dynamic arena (Cull, Kunt and Morduch 2011). After a phenomenal 
global average growth rate of about 40 percent annually between 2004 and 2008 (Chen et al. 
2010), in recent years the microfinance industry has begun to show recovery challenges in 
many countries. In many cases, these challenges soon matured into crises when loan 
collection problems originating in one particular area spread like fire to other operational 
areas within the country or state, as was the case in Morocco in 2007 (Reille 2009), Nicaragua 
in 2008 (ACCION 2009), Pakistan in 2008-09 (Burki 2009), Bosnia in 2009 (Chen et al. 
2010) and India in 2009-10 (CGAP 2010). The consequences have been devastating, for the 
reputation of the industry worldwide, but especially in terms of the human suffering that has 
been reported periodically in the media, such as suicides of defaulting poor clients trapped in 
a spiral of debt in India (see Biswas 2010, Burke 2011 and Hulme and Maitrot 2014).  
The sector crises have multiple roots, with some factors common to all regions and others 
specific to particular countries. Broadly speaking, reasons for the crisis include uncontrolled 
rapid growth of the sector, concentrated market competition fuelled by abundant funding, 
multiple loans taken out by the clients leading to over-indebtedness and unethical lending 
practices from the providers or their employees (see Chen et al. 2010, Burki 2009 and 
Microfinance Focus 2011). Among the factors blamed for turning problems into a crisis were 
reported interference from opportunistic groups or individuals for personal gain in many of 
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the microfinance meltdown countries like Pakistan, Nicaragua and India. Reports of 
politicians, religious leaders, borrower associations, politically motivated groups, influential 
individuals, community and family members of microfinance clients’ involvement in causing 
mass defaults and hampering MFI operations in crisis countries are on the rise in recent years 
(see Banerjee and Duflo 2011, Chen et al. 2010, Krishnaswami and Ponce 2010, Burki 2009 
and ACCION 2009).   
The operational spheres of MFIs encompass several stakeholders, groups and individuals 
of various scales, at several levels with whom they interact directly or indirectly. These 
groups can interact with MFIs on the micro-, meso- or macro- level and are of importance to 
their operations accordingly. For example, interest groups operating at the local, national and 
international level have played a key role in the sector’s delinquency crisis. On the ground, 
the interventions of the local communal interest groups in MFI operations were more obvious 
in the crisis countries; however, among the major reasons for the crisis were an excessive 
funding of the sector by donors (both national and international) and unregulated, often 
unethical, practices of the providers where the state and its various agencies play a key role. 
For an understanding of the complete political economic framework within which the MFIs 
operate, the role of stakeholders and lobbies at the macro-level in influencing the operations 
of MFIs will be briefly discussed here before moving on to the local stakeholders who are of 
more importance and relevance for the study. 
1.3.2 The political economic environment and impediments to microfinance 
 
An academic literature on the relationship between MFI performance and stakeholders 
within their macro political economic environments has largely started to emerge in the past 
decade.9 Stuart explains the “authorizing environment” for MFIs, in which national and 
international actors exercise their controls over microfinance providers by either dictating 
what MFIs can and cannot do, or by controlling the flow of resources (2011: 253). 
Accordingly, Hermes and Meesters find evidence for a positive relationship between the 
political system and MFI efficiency, arguing that MFI-specific factors do not tell the whole 
story when looking at MFI outcomes, and that the larger macro-environment should be taken 
into consideration (2011: 199).  As Girma and Shortland emphasise, “Political systems 
governed by narrow elites obstruct the development of the financial system [...] financial 
development may therefore be a deliberate policy choice by incumbents” (2008: 568, see also 
                                                          
9
 Michaelowa (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Tsai (2004), Weber (2006), Girma and Shortland (2008), 
Bruce (2009) and Hudak 2010 are among the few relevant works that focus on the political economy of financial 
development, informal finance and MFIs from various perspectives on the macro scale. 
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Rajan and Zingales 2003). They also show empirically that in democracies, the influence of 
lobbies is reduced through systems of checks and balances that increase the number of veto 
players that might have to be bribed to obtain loans without having a convincing project to 
present. Conversely, in authoritarian systems elites are likely to block reforms that would 
promote the development of financial markets to the benefit of the majority of the poor, 
because these would threaten elites’ privileged status (Girma and Shortland 2008).  
More convincing arguments are presented by Tsai, who researched informal credit 
markets in Asia, finding that outreach of MFIs in countries where they can operate 
independently and with little government regulation is much higher than the outreach of their 
counterparts in countries that lack such freedom (2004: 1491). Still others, like Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), show that interest group politics can serve as an impediment to financial 
market development. In her empirical study, Weber demonstrates eloquently the misleading 
and “politically naive analysis” of poverty in world politics, which often fails to address the 
contextual social and political aspects that underpin microcredit schemes (2006: 57). The role 
of stakeholders at the macro level, such as donors and national governments, therefore needs 
special attention.  
1.3.3 Donors: international developmental aid agencies/ organizations 
 
Michaelowa (2003) presents a rich discussion of donor interests that range from rival 
lending to the tendency of development aid organisations to promote and perpetuate their 
projects, which can immensely affect MFI operations. She argues that donor organizations are 
traditionally embedded in bureaucratic structures, where power and authority are dependent to 
a great extent on the size of the budgets at their disposal. In the quest to increase their 
allocations, or to avoid shortfalls in annual funds, it is often of the utmost importance that 
annual budgets be totally exhausted. Therefore, as expanding rather than cutting budgets is a 
rational step for these organizations, a strong incentive exists to exhaust their current budgets 
in a given year (Ibid: 79-80). Donor organizations have to justify their spending (to their 
auditors, the state and other financers) so as to ensure the perpetuation of fund flows, which in 
turn guarantees the preservation of their status, projects and networks. It should be noted that 
although this set-up appears philanthropic at first glance, it can also have dire consequences 
for MFIs, as it hinders the eventual self-sufficiency of the MFI by encouraging dependence on 
aid, donations and grant input (see Morduch 2000: 617). 
In addition, donors (or their respective countries) may have other interests to pursue. 
These interests can vary widely, ranging from influencing the financial policy of the recipient 
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country at the macro-level, to shaping institutional structures at the micro-level (for details see 
Michaelowa 1998).  Another aspect on the donor side is the phenomenon referred to as “flag 
raising”: since the idea of microfinance is strongly associated with poverty alleviation, donors 
may seek to compete to sponsor MFIs in hopes of winning positive publicity from the public 
and eventually financiers. However, this has twofold negative consequences. First, there is the 
danger of “rival lending”.10 Second, this may lead to enthusiastic replication of programs that 
are successful in one set of circumstances, but may not be so in areas where other conditions 
prevail. This perspective on replication is rather naïve, as risks may not be similar across 
areas, populations, cultures, demographics, target groups and donors or other sponsors 
(Pischke et al. 1997: 30, see also Karim 2011, Ahlin et al. 2011 and Morvant-Roux et al. 
2013).  
Also of interest are the organizations, agencies and individuals who administer MFI 
funds, such as NGOs or local project staff. These NGOs and their local project staff typically 
aim to prolong projects so that managers and field employees keep their jobs.11 The 
subsidizing of MFIs through grants and aid guarantees a steady flow of funds and thus 
ensures the MFI’s financial dependence, which in turn ensures the perpetuation of the project 
and maintenance of jobs. Here a paradox appears to be at work, in that contrary to the 
objective of financial self-sufficiency, long term and excessive subsidies for the MFIs are 
expected. This high subsidisation attracts a large number of clients, which make the MFI 
appear quite successful on the surface (Pischke et al. 1997). The donor’s short-term 
preferences of pumping funds into MFIs may, however, endanger the MFI’s operations in the 
long run. It is therefore evident that excessive funding may end up being detrimental to the 
central objectives of MFIs, whether serving the poor, women’s empowerment or operational 
self-sufficiency in the long run.  
1.3.4 Government: bureaucracy and politicians 
 
Governmental bodies are primarily composed of the bureaucracy and politicians. 
According to the assumptions of public choice, the bureaucracy acts in a self-interested way, 
pursuing power and following a budget-maximizing model just as the economic man pursues 
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 Here the driving force behind the provision of micro-loans would be purely supply-driven, which in the long 
run can hinder the sustainability of the project (Pischke et al. 1997: 28), as was obvious from the damage 
inflicted on the whole industry by the recent delinquency crises. 
11
 At the higher levels of the hierarchy the allocation of jobs in financial organisations (with it a continuous flow 
of resources) is of great significance (Hulme and Mosley 1996, Vol. 1: 145) 
33 
 
33 
 
profit (Mueller 2003: 362). Typically, the bureaucracy is assigned a utility function12 of 
possessing power through access to economic resources, which enables it to carry out 
discretionary decisions and control the behaviours of people dependent on them in one way or 
another. The relationship between bureaucrats and MFIs can be tense or even hostile, as 
bureaucrats may object that MFIs are allocated development aid that should be distributed 
more in accordance with the government’s (i.e., their own) objectives and priorities (Pischke, 
Schneider and Zander 1997: 21, Guerin and Kumar 2008: 28). This together with a lack of 
transparency of the bureaucratic system enables bureaucrats to exercise power over MFIs to 
the extent that they can practically ruin them – for example, through payments of bribes just 
to get through the whole apparatus, which goes on to strengthen the corruption and the power 
of the administrators (Pischke et al. 1997: 21; Gonzales-Vega and Graham 1995:16, see also 
Annim 2012). 
The bureaucracy also has the incentive to hinder MFIs from establishing themselves, 
as MFIs render services that normally fall in the government’s dominion, and hence can be 
regarded as rivals of the existing traditionally state owned rural agricultural financial 
infrastructure (Gonzales-Vega and Graham 1995: 11). The entire existence of these often 
highly inefficient rural state banks might be at risk when compared to more market efficient 
performance of the MFIs, endangering the bureaucrats system of patronage (see Michaelowa 
2003: 78). With competition in the market, the privileges of bureaucrats within the rural 
development banks, including discretionary power opening up various opportunities for 
corrupt practices, may be at risk. With this incentive in mind, the state officials are anything 
but neutral. They may undertake actions, for example, seeking to cause damage to the MFIs’ 
reputation by “.... (feeding) negative stories to the media,” in order to eliminate competition 
from MFIs on the market and help in promoting their own micro banking models (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2011: 174-178, see also Cowen 2006). 
Similar to the bureaucracy, the politicians are also interested in having power, 
influence and a strong political image or presence. Michaelowa (2003) argues that those in 
power seek to preserve the status quo and continue supporting the state owned agricultural 
banks maintain the political balance and political returns (patronage). Within this context, 
there are a whole range of policy measures that the politicians have at their disposal that can 
simultaneously affect the success of MFIs. These include interest rate regulations, regulations 
for mobilizing savings, regulations for minimal wages, restrictions on imports, monetary 
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 “Utility function” is a convenient representation of an individual’s preferences (for goods and services) that 
permits mathematical analysis. (Dictionary of Social Sciences, 2002) 
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policies influencing exchange rates and inflation and other, varied, measures to pep up 
politicians’ image, like demolition of slums. Such regulations on interest rates and savings 
can thwart competitive market growth of MFIs and make them dependent on public subsidies. 
Regulations on minimum wage and imports, as well as the demolition of slums, where the 
poor live and work, affect MFIs indirectly by increasing the risk of credit defaults or reducing 
income generating possibilities of MFI clients (Ibid.). Banerjee and Duflo in their book Poor 
Economics cite evidence from India where, “….bureaucrats and politicians were keen to 
promote their own brand of microfinance and decided that they needed to get rid of the 
competition” (2011:175). Masterful efforts to accomplish that were combined with bad 
publicity for the MFIs in the districts to totally undermine the organizations by the 
government (Ibid). The next section comprises a sub-section which will elaborate on such 
interventions from local politicians and figures of authority within the districts and 
communities. 
1.3.5 Microfinance uptake and hindrances in local communities 
 
Recent literature has focussed on hindrances to microfinance services or its growth in 
developing and developed countries from various aspects. A number of recent studies show 
that favourable macroeconomic conditions like an established domestic financial systems,13 
stable institutional and political conditions14 and suitable legal and regulatory infrastructure15 
can help to enable efficient provision of MFI services; moreover, the absence of the same can 
seriously hamper the provision of MFI services (See Ahlin et al. 2011, Zhang et al. 2010 and 
Ahlin and Lin 2006).  
Concomitantly, there is growing recognition that demand for microfinance and the 
sector’s success is not shaped only by macroeconomic conditions and institutional 
configurations, but ever increasingly on partially interrelated factors like social institutions, 
cultures, norms and the social life of microcredit (Morvant-Roux et al. 2013; see also 
Fernando 2006). The term “social life of microcredit” refers to how various social actors 
within the MFIs’ milieus engage with microcredit as an entity that becomes part of the 
community and lives and breathes among them and also intervenes in the natural flow of 
community life (Ibid: 302). Based on cultural background in a particular setting, economics 
and finance can carry totally different meanings and formulations instead of a universal 
meaning (Hann and Hart 2011, see also Shipton 2007). Yet the literature examining how 
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 (Cull, Kunt and Morduch 2014) 
14
 (Muller and Uhde 2013 and Hermes and Meesters 2011) 
15
 (Cull et al. 2014, Saeed 2014 and Arun and Murinde 2010) 
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norms, institutions and ideological values can influence the demand for and the use of 
microcredit is scant (Morvant-Roux et al. 2013: 303). The following section will provide an 
overview of recent literature on the influence of norms, social institutions and cultural and 
ideological values on microfinance service provision and MFIs 
1.3.5.1 Microfinance, social institutions, norms and ideological perceptions 
 
Guerin, Morvant-Roux and Servet postulate that as an economic object, the role of 
money would be to create contractual relationships between equals (2011: 102). Yet 
historical, sociological, anthropological and even political analysis of monetary practices 
would reveal this impersonal and anonymous role as illusory (Ibid; see also Zelizer 1994, 
2005 and Villarreal 2004). Access to, and use of, money and finance is subject to norms, 
conventions and formal rules. Hence, money and finance can be seen as social institutions, 
which engender a constant stress or tension between the individual and the group, between 
personal aspirations and collective responsibilities (Guerin et al. 2011: 102, see also Guerin 
2006). This ongoing tension takes several forms as a means of relating to the group or 
creating interpersonal bonds of dependence and domination. Financial transactions of debt 
and lending are therefore regarded as a sign of being accepted in one or more social groups 
(Ibid: 102-103). Acceptance and membership into different social groups that range from 
traditionally based (family, ethnicity, caste, gender, religion) to more constructed 
(professional, neighbourhood and associative groupings) is constantly evolving (Ibid: 103). It 
therefore becomes indispensible to understand and adapt with these social settings, if MFIs 
are to accomplish their goals, including the monetarisation of these contemporary societies.  
Given this background, it is also important to point out that the very lending 
mechanisms that most MFIs employ such as group lending, expect the borrowers to know one 
another and help a group member facing a temporary difficulty in payment. This mechanism 
works because the social networks of clients have an effective way of reinforcing payments 
through peer pressure. Fear of ostracism and loss of face within the community provides 
strong leverage in enforcing instalment payments for the loans (Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 
167; Karim 2011: xviii; see also Ashraf 2014). As community members abide by certain 
norms and codes of conduct, and avoiding others that can bring shame or ostracism, they 
sustain social institutions and guarantee the conservation of social conventions (see Schweizer 
1996).  
Communities all over the world have distinctive norms and practices that serve vital 
functions for their members. How these communities experience and perceive microfinance 
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varies widely. It is crucial therefore to take into consideration the local and regional contexts 
with their specific norms and practices when designing microfinance programmes. 
Microfinance can have multiple meanings for people, which in turn determine whether they 
want to use microfinance and how they may use (or misuse) it (Morvant-Roux et al. 2013: 
303). In Morocco, for example local perceptions deeply ingrained in historical, political and 
social constructs of the microcredit markets were far more important than the forces of market 
supply and demand to shape the sectors’ market (Ibid: 310). Religious norms and cultural 
practices in Moroccan society is a major hindrance to borrowing (Ibid: 306). Local 
perceptions of being in debt equate this situation to lacking all control of your life and, as 
head of a household, having failed to cater to the family’s material needs (Ibid: 306).16 Many 
religious injunctions restrain Moroccans from borrowing; for example Muslims cannot go to 
perform the Hajj (the holy Pilgrimage to Mecca), when in debt (Ibid). 
Likewise, cultures that discourage conventional interest on loans, and systems and 
regimes that forbid or promote certain market forms, are generally not microfinance friendly 
(see Hes and Polednakova 2013 and Karim 2011; see also Iqbal and Mirakhor 2013). 
Microfinance thus has a very real chance of being resisted by, for example, many Muslim 
communities and societies where religious ideologies come into friction with MFI lending 
practices due to prohibitions on interest-based loans (Hassan et al. 2013).  A survey by CGAP 
in 2007 on Islamic microfinance for example disclosed that almost three quarters of the 
population in Muslim countries cited religious admonitions on interest based loans as a reason 
for abstaining from microfinance services (Karim et al. 2008).17 Statistics compiled by 
another study show that around 155.5 million adults are not integrated into the microfinance 
market simply due to the fact that they live under Islamic (Sharia) Law,18 which bans 
conventional microfinance due to the practice of charging interest (Hes and Polednakova 
2013: 26).  
Within this realm of cultural practices, social conventions and ideology lies another 
interrelated factor of a more historical nature. Often a lack of a certain “culture” (for the direct 
and indirect services that the MFIs have to offer) can itself be an impediment to the sector’s 
outreach and has to be addressed through vigorous advocacy programmes by the microfinance 
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 Ashraf 2014 presents similar evidence for a study in Bangladesh where subjective norms and beliefs have a 
significant negative influence towards intention to participate in MFIs. 
17
 The survey comprised of information on and from over 125 institutions and interviews from experts in 19 
Muslim countries (Karim et al. 2008:1) 
18
 Countries include Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen. 
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providers (see Giesbert 2013: 4, Churchill and Matul 2012: 18 and Kalra 2010: 7-8).19 The 
issue at hand is that if the services that are offered by MFIs were historically not common or 
widely accepted within the target populations, then it will take time and investment of 
resources to establish a culture (of acceptance) of microfinance in the first place. It will take 
time to change the perception of a diverse range of new organisations offering services that 
either are assumed to be the responsibility of the extended family or clan, or that were totally 
absent and unknown before.  
1.3.5.2 The social life of microfinance 
 
MFIs targeting communities with different developmental agendas can be a “site of 
struggle, of competing interests, conflicting agendas and a divergent conception of the very 
agenda of participation: an arena in which people with different responsibilities, tasks and 
different constructions of reality compete for power” (see Mosse 2005: 103). The coherence 
and stability of microfinance service provision, like most development practice, is achieved 
not by management through policy, but through the creation of effective social relationships 
and alliances (see Ibid: 130). 
The clients of MFIs may be the official target population that they concentrate on but 
are by far not the only ones that MFIs and their staff have to engage with on a day to day 
basis. MFIs have a local reputation to build or preserve, and are embedded in a range of 
relationships within the communities they serve, having partners, formal or informal, 
competitors, followers, friends but also opponents and enemies (Guerin and Kumar 2008: 33). 
Along with social norms and institutions, the interpersonal relationships between the MFIs 
and local actors, both clients and non-clients, significantly facilitate or slow down MFI 
operations. With each interaction the institutional environment is actualised, collaborations 
are reinforced and both personal and interpersonal tensions are aroused (Guerin and Kumar 
2008: 33).  
Recent evidence has shed light on the importance and complexity of the relationships 
between MFI employees and clients, and the key role that these relationships play in building 
trust with their clients (see Morvant-Roux et al. 2013, Guerin and Kumar 2008 and Mosse 
2005). Morvant-Roux et al. (2013) observe how individual credit officers, as well as local 
leaders and authority figures, can significantly influence how micro-credit is represented, 
envisioned and understood in local Moroccan communities (Morvant-Roux et al. 2013: 303). 
                                                          
19
 Services can range from financial services like debt, insurance, savings, remittances, financial literacy and 
asset investment to non-financial services like vocational services, sanitation and hygiene, clean drinking water, 
contraception, etc.  
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According to them the social integration of credit officers (i.e., whether officers originate 
from the area and their local knowledge) and their ability to build close social relationships 
with clients is the key to trustworthy lending relationships (Ibid). Such relationships instil and 
perpetuate a healthy reputation of the MFIs within communities, which is of utmost 
importance to MFIs outreach and sustainability.  
MFI employees are seen to represent their organisations where relations are “…far 
from being a market relation, reduced to financial transactions and isolated from personal 
issues (…) relations between borrowers and microfinance NGOs are….dynamic, meaningful, 
incessantly negotiated interactions which are fully embedded into personal relations and 
sentiments”. (Guerin and Kumar 2008: 33). The empirical study depicts in detail how the 
positioning of MFIs in South India is a continuous struggle for control of territory and 
population in a viciously competitive environment. The authors argue insightfully that control 
is a mutual construction, where loan officers and group leaders build patron-client 
relationships to gain client loyalty. Support, protection and gratitude lie at the heart of these 
relationships (ibid: 6-7). In other contexts, however, relationships can also be hostile or 
indifferent. Fernando (2006) found that field officers lacked incentives to take measures 
against, or even to communicate in their reports, the misery and exploitation of their clients in 
Bangladesh, who would deposit their entire loans with local moneylenders or traders in 
exchange for a supply of daily rations (2006: 223). He argues that the preferences of the field 
officers were to maintain a high recovery rate, a mandate directed to them from the head 
office (Ibid). 
MFI interactions constitute more than just the provision of credit to a targeted 
disenfranchised section of the population and tends to disturb existing social relationships that 
are integral to the hierarchical structured constellations of class, caste and gender relations 
(Taylor 2011: 485; see also Mosse 2005 and Guerin 2006). One study on an agrarian rural 
community in India shows how microfinance operations are vexed by credit and labour 
relations between MFI clients and rich landlords, merchants and moneylenders (Taylor 2011). 
Analyzing microfinance crisis areas in India, Taylor finds that relationships of power between 
different social classes, castes and gender hierarchies resulted in the proliferation of debt traps 
that immensely hampered MFI operations (Ibid: 501).  
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, harmful competition on the one side, and 
the oppositional stance of local politicians and public or religious authorities on the other, 
have been documented to cause immense harm to MFIs in many regions (Yerramilli 2013, 
Banerjee and Duflo 2011, Bajaj 2011, Gonzalez 2011 and Burki 2009). Media and press 
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coverage of several microfinance crisis countries found extreme pressure on MFI clients to 
repay loans, and that this led to suicides, to disability after suicide attempts, and other 
negative consequences. This has not only led to government interventions, paralyzing MFI 
operations, but also resulted in considerable skepticism and hostility toward the entire sector 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 176, Kumar 2012, see also Taylor 2011, Biswas 2010 and Burki 
2009). Independently of the accuracy of media reports, this tarnished image of the sector, 
together with interventions by various actors, resulted in MFIs’ work being undermined, to 
the extent that several countries have seen a delinquency crisis of the whole sector (see Burki 
2009, Reille 2009, CGAP 2010, ACCION 2009 and Krishnaswami and Ponce 2010).  
1.3.5.3 Microfinance, gender and power constellations 
 
Microfinance is popularly hailed as a tool to empower women, help them break the 
chains of financial dependence and enhance their status in household decision making. Ample 
evidence backs the social and economic uplift of women in developing countries, even in 
regions with patriarchal societal structure that harbour gender-biased traditions that oppress 
women in their communities and homes (Devi 2014, Khan and Noreen 2012, Kristof and 
WuDunn 2009, Swain and Wallentin 2009 and Cheston and Kuhn 2002). It would be difficult 
to imagine that instruments and ideas that are believed to upend these well-established 
structures would face no opposition from the affected communities in general and the families 
of women clients in particular (see Mahoney 2014).  
    Cultural perceptions of women as weak and subordinate to men, and that groom 
women not to challenge authority, can themselves be an obstacle that needs to be overcome 
by potential target clients (Mahoney 2014: 41). Kristof and WuDunn (2009) present cases in 
South Asia where MFIs have faced a difficult time simply getting women to accept credit for 
economic activities, even when they are in dire need and have skills that could be leveraged, 
because these women were brought up believing that they have absolutely no right to make 
decisions in familial financial matters. The authors refer to the case of the CEO of Kashf, one 
of the largest MFIs in Pakistan, who acknowledged a very arduous start more than a decade 
ago due to hindrances rooted in patriarchal social institutions. No one wanted to rent offices in 
targeted villages and there was substantial bureaucratic red tape in transferring of property 
titles to women for loans, mainly due to restrictive gender roles within the society (Ibid). The 
study also identifies another very relevant obstacle to women’s use of microfinance, namely 
the expected performance of “wifely duties” in addition to their income generating jobs (Ibid: 
191). Women are expected to keep the household running in cleaning, cooking, taking care of 
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the children, old and the sick and seeing to all household affairs in addition to any work 
outside the family dwelling. This “second shift” is pervasive across cultures in developing and 
developed countries (Mahoney 2014:44-45). Consequently, if they fail to fulfil all the 
demands and expectations of their “wifely duties” in addition to their economic ones, women 
often face recrimination for neglecting their first and foremost priority, wasting their time in 
useless group meetings and hindered in opting for MFI loans (see Ginè et al. 2013) 
Women who start their own micro income generating projects with microloans are 
challenging cultural norms of male authority in all cultures that support such norms. 
However, the “loans to women only” policy espoused by many MFIs is more than just a 
means of empowering women. There are also strategic reasons for the targeting of women 
(Rahmen 1999: 69). Women are seen as easier to work with due to their supposedly more 
submissive nature, and are considered “better credit risks” because they are “less arrogant” 
and “more receptable [sic]” to be cajoled into the rigid regular repayment schedules, weekly 
group meetings and the maintenance of group solidarity (see Rahman 1999; Isserles 2003 and 
Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996).20 This strategic targeting of women implies that MFIs are as 
susceptible to patriarchal attitudes as the rest of the society, and one can question whether 
these actually aim to empower women. Nonetheless, this strategic targeting of women is 
obviously perceived by many in society as a challenge to existing norms and has often 
escalated into violence towards women with direct negative repercussions to MFI outreach. 
Rehman’s (1998, 1999) findings of an increase in domestic violence (both verbal aggression 
and physical assault) for more than half of the women borrowers because of their involvement 
with MFIs in rural Bangladesh is proof of such attitude. Rehman elaborates on how these 
instances of domestic violence resulted when women challenged positions of power and 
authority within the household by refusing to hand over their loans to male family members, 
or rejected male family members’ proposals for using the loans (1998, 1999; see also 
Hashemi et al. 1996). One can therefore expect opposition and unpleasant repercussions for 
women clients of MFIs from their immediate and extended families when power 
constellations are challenged or women resist dominance over the use of loan and or decisions 
resulting from the change in their income status. This opposition and intimidation has 
immense negative consequences for the women themselves, but also for MFIs’ outreach.  
There is a great diversity in how women actually access microfinance services. In 
addition to personal profiles, other factors like class, caste, localisation, religion, gender, 
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 Isserles writes that “...in many places where microcredit programs have been implemented, the gendered 
environment is such that women are more easily coerced and pressured by loan officers …that eventually result 
in higher repayments” (2003:49). 
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norms, social networks and cooperation from husbands and support from family and kinship 
are very important in appropriating a microfinance loan (Guerin et al. 2010: 3; see also Karim 
2011, Kabeer 2001; Mayoux 2001 and Johnson 2005). Guerin et al. (2010) provide a rich 
analysis of the various patterns of women’s credit appropriation in South India.  
The study sheds light on the complexity and the diversity of female relationships 
within the communities and how this affects their “empowerment” and “power” within the 
social institutions and credit appropriation (2010:11). In societies where it is common for 
multiple generations to share the same household, women have to dwell with husbands kin 
within the same premises. With household spaces primarily seen as female spaces, Guerin et 
al. found everyday conflicts, rivalries and power struggles commonplace. Tensions arising 
around family duties, women’s mobility, children and other important household decisions 
like resource allocation and management, inheritance and property distribution. (2010: 6). 
Hierarchies are rarely fixed, and are constantly negotiated along various lines such as age, 
kinship ties (blood versus marriage ties), the husband’s position within the household and 
women’s contribution to the household budget (Ibid: 7). The study elaborates how women’s 
contributions to household expenses in turn depend upon the support they receive from their 
own kin, and the relative importance of this support compared to the husband’s kin (Ibid). 
Likewise within the neighbourhood context, relationships were observed to evolve and 
persist, ripe with a whole mix of solidarity, mutual help and support on the one hand and 
hierarchy concerns, jealousies, conflicts, denunciation, threats, blackmail and connivance on 
the other hand (Ibid, see also Maclean 2010). Thus for the women in these communities, and 
for many other communities, solidarity and cooperation within these social networks are 
instrumental in helping women to manage their household finances.21 One important 
conclusion of the study is that microfinance may actually worsen and deepen the divisions in 
pre-existing gender hierarchies, and also generate new inequalities between women (Ibid: 15). 
In sum, many empirical studies have already highlighted the impact and effect on 
MFIs of stakeholders within their operational spheres. However, most are anecdotal, and each 
covers only a certain component or a particular aspect of these complex environments. In 
contrast, this thesis attempts to bring together the various aspects of social, cultural and 
economic interactions relevant to the impact and effectiveness of microfinance.  
Figure 1 presents an illustration of the operational spheres of MFIs, representing 
various interest groups, their general preferences and their influence on the MFIs’ success. 
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 The authors also include microfinance appropriation within their conception of household finance 
management. 
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Though by no means complete, the illustration aims to draw out the most important actors and 
stakeholders in the socio-economic and political spheres of MFIs, with reference to the 
literature discussed in this chapter. As mentioned, the analysis aims to focus on stakeholders 
at the local level, which predominantly rests on the right hand side of the illustration, (i.e., 
stakeholders from the category “society”), but will also comprise stakeholders from other 
categories where they are part of the communal life in the operational spheres. The illustration 
will be further elaborated with specific details of the actors on the local level and their 
respective preferences in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 1 – The Political and Socio-economic Environment of MFIs 22 
 
1.4 Research questions and how they are addressed 
In sum, there is little comprehensive analysis of whether, to what extent, and under 
which conditions the social life of MFI clients has an effect on MFI outreach and 
sustainability. The introduction already outlined the main research questions. Having now 
reviewed the literature regarding these questions I now restate them here with more detail and 
elaborate how they are addressed. The first three questions that this thesis addresses are: 
1. Is the fear of persecution/ stigma or sanctions from the communal actors/groups or 
individuals keeping potential MFI clients at bay from MFI membership? 
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2. Do interventions from various local actors within the working areas of MFI affect 
the MFIs’ operations?  
3. Is the opposition to MFIs at domestic level from male guardian and family, a 
deterrent for women who want to opt for MFI membership? 
This thesis answers these questions with reference to the preferences behind such 
interventions/ persecution or sanctions of the intervening party. The identification of the 
interveners or actors within the operational spheres of MFIs will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 2, which presents the theoretical framework. For the theoretical framework I will 
draw from the literature on the political economy of social institutions and rational choice 
approaches. I mostly rely on the bargaining framework presented by Knight and Ensminger 
(1998) to explain the emergence and change of social norms norms that have distributional 
consequences for the actors involved.  
 Questions 1-3 addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. Using household survey data and 
interviews with MFI staff and moneylenders in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in the 
north of India and from four different districts of the north eastern Province of Punjab in 
Pakistan respectively, a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods are applied to investigate 
the households’ decisions for the uptake of an MFI loan. For the survey, 55 households in 
each of the two countries were selected and interviews with the help of detailed semi-
structured questionnaires were conducted. For the data generation, there were several sources 
of informants as interviewees. The first two sets of interviews were conducted with women 
participants from among the clients of MFIs and also non-borrower households from the same 
neighbourhoods. In addition to each woman (client and non-client) who was interviewed, 
their male household guardian or head of household was also interviewed, making up for the 
third and fourth set of interviews. Furthermore, MFI staff and senior executive members of 
the MFIs were also interviewed, making up the fifth and sixth set of interviews. Lastly, local 
moneylenders made up the seventh and last set of interviewees for the survey. Chapter 3 on 
the methodological framework will deal with all issues of sampling, country selection, MFI 
partners within the countries and a detail of all questionnaires. 
The analysis takes a more descriptive approach by taking into account factors such as 
the social affiliations, networks and perceptions of class, caste and gender relations and how 
important these are in the lives of the participants of the survey. Apart from adding 
knowledge on how social spheres affect MFI operations, the thesis also interrogates how 
decisions relate back to intra-household dynamics. The analysis takes into account the 
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familial support and the cooperation of the male head of the household for a membership with 
a MFI.  
In chapter 6, I compare the findings from both countries and analyse the following 
three questions: 
4. How do women clients of the MFI in India differ from the women clients of the MFI 
in Pakistan? 
5. Do MFI institutions and their clients face the same set of problems or difficulties 
from within the social and communal milieus in different set ups or countries?  
6. Do MFI clients communal, social and domestic circles have the same (or different) 
effect on their decision making process of opting for a microfinance loan or not? 
 The chapter will review the results of the surveys in both countries, with a focus on 
the similarities and differences of the social life of MFIs and the communities. 
Chapter 7 will provide a summary and the most important conclusions for the 
dissertation. 
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MFIs do not operate in isolation. With microfinance’s evolution from the informal sector 
into a more mainstream financial services sector, the wider operational environment of MFIs 
has become more important. MFIs move and operate within a socio-economic and political 
system, with various tiers and levels of collaborators and networks. Within this socio-
economic and political framework of microfinance, a variety of actors at the international, 
national and local level of governing bodies and agents represent various interest groups. 
These (groups of) actors have a kaleidoscope of preferences that they pursue in their dealings 
and interactions with the MFIs. For my analysis, I will focus on the interactions of MFIs with 
actors within their local milieus. The analysis of the preferences and incentives of the actors 
therefore are on a micro level, and this analysis does not account for a macro level study of 
state or multilateral organisations and their representatives here.  
In this chapter, I will provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the incentives or 
preferences of the key stakeholder groups and actors that have an impact on the operations of 
MFIs within their political and socio-economic environments. The aim is to explore the 
determinants of success of MFIs in terms of outreach based on the external societal and 
political economic framework. No single unified body of thought or theoretical approach can 
encompass all the incentives or preferences of all the actors and groups that could possibly be 
in conflict with or affect the operations of MFIs. Rather, I draw on a number of theoretical 
strands, mainly from the institutional and rational choice literature, to inform my analysis of 
actors’ behaviour within the socio-economic and political frameworks of MFIs. The most 
important work that I draw on for inspiration, especially in section 2.2, is that of Knight and 
Ensminger (1998). Their paper on the bargaining framework for the emergence and change of 
social norms that have distributional consequences for the actors involved fits the line of 
argumentation and theoretical expectations for my work quite well. 
Below, I categorise the individual actors and groups within communities, and discuss 
how their incentives and preferences can lead to them helping or hindering the operations of 
MFIs. First, however, I elaborate on some central theoretical concepts. I will construct a 
framework to help understand actors’ incentive structures and the patterns of interactions that 
can affect MFI outreach and sustainability. 
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2.1 The new institutionalism and rational choice 
 
The new institutionalism incorporates a number of theoretical approaches that deal 
with the analysis of the relationship between individual action and institutional frameworks 
(Finke 2004: 3).1 Although the roots of new institutionalism lie in economics, advances in 
interdisciplinary research directed at understanding and explaining institutions and human 
interaction has seen its application in political science, anthropology and sociology (Finke 
2004 and Nee 1998).2 The new institutionalism in political science has stressed formal norms 
and their monitoring by third-party enforcers and the state (Nee 1998: 2). Before discussing 
these deeply contextual norms and the role of these third-party enforcers, I define and clarify 
some of the basic concepts that I will use throughout this work. 
2.1.1 Institutions and Organisations 
 
 At the core of new institutionalism is the study of institutions, defined as “... the rules 
of the game in a society ... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.... 
they structure incentives in human exchanges, whether political, social or economic” (North 
1990: 3). Institutions reduce human uncertainty in human relations and specify limits of 
acceptable action, in the way that the rules of a game specify the structure within which the 
players are free to pursue their strategic moves using pieces that have specific roles and status 
positions (Nee 1998: 8). Institutions comprise everyday norms of expected behaviour 
embodying the interests and preferences of a group or a community, family and kin; they also 
encompass complex economic, social and political institutions like markets, authorities and 
legal systems. (Finke 2004: 4; and Nee 1998: 8). Institutions thus incorporate not only sets of 
regulations and norms, but also their enforcement and sanctioning of the individual actors in 
case of breech or violation of these (Finke 2004: 4). Institutions can be both formal and 
informal, with the latter understood as non-codified institutions that are nevertheless 
acknowledged as binding, with a set of non-codified sanctions in case of breech or violation 
(Finke 2004: 4). Family members, relatives, friends and acquaintances monitor informal 
norms, while the state formally monitors the legal rules (Nee 1998: 8, see also Knight 1992: 
171). It is important to note here that for the analyses to follow social groups will be regarded 
as institutional frameworks because, apart from being groups of individuals, they also 
                                                          
1
 For the theoretical section, I will mainly adopt the structure and order of concepts applied by Finke (2004) in 
his first chapter on theory. I will adapt and incorporate relevant concepts from other sources when necessary. 
2
 For a detailed overview of works on new institutionalism see March and Olsen (1983), Hechter et. al. (1990) 
and Powell and Dimaggio (2012); for the sources of new institutionalism Nee (1998); and for institutional theory 
in political science Knight (1992) and Peter (2011). 
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constitute a set of guidelines for proper behaviour both within and outside their boundaries 
(cf. Finke 2014). 
 A second central concept in the new institutionalism is that of organisation (Finke 
2004: 4). In his book Institutions and social conflict, Knight (1992) defines organisations as 
collective actors subject to institutional constraints, with an internal structure and an 
institutional framework governing the interactions of those persons who constitute the 
organisation (1992: 3). Various entities, such as a university, a church, a trade union or a firm, 
can be conceptualised as both institutions and organisations (Ibid; see also Finke 2004: 4). 
These organisations act collectively for furthering the common interests of their members and 
the members are motivated not only by economic incentives, but also by social incentives, 
like a desire to win prestige or respect and to contribute to the advancement of the groups’ 
interests (see Olson 1965:  60). 
2.1.2 Social norms, preferences and conflict 
 
 From a behavioural point of view, social institutions are arenas where expectations 
regarding human interactions are established and social relations are maintained. Since social 
norms are the foundation of social life, they govern the expectations and relationships that lay 
the basis of how individuals act in their everyday lives (Knight and Ensminger1998: 105). 
Norms are implicit or explicit rules of expected behaviour that embody the interests and 
preferences of members of a close-knit group or a community (Nee 1998:  8). Norms establish 
the structures for social interactions, allowing the participants of social institutions to gain the 
benefit of joint activity by determining ways for the distribution of the benefits of social life 
(Knight and Ensminger 1998: 105 and Knight 1992: 22). Norms are the property of a social 
system, are collectively maintained and members of the group share the benefits gained by 
conforming. From this perspective, norms can be understood as a form of social capital or a 
collective good (Nee 1998:  8, Coleman 1990:  310).3  
Norms affect social behaviour and social institutions affect the distribution of benefits 
from the numerous interactions that constitute social life. Although there is considerable 
variation across societies and communities at one particular time regarding the gains from 
these institutions, the distributional consequences for all the actors involved are very 
                                                          
3
 The essence of social capital in this context can best be captured by Ostrom who defines it as “... shared 
knowledge, understandings, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of 
individuals bring to a recurrent activity” (2001: 176). The individuals who are part of this network would then 
derive benefits from these norms (Nee 1998: 9). 
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important (Knight 1992: 40).4 This implies that the institutions are a by-product of substantive 
conflicts over the distributions inherent in social outcomes. In simple words, the main goal of 
those who develop the institutional rules is to gain strategic advantage over other actors, and 
the essential content of those rules generally reflects distributional concerns (Ibid.). The 
rational choice theorists have produced a number of accounts of the evolution of social norms 
(Knight and Ensimger 1998: 105). Now each starts from the premise that social actors pursue 
some set of preferences in a rational way – seeking to achieve their most preferred outcome 
under certain constraints (Ibid: 106, see also Finke 2000: 5-8).5  
The challenge arises when one directs attention to the factors that influence the 
capacities of the actors (to determine the substantive content of institutional rules, introducing 
the asymmetries of power in the community (Knight 1992: 41). There are rarely ever 
institutions, formal or informal, where all participants are on an equal footing, and therefore 
power positions matter. Knight suggests the following working definition of power: “To 
exercise power over someone or some group is to affect by some means the alternatives 
available to that person or group” (Ibid.). Possession of influence and power in institutions is 
often a strong incentive for groups and for individual actors, as it is power that decides the 
benefits or advantages that they might gain in various forms – the distributional consequences 
for the other actors involved. Knight and Ensminger (1998) provide explanations of human 
behaviour grounded in rational decision-making that go beyond a narrow focus on economic 
interests, incorporating power asymmetries, distributional consequences and ideological 
motivations. They present a bargaining framework to analyse social conflict of preferences, 
which I will discuss in detail in Section 2.2. For my analysis, I rely primarily on their 
theoretical assumptions in explaining the incentives behind the behaviour of social actors 
within the operational spheres of MFIs. 
2.1.3 Norm Compliance 
One view of why individuals adhere to norms is that norms are rules that structure 
strategic behaviour. Individuals comply because it is in their self-interest to do so (Coleman 
1990). From a different perspective, Bourdieu (1977) explains norm compliance as the 
appropriate form of behaviour in a specific context even when it is not in the narrow self-
interest of the individual to do so. The two views can be reconciled if acting according to the 
                                                          
4
 Distributional consequences here are not to be understood in economic terms only; they also encompass other 
collective benefits/ elements that the institutions might have to offer. 
5
 This rests on the principle of action that defines rationality as “maximisation of utility”, that is, that the agent 
who carries out an action seeks to realise maximum value possible with the least cost or effort (see Coleman 
1990: 510). 
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dictates of a rule is a means of simplifying decision making or a way to give in to social 
pressure that may be indirectly beneficial for the individual (Knight 1992: 15 and Knight and 
Ensminger1998: 105). I share with both perspectives the basic view that norms structure 
social interactions that promote the benefits of cooperative behaviour. The idea of rationality 
for complying with norms here assumes a “thick” rather than a “thin” view of rationality 
(compare Coleman 1990: 511 and Simon 1957: xxiv). According to this perception of 
rationality,  
 
“...actors are seen to meliorise rather than maximise, the action of individuals is 
assumed to be purposive in the sense that self-interest and incentives matter. In 
thick accounts of rationality, understanding purposive action necessitates 
interpreting the choices made by actors according to benefits and costs embedded 
in the institutional environment. The cultural heritage of a society is also important 
because customs, myths, and ideology matter in understanding the mental models 
of actors” (Nee 1998: 10). 
 
This thick view of rationality explicitly takes into account that individuals do not have 
complete information about what is best for them under all circumstances, and thus depend on 
myths, dogmas, prejudices, ideologies and cultural ideas. Such individuals rely on a variety of 
short cuts to arrive at decisions. Examples abound of cultural beliefs, group identification and 
symbolic expression shaping and incentivising certain acts of individuals or groups, even 
when these are not necessarily the most preferred outcome for an optimum cost. From female 
genital mutilation in many countries like Somalia or Egypt or ethnic conflict in Jerusalem, 
they can only be understood by examining the dogmas, cultural beliefs or collective identities 
of the participants involved (see Nee 1998). For this analysis, I employ rational choice theory 
in the broadest possible sense, “thick” as opposed to “thin” rationality. 
2.2 Interactions as bargaining problem 
 
Knight and Ensminger present a bargaining framework of social conflict where all 
actors have differing conceptions of social norms, and consequently negotiate on the form that 
these should take (1998: 105). Within this framework, each actor will prefer that this norm 
favour his/her preferences, and will bargain to try to achieve this. Knight and Ensminger 
distinguish between norms governing economic and non-economic behaviour: while 
bargaining over norms governing economic behaviour is a conflict of actors’ material 
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interests, bargaining over norms that govern non-economic behaviour is driven by non-
material or ideological preferences, and any benefits gained are non-material in nature. 
Nonetheless conflicts of interest are just as likely to occur over ideologically motivated norm 
changes as over materially motivated ones. They argue that ideology is compatible with a 
bargaining approach and that bargaining power has an important role to play in instances of 
ideologically motivated change (Ibid: 106).  
Knight and Ensminger define bargaining power as superiority in resource endowments 
(Ibid)6. According to their interpretation, actors with greater bargaining power will be most 
likely to have the norms established that would also manifest their interests. Several factors 
result in power asymmetries among actors that allow some actors or groups to enforce their 
preferred norms at the expense of others’ preferences. Such factors include, for example, the 
initial endowment in terms of status, or access to methods of enforcement to deploy against 
actors who breach or do not conform to the dominant actors’ norms.  In social institutions, 
where enforcement power does not lie with a central formal authority like the state, rewards 
and sanctions may be enforced through clans or kinship networks (Ibid.). 
Primarily, the bargaining approach sees the establishment of norms as an on-going 
negotiation process among actors embedded in social institutions, who compete over 
distributional advantage in accessing essential benefits.7 Actors always seek strategic 
advantage over the outcome of bargaining processes and norm change, and norm 
establishment is just a means to achieve this strategic advantage (Ibid: 107). Under the 
bargaining approach, social norms are a by-product of the process of competition for essential 
benefits. It is through this bargaining process that certain factors like initial resource 
ownership or status eventually influence the choice of social norms. Unequal resource 
ownership influences the willingness of rational self-interested actors to accept the bargaining 
demands of other actors. In other words, actors who own or possess substantial resources have 
more to say, and an upper hand in bargaining with those who do not. The establishment of 
social norms therefore, strongly depends on ex-ante resource asymmetries.  
According to Knight and Ensminger, “... norms structure social situations that are 
characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria; that is, there is more than one way of 
coordinating our behaviour in a particular setting, but we need to establish shared 
expectations as to which of these ways we will actually choose” (Ibid). Actors can therefore 
                                                          
6
 Asymmetries in resource ownership serve as a proxy for bargaining power (Ensminger and Knight 1997: 6 and 
Knight and Ensminger 1998:  106). 
7
 The process of norm generation is relevant in the bargaining approach as it shows the ability of those who seek 
to change norms to enforce compliance with the new norm. Hence the focus is as much on norm change as it is 
on compliance, especially when existing norms are challenged (cf. Knight and Ensminger 1997 and 1998) 
  
52 
 
differ in their preferences of the course of action that they adopt in social situations, and 
whether these preferences will be taken up in the establishment or changing of norms depends 
upon their negotiating and bargaining power. During the bargaining process, it is very 
important to assess the credibility of claims made by actors about their commitments to 
various forms of behaviour (Ibid.). Of much relevance is the fact that the bargaining model 
encompasses a wide range of interactions, from formal negotiations of the whole community 
to implicit strategic behaviour that converges over time to form a behavioural norm. Common 
to all of these social interactions are features of multiple equilibria, conflict in preferences 
over the range of possible norms of behaviour and asymmetries in the possession of relevant 
resources (Ibid:  108). 
Negotiating over social norms would be simple if every actor in a social institution had 
perfect knowledge of how other actors would assess the costs and benefits of commitment to 
a certain course of behaviour among many alternatives. What everyone can do with relative 
ease is assess to what extent their own preferred behaviour is shared by others in the 
community. This allows them to calculate the relative benefits of sticking to their own 
approach versus adopting an alternative way of behaviour. The establishment of a norm then 
takes place as members making this assessment adjust their own actions to the form of 
behaviour upon which most of the community converged (Ibid.). Certain features of social 
life complicate this bargaining process and deserve particular attention.  
One such feature is ideology and cultural identity. Ideological and cultural beliefs 
affect not only how people assess the merits of various forms of behaviour, but also how 
people position themselves in their social world in relation to others (cf. Finke 2014). These 
ideological and cultural beliefs influence people’s assessments of an action’s optimal 
consequences for themselves and their communities. This complicates the bargaining process 
of norm establishment and norm change, as it involves the willingness of the powerful and the 
powerless to both maintain existing commitments and accept proposals for change (Knight 
and Ensminger 1998: 108).  
The second factor, according to Knight and Ensminger is the complexity and diversity 
of enforcement mechanisms, which affect the cost of maintaining commitments to various 
forms of behaviour. Social sanctions are one very effective mechanism for enforcing 
conformity of behaviour and commitment to social norms. When confronted with the choice 
of different forms of behaviour, people must take into account the (financial and social) cost 
of a particular course of action and the cost of alternative ways of behaviour. The task of 
assessing this cost is especially crucial when individuals must choose a path of norm 
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compliance versus norm change. There are certain enforcement costs involved for 
“reformers” of social norms who share an interest in changing established patterns of 
behaviour and expectations. In addition to the costs created by the guardians or enforcers of 
norm compliance, there are also other enforcement costs imposed from cooperating reformers. 
Reformers who seek to change social norms have common interests and cooperate to bring 
about change. In so doing, they establish their own sanctioning mechanisms to ensure that 
group members abide by their commitments to new norms and forms of behaviour. The 
success of reform efforts depends mainly on reformers’ ability to establish and maintain 
alternative enforcement mechanisms (Ibid).   
A third factor lies in the problem of collective action, which can complicate the 
bargaining process. In situations where everyone would benefit from achieving a particular 
goal through joint activity, the temptation is high to let the others do the work (Finke 2014: 
14). When goals have the character of public goods, it is difficult to exclude “free riders”, 
who have not participated in its supply, from the resulting benefits (Ibid). Quite often, it can 
result in the breakdown or failure of collective action and the public good it was supposed to 
create (Ibid).  
A fourth and closely related factor is opportunistic behaviour by individuals, which 
can trust and reliance issues among group members. Those seeking to reform or change 
existing norms may be plagued by the opportunistic behaviour of their affiliates. Thus, 
loyalties can switch in a given situation when the affiliate finds it more advantageous not to 
adhere to new norms. Effective enforcement strategies would have to account for such risks 
linked to trust and reliance issues. 
Having touched on the conflicting interests and the influence of bargaining powers of 
the actors within social institutions, I will now explicitly apply this framework to the actors 
within the socio-economic and political milieus of microfinance providers. This framework 
can allow us to understand the common economic, social or political incentives of the actors 
to intervene in MFI operations in the next section. Before doing so, I set the stage by 
presenting the general milieu in which microfinance programs and their replication programs 
all over the world operate. 
2.3 The socio-political milieus 
 
This section will illustrate the motivation behind the common economic, social or 
political preferences of the actors that form the socio-economic and political peripheries of 
MFIs. MFIs vary in size and operations (see Appendix 1 for more differentiated types of 
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MFIs). Some are large national programs, including government and private-sector 
collaborators, aiming to provide financial services to populations outside the mainstream 
banking system and to support their small businesses and micro-enterprises. Another group of 
MFIs are indigenous local- or state-level institutions, which have the goal of providing better 
access to financial services for the poor. Yet another segment seeks to replicate the programs 
of more established, successful and bigger MFIs like the Grameen of Bangladesh or 
ACCION, which operates in Latin America. All MFIs, regardless of the scale of their 
operations, have to work in close proximity to their local clientele. Due to their lending 
mechanisms and the nature of their work, which requires vigilant screening and monitoring 
activities, local integration and blending within the local communities is a definite must for 
successful operations. Why is this local integration and knowledge of the community 
important? Which actors within these social milieus that can affect MFI operation? How and 
why can these actors have an impact on the operations of MFIs? What are their stakes within 
this whole set up? This section will seek to answer such questions and help shed some light 
on the complex and intricate socio-economic and political environment of MFIs.  
For the MFIs where regular collections and client monitoring is part of their daily 
operations, their presence within the communities and client households is necessary. The 
presence of MFIs and their employees can, however, arouse attention and lead to questions or 
interventions at some point by these actors. These actors have to now be singled out and their 
stakes in the operations of MFIs be analysed. For the sections to follow, it is important to note 
that expectations regarding the individual behaviours of actors are contextual. Most of the 
expectations within the bargaining framework are therefore induced from several theoretical 
sources with a very different context. Formulations for the analysis of the actors’ preferences 
in this chapter in general are presented as expectations when no relevant theoretical source is 
quoted which exactly matches the context. 
2.3.1 External agents and their preferences 
 
Different actors’ incentives to intervene and interact with MFIs vary in nature and 
intensity. I now introduce the various categories of communal groups and actors within the 
operational spheres of MFIs and their clients, which I refer to throughout. These actors can be 
roughly categorised as follows: competitors of MFIs (including moneylenders) and influential 
elites, local politicians and public officials, others socio-economic groups with vested 
interests, religious and communal groups, men or male guardians of women clients (of MFIs), 
immediate and extended families of women clients (of MFIs) and the neighbours and peers 
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within communities. After a brief general discussion of these categories, the remaining 
sections discuss the composition of each category and their respective preferences. 
I posit that most incentives are the skilfully camouflaged preferences of the various 
actors that can affect the MFIs operations. By preferences of the actors, I mean any explicit or 
implicit interests as an individual, a group, an organisation or as an apparatus of the state 
system interacting directly or indirectly with the MFI or its clients. These preferences are 
often less distinct and can be roughly identified as the desire to obtain or consolidate power or 
a favourable position in order to gain bargaining advantage over others. This upper hand 
renders them distributional benefits in various forms. By skilfully camouflaging personal 
preferences, I refer to the tendency of actors to disguise their preferences to increase their 
power and bargaining advantage with appeals to religion, tradition or communal well-being. 
In doing so, these actors draw the communal gaze away from seeing that the actors benefit 
disproportionately from their collective efforts of promoting or shunning particular MFI 
initiatives. The 2008/9 delinquency crisis of the microfinance sector in Pakistan (discussed 
below), saw politicians and their supporters (among others) causing much havoc for MFIs by 
supporting delinquent clients for political advantage. Such manoeuvrings may greatly hamper 
the sustainability of MFI services in communities. Likewise, religious leaders and clerics 
usually amass support for their version of ideology in matters of communal guidance, 
presumably in the name of propagating “the word of God” as provided in the holy religious 
scriptures. Regardless of whether scripture actually supports their interpretation of the issue at 
hand, clerics benefit disproportionately in such exchanges. By staking out positions relative to 
MFIs, religious leaders further their brand of ideological interpretation and may win support 
within communities over personal and ideological rivals. The following sections will help 
throw light on the categories of actors, their preferences and the way that they use specific 
resources at their disposal to exert pressure on other actors and to influence the bargaining 
process.  
2.3.1.1 Competitors of MFIs and influential elites 
 
Amongst the groups that may affect the operations of MFIs in their target markets are 
competitors like other MFIs, some banks with microfinance arms and moneylenders of all 
sorts. Competing MFIs and others on the market like the moneylenders – ranging from formal 
commercial moneylenders to rich landlords who engage in lending on the side – have a stake 
in the success or failure of MFIs.  
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In agrarian societies, rich landlords wield considerable influence, and often have their 
lands tilled and maintained by hired labour. These landlords often lend to local populations in 
times of financial crunch, usually in return for cheap labour on their lands. MFIs offer an 
alternative source of finance to the poor, providing them the opportunity to escape what can in 
extreme cases amount to bonded labour on the fields of feudal lords or other activities 
undertaken in humiliating conditions (cf. Baloch 2013, Hashemi and Schuler 1997: 16). These 
influential landlords may want to protect their preference to wield authority and power over 
local populations, and to continue to benefit from these populations’ vulnerable position. 
Thus, landlords may seek in turn to ensure that the practice of relying on landlords when in 
need is maintained, and may oppose any other sources of lending to MFIs’ target 
communities (cf. Ilyas 2015). They may draw on the resources of social status and family 
standing to influence the local community’s opinions against the MFIs. Hulme and Mosely 
(1996: 163) report antagonism and clashes between MFIs and local elites, landlords and other 
groups in Bangladesh due to such conflicting preferences.  
Commercial moneylenders also serve a clientele who are typically in dire need of credit 
for non-economic activities.8 For moneylenders, lending to the poor can be an extremely risky 
investment as there is no collateral,  no expected regular income in the future on the loan to 
pay back in instalments or payment in the form of labour. They therefore usually charge very 
high interest rates, much higher than the MFIs. In addition, their reputation for 
unconventional means of recovering loans usually makes them unpopular, and they are seen 
as best avoided.9 Nonetheless, these moneylenders have a larger client base when the local 
population lacks access to MFIs, enjoying less competition and the ability to dictate terms to 
borrowers. Although the interest rates on the loans remain unaffected, the alternative sources 
of credit on the market may hurt their client base. In addition, microfinance clients sometimes 
develop their own channels of lending from MFIs and then giving out these loans on higher 
interest rates to others in need.10 In doing so, they may harm the client base of moneylenders. 
Moneylenders therefore, may prefer to hinder any kind of positive advocacy for MFI 
operations in their localities. For this purpose, they can employ a number of tactics, ranging 
                                                          
8
 One can argue that the MFIs and the moneylenders or landlords serve a different clientele, where the former 
lends to the economically active poor and the later for consumption or non-economic activities. Nonetheless, the 
stronghold of the landlords and the client count of the moneylenders would still suffer when there are alternative 
sources of credit on the market, regardless of the purpose for which credit is sought. 
9
 People living in close-knit communities usually fear the “loss of face” or honour more than any other social 
sanction. Moneylenders in duress will make use of all means at their disposal, including character assassination 
within the community, to recover their loans. 
10
 Instead of investing in a so-called productive activity or covering a family expense, studies have found that 
some clients use microcredit for money lending (Guerin et al. 2011:112; see also Perry 2002).  
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from negative propaganda to more coercive or threatening measures, such as blacklisting 
clientele from all future loans. The threat of being shunned by the moneylender can serve as a 
deterrent to affiliations with an MFI for the local poor, who have limited sources of capital 
when in dire need and may fear being shut out entirely. 
Likewise, in the competition for the same clientele, aggressive or unethical practices by 
fellow MFIs, their employees and moneylenders are by no means unheard of. In an industry 
like microfinance, where the sector has witnessed uncontrolled rapid growth and concentrated 
market competition11 in many regions, providers are bound to compete hard for market share. 
Multiple sources of lending on the market may lead to an oversupply of credit, enabling 
multiple borrowing on the borrowers’ side and leading to over-indebtedness (cf. Schicks 
2013: 171; see also Hudon 2011: 129 and Burki 2009). This disrupts the quality of operations 
due to superficial screening processes that encourage taking on high-risk clients as the MFIs 
grow. Unethical practices by the providers or their employees, such as forced loans (loans that 
are not needed, but rather taken out as the result of aggressive marketing or pressure), 
coercive collections, and intimidation or physical harm to their own and other MFIs’ clients, 
may be on the rise in areas that are saturated with providers (see Shylender 2006, Chen et al. 
2010, Microfinance Focus 2011 and Luetzenkirchen 2012). Improper regulatory infrastructure 
and unhealthy rivalry from fellow MFIs not only hamper the operations of successful MFIs, 
but can damage the entire industry, as was the case in Pakistan, as well as other countries like 
India and Bosnia and Herzegovina.12 In all these countries, concentrated market competition 
and lack of proper legal checks on the sectors business practices led to a market meltdown in 
micro-lending services.  
Obviously, MFIs and moneylenders seek to advance their preference for having the 
upper hand or an advantageous position over rival MFIs. All actors within this group of 
lenders possess certain resources to varying degrees. These actors can undertake actions that 
range from sabotaging their rivals’ operations to intimidating potential MFI clients within a 
community.13 Such interventions may hamper the ability of MFIs to do their work, 
particularly in terms of conducting outreach.  The influence of the actors discussed above can 
be a possible cause of tension for the MFIs and their clients, who can be regarded as 
reformers of the norms of credit relations within the bargaining framework. Here the 
                                                          
11
 I do not seek to argue against competition, but against unethical market practices like espionage, and 
uncontrolled growth and concentrated market competition, where some geographical sectors have an over-supply 
of microfinance products while others lack these services all together.  
12
 See Burki (2009) for a case study on Pakistan, Shylendra (2006) for India and Luetzenkirchen and Wiestroffer 
(2012) for Bosnia and Herzegovina  
13
 Acts of operational sabotage can be anything ranging from negative public relations activities to dissuasion of 
clients from paying back loans to a competing MFI. 
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community (including communal gathering spaces) is the social institution of which they are 
all a part. In the schema presented here, their interactions and the use of their respective 
resources for their actions and efforts are effectively negotiations for power and influence 
over a financial service market.    
2.3.1.2 Local politicians and public officials 
 
Local politicians or other influential personalities (like government officials, 
bureaucrats, and technocrats), together with their supporters, represent another group that 
might interfere with MFI operations for personal or professional gain. Their key preference to 
wield power for political, professional or personal advantage may come into conflict with 
MFI operations. Politicians and bureaucrats seek positions of power with the status that 
accrues to a representative of the people or a high-ranking government official.14 The most 
sought-after positions of power are commonly associated with access to certain resources, 
such as discretionary decision-making power or state resources, which in turn allow office 
holders to obtain further resource allocation benefits. Ambiguous constitutional provisions 
and lack of transparency and accountability in many developing countries usually gives these 
office bearers considerable room for arbitrary decision making and the pursuit of their own 
preferences (cf. Michaelowa 2003: 77-78).  
For MFIs and their clients, mostly micro- and small enterprises in the informal sector, 
any interaction or reliance on bureaucrats and politicians for services can prove onerous. 
Arbitrary decisions from these office bearers regarding tax payments or regulatory 
compliance for various permits (construction, environmental, operations etc.) can ruin an 
otherwise profitable business (Ibid:  78). However, public officials may also be supportive of 
the MFIs’ agendas of poverty reduction. Local government officials may also support MFIs 
due to their grassroots approach and focus on local low-income populations that seldom 
benefit from large-scale national programs that are badly executed. Local government 
officials may genuinely be interested in the development of the vicinities under their 
jurisdictions, as these officials stand to gain respect and appreciation for service delivery to 
local communities. In these cases, public officials’ supportive stance can be extremely 
beneficial to MFIs and their clients in official matters that need endorsement from the state 
authorities.  
                                                          
14
 In a democracy the public representative is elected by the people and has a public mandate. In authoritarian 
regimes, might be installed by the higher political or military authorities with a mandate dictated by the regime. 
Further references to politicians in this chapter will treat them as elected representatives of the people. 
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MFIs must also contend with the fact that the government bureaucracy is often 
aligned, directly or indirectly, with the existing rural agricultural state-owned banks whose 
services overlap with those of MFIs. Within these state owned financial structures, most of 
which operate highly inefficiently, public officials possess an influential status. Inefficient 
rural banks may see the comparatively more efficient and competitive MFIs as an existential 
threat, and act to counter this (Ibid: 78). For example, the discretionary leeway that most state 
officials enjoy in authorising loans and collections makes them prone to misuse their official 
authority. The result is then discrimination against debtors on the grounds of expected 
personal economic or political returns, harming the operational efficiency of the banks (Ibid, 
see also Pischke et.al 1997:  21 and Gonzales-Vega and Graham 1995: 16). When MFIs 
threaten these prerogatives, they may earn ill will from such (groups of) individuals.   
There is always the possibility that local politicians, political parties and state officials 
cooperate to further each other’s causes or preferences (Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 175). Local 
politicians are normally influential personalities with considerable clout within their 
communities and public spheres. Being the representatives of their communities in all 
political institutions, the local population expects the local leaders to ensure the communities’ 
well-being if they are to continue being elected. In the name of serving the community, local 
politicians can and do make use of opportunities to exploit critical or difficult situations of the 
MFIs to their benefit where they can (Banerjee and Duflo 2011 and Cowen 2006). For 
example, local politicians and officials have been observed to directly encourage MFI clients 
to stop repayments of their loan instalments, as politicians or officials may see an opportunity 
to gain political or professional leverage in supporting defaulting clients (Yerramilli 2013: 
213, Luetzenkirchen and Weistroffer 2012:  11; see also Burki 2009). This was the case in the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh where, “Intense conflict between political parties and their 
struggle to gain votes through clientelism contributed to a politically tense environment. By 
providing a service that overlapped with those extended by the government, MFIs interfered 
with political parties strategies to establish power and thus served as scapegoats to further 
each players ulterior agenda” (Yerramilli 2013: 192).  
 However, the case of Andhra Pradesh is not a one-off episode and there are other 
examples of such detrimental interferences on behalf of local politicians/ officials or their 
supporters. The 2008-9 microfinance sector crises in Pakistan (see Burki 2009) and the “No 
Pago Movement” (a movement for non-repayment of loans) in Nicaragua in 2008 (see 
Minchew 2011) are other politically motivated local interventions negatively affecting 
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MFIs.15 These interventions took place solely because local politicians expected to gain the 
sympathies of local communities by supporting large scale MFI defaulters at the cost of MFI 
operations. Such interventions above all affect the sustainability of MFIs, hindering 
operations and hampering the enforcement of loan repayments. Moreover the clientele (both 
current and potential) in the operational areas where such interventions occur may be less 
likely to take MFIs seriously in the future.  
As in the case of public officials, when local politicians assume a more cooperative 
stance toward MFIs, this can leave the financial service providers better off. For example, 
resourceful local political leaders can use their influence to work with the community and the 
MFIs to help settle disputes or arbitrate conflict situations. A more supportive and cooperative 
stance of local politicians and leaders might not have a measurable positive influence towards  
everyday MFI operations, but it can keep a crisis from getting out of hand, as was the case in 
many of the sector’s delinquency crisis countries. 
2.3.1.3 Others socio-economic groups with vested interests 
 
Since most MFIs target women as their clientele, this gender based targeting alone can 
bring along a myriad of groups with conflicting preferences, where power relationships and 
hierarchy within communal life are disrupted. Michaelowa (2003) rightfully argues that 
because MFIs target the poor and mostly women, they pose a direct threat to the interests of 
many groups, such as wealthy landlords, local influential elites, religious groups or 
conservative men within local communities, that generally oppose women’s empowerment.16 
The men (husband, fathers, brothers etc.) and the families of women clients, their neighbours 
and peers within the communities to this list. Many men among these groups, like the wealthy 
landlords and the elites benefit from the vulnerability of women in the form of cheap labour 
on their land or as domestic help as long as they lack other sources of income or financial 
support.17 Still others simply want to exert their authority over women, which they perceive to 
be their right. For example, in many patriarchal societies, women are considered to be the 
                                                          
15
 See also Bajaj 2011, Gonzalez 2011 and Krishnaswami and Ponce 2010. 
16
 In addition to the actors that are mentioned under this category, actors from previous categories like wealthy 
landlords or influential elites be placed in this category, as most of them are opposed to empowerment of the 
poor and women and to their financial independence for reasons highlighted above. In addition, women make up 
the most vulnerable section of the poor due to their gender and low financial standing. 
17
 More women than men work in vulnerable, low-paid, or undervalued jobs. As of 2013, 49.1 % of the world’s 
working women were in vulnerable employment, often unprotected by labour legislation, compared to 46.9% of 
men. Women were far more likely than men to be in vulnerable employment in East Asia (50.3 % versus 42.3), 
South-East Asia and the Pacific (63.1% versus 56%), South Asia (80.9% versus 74.4%), North Africa (54.7% 
versus 30.2%), the Middle East (33.2% versus 23.7%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (nearly 85.5% versus 
70.5%) (Source: UN Women 2015). Women also account for more than 43% of the total agricultural labour 
force in the developing countries (FAO 2011) 
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property of their male kin, or to be the bearers of family honour that need to be under control 
(cf. Moghadam1992: 36; see also Kirti et al. 2011). Similarly the practice, common in many 
cultures, of paying “bride money” to obtain a wife is also interpreted as women being mere 
possessions, and men use this fact to justify the abuse and control of women (cf. Hague et al. 
2011; see also Kaye et al. 2007). For such groups, the establishment of an MFI can threaten 
their authority over women. Just like the vulnerable disposition of the poor at the hands of 
powerful landlords discussed above, women, too, are at risk of exploitation and 
discrimination in a patriarchal society. Patriarchy here is understood in a wider sense as the 
dominance of men over women in the family life and in society in general, partly restricting 
women’s right to self-determination and/ or access to influence or resources (Sultana 2012:  
3).  
The gendered norms within the household and families that place women much lower in 
the hierarchies of familial structures are therefore very typical in such a set up. Women are 
rendered resource-less in these social institutions. This makes them powerless within the 
bargaining framework to establish or change norms of decision-making and power sharing to 
reflect more of their preferences. Of course, women possessing strong personal skills may 
eventually persist to have a significant influence in the bargaining process despite their initial 
paucity of financial resources. Personality traits of being suave, patient, clever and observant 
can be great resources in trying to convince others in the bargaining process and win 
influence. Still, there are other things that women have no or little control over. For example, 
the status of their husbands within the family, their hierarchical position among the other 
women of the family, or whether they bear a male child can be of significant importance in 
determining their bargaining positions within the family.  
The custodians of the patriarchal societal structures identified above are primarily 
endowed with their dominant male status within the social structures. In addition to their male 
gender status (in most cases), other specific resources at the disposal of those opposed to 
MFIs targeting of women include physical dominance, religious ideology, familial and 
societal support and financial resources. Opposition from patriarchal structures mostly harms 
the MFIs’ outreach, in that they become a channel of dissuasion to potential MFI clients. In 
the next section, I discuss how the resources at their disposal help them to influence the 
bargaining process, and what possible preferences within each of these groups may lead to 
opposition to MFIs targeting women is discussed.  
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2.3.1.4 Religious and communal groups 
 
In a patriarchal conservative society, power hierarchies are commonplace and often 
strictly observed. Within the domains of communal life, religious groupings and communal 
affiliations to groups along caste lines are part of this hierarchy and usually play a dominant 
role in the lives of the community members. These groups consist mainly of conservative men 
and usually serve as sources of religious guidance, counselling in community or family 
matters and arbitration in conflicts.  
Often these religious and communal groups dictate and propagate the nature of 
acceptable roles for women within their communities. Women’s primary function and 
responsibility within such “acceptable roles” is to look after the family’s well-being and care, 
and they are expected to conform to this traditionally pre-defined role. Problems arise when 
women (or their families) do not want to keep up with these roles chosen for them by such 
groups and want to realise other potentials, notably by achieving financial independence. 
These religious and communal groups, in their quest to maintain their influence and authority 
over the women in their societies and to conserve their status may well oppose all channels 
that might endanger or challenge their authority (or the norms they propagate). This may well 
include attempts to counter MFI outreach.   
The issue becomes more complex when resistance to MFIs on behalf of these groups 
is justified on ideological grounds. For example, the wrath of such groups may fall on MFIs 
or their clientele when there are ideological conflicts with religious decrees. One such case is 
the principle of interest-based banking or in other words, the Islamic prohibition of riba 
(interest).18 MFIs generally operate on interest-based loans and tend to target the lower and 
lower-middle classes that also comprise a significant number of these religious groups’ 
supporters and followers. These groups may well disseminate their outcry against MFIs 
“unlawful activities on religious grounds” to their immediate and wider public spheres. 
Religious institutions and individual clerics may use their religious ideology as a resource to 
influence the bargaining process and exert pressure on the community members to adhere to 
norms of financial contracts. Fear of public condemnation and ostracism for not adhering to 
one’s faith can be very intimidating for potential MFI clients and their families. One example 
can be observed in the community of Kolar in Karnataka, India in 2009, when a religious 
                                                          
18
 In Islam, charging interest (riba) on loans is considered one of the greatest sins. It is a matter of much heated 
debate whether the prohibition of riba (which literally means usury in Arabic) is explicitly meant to apply to 
usury (excessive interest) only or interest in general. Many argue that the condemnation of usury was based 
against the exploitation of economically disadvantaged groups in the earlier communities around the times of the 
Prophet Mohammad and not on regular interest rates regulated by contemporary states today. For a good 
understanding of the moral context of riba and its prohibition see Saeed 1995. 
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committee, backed mostly by men from the community, prohibited (by religious edict) the 
interactions between MFIs and Muslim women. The reasons for their actions were 
“complaints about women neglecting their family duties” in their quest to achieve 
independence with microfinance loans (Krishnaswami and Ponce 2010). 
Likewise, various justifications in the name of tradition, religion or simply conformity 
with social values are different means to the same end for these groups: the objective or 
preference of defending and maintaining their authority, influence and power positions over 
women in particular and the community in general. The strongest resource that the religious 
and clan elders from the kin groups possess is their power of socially ostracising the non-
conformers within their communities. Typically, they enjoy a respectable social standing 
within their local communities and social circles, and thus they are well-positioned to 
influence other community and clan members to socially persecute all who might be accused 
of non-conformity with religious or traditional laws and rules. 
2.3.1.5 Men or male guardians of women clients 
 
Historically men have been the providers of financial support for their families. This 
status involves the possession and the maintenance of a certain dominance and authority over 
family unit and particularly over the women of the family. The term “male guardian” here 
refers to this historical connotation, which is still very present in many patriarchal societies. 
The women themselves might or might not consciously interpret this as such. Most probably 
do or are at least very aware of the expectations that are attached to such a term.  
With additional sources of income within the family, comes the sharing of authority and 
decision-making. Economic empowerment via investments from MFI loans in their small and 
micro enterprises might enable women to take over more important decisions for the 
household. This in turn might make men feel more insecure in their positions as heads of their 
households because in many societies and cultures decision making traditionally falls in the 
domain of men. Men’s fear to lose their dominance and authority over the women within their 
households might make them prefer to maintain the status quo and oppose any change that 
might threaten their upper hand.  
This fear is not unfounded, in that priorities for the allocation of financial resources for 
the household may be very different from those of the men. Given the condition of financial 
independence and greater leeway in decision making, women generally tend to spend more on 
the welfare of the children and family then do men (see Duflo 2012, Seth and Bradford 2008 
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and Garikipati 2008). When women are empowered, the men of the family may lose authority 
not only over the women, but also eventually over the households’ other members. 
MFIs’ effects on women’s empowerment – and the related consequences – may be even 
stronger when MFIs do not just offer financial services, but also associated programs such as 
literacy, vocational trainings, health, sanitation, female reproductive and contraceptive 
awareness. All such awareness and welfare programs, where women benefit 
disproportionately by taking control of their life decisions (regarding education, sexuality, 
motherhood, rights etc.), may be seen as an additional threat to male domination within 
family life and society (cf. Knight and Ensminger 1998: 112; see also Swain and Wallentin 
2009: 553). Pressure to conform to socially acceptable roles in male-dominated societies is 
pervasive. Even when the personal opinions held by individual men are relatively liberal, the 
fear of social ostracism within close-knit communities may cause men to comply with pre-
defined gendered roles.      
The fathers, husbands, brothers, sons or other extended male family members can well 
perceive it as their natural right to uphold and defend their preferred male domination over 
women (cf. Agarwal 1997). Their favoured male gender status, physical dominance, financial 
strength (as probably the main breadwinner of the family) and authority as heads of household 
means that they have many resources by which they maintain the upper hand and dictate “the 
rules of the game” within their families and clans. In general, therefore, men can be expected 
to oppose MFIs’ gender specific operations in male dominated societies.  
2.3.1.6 Immediate and extended families of women clients of MFIs 
 
 Just as men and male guardians do, families of female clients of MFIs often fear that 
with women’s empowerment, their authority over the women in their families would be at 
stake. This is in part a function of family structures and dwelling forms that exist in these 
contexts. In many societies where MFIs are active, families cohabit over multiple generations 
within the same quarters, called joint family structures. In such cases, even when children get 
married, they normally do not move out. Often, close relatives like uncles, aunts and cousins 
all live under the same roof. The oldest male typically heads the family and makes all the 
important decisions on behalf of the family. In such a setup, a scenario where one female 
member opts for a loan with an MFI, and eventually succeeds in attaining a certain level of 
economic independence, can prove profoundly destabilising. Other family members 
(including female members) may harbour envious or jealous sentiments against the borrowing 
female member.With multiple generations in close proximity, these family members can be of 
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the same age group or from older generations. Female members can be mothers-in-law, 
sisters-in-law, cousins (in-law), aunts (in-law) and so forth. Relationships of envy between 
such women might also be generational, and can worsen when the younger women try to 
attain a level of financial independence. To avoid the emergence of rivalries and subsequent 
harm to the fragile amicable relationships within the joint family setup, family members 
might therefore ban their women from taking out a loan.  
Also, the in-laws of the women (members of her husband’s family), whether living 
with her or not, might oppose her desire for financial independence and self-determination. 
Again, the fear that with such empowerment the women will escape her husband’s or her in-
laws’ control is the main reason for this opposition.  Fear of family rivalry, disharmony within 
the family or opposition within the family to women’s working status are additional factors 
that might hinder potential female clients from taking out a loan with an MFI. 
2.3.1.7 Neighbours and peers within communities 
Similar to the potential women clients’ family members, peers and neighbours within the 
communities and neighbourhoods might also develop feelings of jealousy and envy. Since 
MFIs give out loans for economic activities to small and micro businesses, it is quite probable 
that the most enterprising women of a local area may opt successfully for a loan. If these 
women succeed in generating income for themselves and their families, other women who did 
not succeed in obtaining a loan – because they were barred by their families or because they 
did not qualify for a loan for whatever reason – may feel left out, abased or inferior. In turn, 
these discrepancies may lead to antagonism or animosity not only towards the women who 
successfully obtained the loan, but also towards the MFIs by jealous peers and neighbours, 
who may then attempt to undermine MFIs and dissuade potential clients.  
Furthermore, women who are clients of MFIs may have agendas that do not benefit all 
community members. This scenario may be most salient when the preferences of the 
(empowered) women targeted by MFIs find their way into the political agendas of local 
governments and can end up negatively influencing others in their familial or communal 
circles. For example, Casini and Vandewalle (2012) provide empirical evidence from India 
that explicitly shows that collective action undertaken by women’s Self-Help Groups (SHGs), 
the most common form of microfinance in India, does exert influence on local governments to 
provide public goods. Their study examines public goods provision in the form of measures 
against excessive alcohol consumption, and solving problems related to school and forest 
management. Excessive alcohol consumption (wide-spread among Indian men in certain 
strata of the population) negatively affects household budgets, in addition to triggering 
  
66 
 
domestic violence (Ibid: 2). Educational issues were related to the provision of free midday 
meals, sanitation and teacher quality. The interest in the forest was due to the households’ 
dependence on it for livelihood (Ibid). The activities of women in these areas reflect their 
general preferences for spending more time and resources on children’s welfare (Ibid; see 
Anderson and Baland 2002 and Duflo 2012). These public goods exerted a negative 
externality on other subgroups of villagers, like the men who were mostly the ones consuming 
and producing alcohol (Ibid: 3). The collective actions of the SHG consisted of manual 
interventions, campaigns in the village against alcohol production and visits to a government 
official to ask for a solution (Ibid: 3) The authors conclude that a non-financial benefit of the 
MFIs is that they provide a platform that allows socially disadvantaged women to meet 
regularly and discuss shared problems. This has proved effective in making them both visible 
and credible to local authorities (Ibid). Under such circumstances when the peers of the MFI 
clients within the communities feel that they are at a losing end (like the men consuming or 
producing alcohol) or benefitting less than others, their opposition to groups of women 
collaborating for microfinance services is understandable. 
Figure 2 presents an expanded version of Figure 1 from Chapter 1. It provides further 
details on which kinds of groups directly or indirectly intervene in MFIs’ operations within 
the local communities. The illustration is a visual summary of different actors’ preferences, 
their possible intervening actions and resources that they might draw upon as a means to 
achieve their goals.  
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Figure 2 – The local socio-political milieus, the actors with their possible preferences and 
resources 
 
P: Cut competition, 
maximise outreach
R: Operational sabotage 
and aggressive/ unethical 
company practices, 
negative propaganda, 
Intimidation, threat of 
blacklisting for future loans
Other MFIs, 
their 
employees 
and 
supporters
Landlords, 
money 
lenders 
Local 
politicians 
and other 
influential 
personalities
Religious and 
communal 
groups along 
clan and 
caste lines
Men and 
families of 
women 
clients
P:  Wielding authority/ power, 
cheap labour, competition, 
exorbitant interest rates
R:  Social standing, 
landholding, negative 
propaganda, financial 
strength, intimidation, threat of 
blacklisting for future loans 
P: Wielding influence and 
possessing power, political or 
personal mileage, social mobility, 
identification with MFIs missions 
etc. 
R:  Arbitrary decision making, 
insufficient transparency, social 
standing/ clout within communities, 
negative propaganda, financial 
strength, supporting defaulting MFI 
clients etc.
P: Probable possession of power, control of 
women, keeping up with familial and/ or 
local traditional practices, household 
harmony, possible envious relationships 
and  desire for social acceptance or 
avoiding social ostracism 
R: favoured male gender, physical 
dominance, status in familial hierarchies, 
probable financial strength, 
P: Probable wielding of 
authority/ power, control of 
women, maintaining the 
local traditional/ status quo
R: Religious ideology, 
pledging allegiance to 
traditional norms, possible 
authority to socially 
ostracise non-conformers, 
persecution etc.
Microfinance 
Institution
(MFI)
Neighbours 
and peers
P: Possibly envious relationships, 
desire for influencing  peer 
decisions/ social integration, fear of 
change in social communal life
R:  Negative propaganda for MFIs, 
socially ostracising non-conformers, 
 
Note: P: possible preferences of actors; R: Possible resources at the disposal of actors 
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The circles show the categories or groups of the intervening actors and the quadratic 
shapes outline the preferences (P) and the respective resources (R) at their disposal that would 
endorse their actions. In the centre of the illustration are the MFIs that find themselves in the 
middle of these interventions and interactions between the various actors, the MFI clients and 
the MFIs. As already mentioned above the outcomes for the MFIs can be negative or positive; 
to reflect this, the arrows pointing to the MFIs in the centre can have a positive or a negative 
sign. 
In the next chapter, I present a methodological framework that provides a detailed 
overview of the methods, sampling, rationale for the selection of countries and MFIs and all 
other technical remarks. 
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3  Methodological Framework  
 
This chapter presents a methodological framework for the analysis of all the 
stakeholders’ preferences within the MFIs socio-economic and political milieus and 
provides details on the data and the sample. I first provide a description of the regional 
case selection for the empirical analysis, followed by a section on the sources of data and a 
brief contextual background on sampling and data generation methodology. This 
background is essential for the following section, which provides details of the method that 
the analysis will adopt in the following chapters. It will provide the basis for understanding 
the process that leads to a loan take up decision by the MFIs’ potential clients. The 
following sections will highlight the field settings and systems design, reasons for the 
choice of field sites (both of the countries and the MFIs within the countries), the sampling 
methodology, the key issues and problems confronted during the survey and the 
methodology for analysis and presentation of this information in the following chapters.   
3.1 South Asia and microfinance 
 
The South Asian region is known for pioneering the microfinance movement with some 
of the most notable institutions like the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) and Association for Social Advancement (ASA) of Bangladesh. India’s 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) hosts the largest bank 
linkage programme in the world. NABARD’s bank linkage programme encourages India's 
banks to lend to self-help groups (SHGs) composed mainly of poor women, evolving into an 
important Indian tool for microfinance. Since its initiation in 1992, about 95 million 
households had been reached to date (NABARD 2015, see also Reddy and Malik 2011: 1). 
Even prior to the introduction of contemporary microfinance institutions, informal finance in 
South Asia dates back more than two millennia in the form of community rotating funds 
(ROSCAs) and credit associations of all sorts (see Seibel 2005).   
The South Asian countries selected for the country empirical analysis are India and 
Pakistan. The analysis is not only a comparative study of the two countries, but also of the 
societal structures affecting MFI outreach within each country itself. For this purpose, the 
regions within India and Pakistan covered here were also chosen based on a most similar 
systems design (MSSD) for the survey. In this design, external control variables are as similar 
as possible, except variables that directly stem from the phenomenon being studied – in this 
case, the communal interactive pressures from different groups that affect MFI operations 
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targeting women – in order to isolate the key factors affecting this phenomenon. Both India 
and Pakistan have seen steady growth of microfinance services for the lower income class of 
the population, especially in the past couple of decades.1 These countries share important 
features that have sustained the growth of the microfinance industry, including a large 
agricultural sector, widespread poverty and a substantial percentage of the labour force 
employed in the informal sector. The seasonal nature of these countries’ agricultural sectors 
means that agricultural workers typically seek employment in other informal sectors for part 
of the year. Often investments from micro-loans for small and micro-enterprises help in 
supplementing household incomes, especially when there is no demand for agricultural 
labour. Within this context, the existence of a parallel informal economy of micro-enterprises 
has flourished in India and Pakistan. These enterprises are run mostly by members of the 
micro-entrepreneur’s household, comprising day labourers and vendors of food stalls, skilled 
and semi-skilled entrepreneurs and cattle owners. In both countries, governments have 
increasingly engaged in the regulation of the microfinance sector, especially after the sector 
experienced a crisis in both countries in 2008-2010. MFIs are now subject to stringent 
controls and have had to adjust their screening and lending methodologies in both the 
countries. 
India and Pakistan share an intertwined history, including a common colonial past 
before the establishment of an independent Pakistan in August 1947, and share many cultural 
and traditional similarities. In both countries, traditional social structures are driven by 
patriarchal socio-cultural norms, where gender relations are characterised by the largely 
segregated roles of women and men. Gupta and Yesudian (2006), in their study of socio-
spatial disparities in women’s empowerment in India find that “...women’s position and 
degree of empowerment is determined by the ways that gender identities, gender roles and 
gender relations are conceived at the family, household, community and societal levels. The 
differential valuation of the tasks performed by men and women remains the root cause of 
attitudes that result in differential investment in men and women with regard to such 
development forces as secular education, skill formation, and income generating activities,” 
(Ibid: 366). Similarly in Pakistan, as noted by Hakim and Aziz (1998), “...seclusion of women 
is invoked by religious injunctions” and perceptions of their exclusion from male-oriented 
work are intact (Ibid: 729). This is confirmed by Roomi and Parrot (2008), who observe that 
                                                          
1
 The discussion on the systems design will continue in the coming sections where details of similarities in the 
regions within the two countries will be narrowed down further with details on the states and districts within the 
states. However, it is important to get started on a more general discussion here on the similarities within the 
regions. 
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“...systematic subordination determined by the forces of patriarchy” and exacerbated by 
feudalistic and cultural practices restrict opportunities and options for women entrepreneurs 
(Ibid: 60).  
Still, and in light of the passage of six and a half decades since independence, India and 
Pakistan also differ in many ways.2 This is especially relevant for the MSSD analysis 
undertaken in this thesis, where the key variable of interest is how the social fabric of 
neighbourhoods and communities influences certain household decisions like MFI 
membership. The term “social fabric” is used here to capture the strengths of interpersonal 
relationships as measured through different types of communal interactions (see Ahlbrant and 
Cunningham 1979). These interpersonal relationships and interactions within the communities 
make up a dynamic force that endorses a sense of belonging for the members of the 
community. This sense of belonging can exist at several levels within the community, 
including religion, caste and social standing for example. The presence of a single dominant 
religion in Pakistan, where the population is predominantly Muslim and the constitution partly 
incorporates elements of Islamic law, compared to India’s relatively secular state and more 
multi-faith environment, is one such factor that might influence MFI-community relations and 
interactions. In addition to independent analyses within each country, this comparative study 
is deepened by examining how the situation of female MFI clients in one patriarchal society 
differ from their counterparts in another patriarchal society.  
3.2 Sources of data and the contextual set up 
 
 The sampling and data collection methodology were designed to deal with three major 
issues regarding the independent variables. First, to examine the impact of women’s intra-
household power relations on their MFI memberships; second, how the perceived threat of 
persecution from extended family and other actors affected MFI membership; and third, the 
difficulties faced by the MFI and its employees from the various actors within the 
communities they work.  
 The analysis is based on a household survey of 110 households (HH), of which 55 HH 
were in Pakistan and 55 HH in India. The sample included households with an active lending 
status with the MFI under study in the country and a control group of non-lending HHs within 
the same areas where the MFIs operated.3 The data collection was carried out with seven 
different types of interviews (for more detail on the questionnaires used, see Appendices 3A - 
                                                          
2
 See Jalal 2012 for a detailed historiography of cultural and traditional ties and development in Pakistan before 
and since partition. 
3
 A detail of field sites and setting follows in the later sections. 
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3G). Given the particular emphasis of the study, which examines whether the societal setting 
characterised by a patrilineal system with a relatively low status of women, has a negative 
effect on the performance of MFIs (both in terms of outreach and sustainability), I seek to 
answer the core questions based on responses and opinions of both the women and the men 
within these communities. The data presented was collected from complete HHs (wherever 
available), meaning that the woman of the household has been interviewed, and a male 
counterpart (usually the husband, but also sometimes the father, the brother or the son, where 
the husband was not available or the woman was unmarried or widowed) was also 
interviewed. Since this analysis examines the juxtaposition of power positions within 
households in a male dominated society, it makes sense to get a complete picture of how 
power and decision making is perceived by both men and women within the households, and 
how it is negotiated in the wake of women aiming for more financial decision making within 
the households. Loan officers, branch managers, and senior management of the MFIs were 
also interviewed. A final set of interviews was carried out with local moneylenders. 
The survey questionnaires for households covered a wide range of questions to 
generate individual profiles, like household income, size and structure, bank account holding, 
intra-household violence and decision-making processes, resource sharing and mobility, as 
well as respondents’ personal views on MFIs, loans and reactions from family, peers and the 
community (see appendices 3A-3D). In addition to semi-structured interviews with the survey 
participants, participant observation was also carried out within their social circles in the 
community, on occasions like religious festivals, as well as in their dealings with the 
respective MFIs, for example during loan disbursements or collections. This helped to 
understand everyday interactions with peers, community members and MFI staff. 
 One of the most important features of the interviews is an open-ended component that 
enables the respondent to elaborate wherever there was a need to relate to their personal life 
experiences and share the information in the form of an informal conversation. These deeply 
personal, real life stories of the women and their families shed light on how power is 
negotiated and decisions are made at different levels of familial and social circles.  
3.3 Systematic method of analysis  
 
 For the analysis to follow, it is important to derive a systematic methodology which 
would help in sorting the mass of information and understanding the decision of a household 
for taking up a loan or not. Thus I argue that several actors (groups and individuals) in 
communities where MFIs operate will be motivated by their quest to have power or gain 
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influence over households (and especially over women) in their decision whether to opt for a 
loan with an MFI. I further postulate that the affiliations and the social ties in lower to lower-
middle class close knit communities (including the immediate and extended family) are 
crucial for a household which is a part of this community. Most members of the community 
want to be fully accepted and integrated in their communities, and therefore go to great 
lengths to avoid the wrath of other community members. This renders these households in 
general, and the women of these households in particular, vulnerable to pressures from to 
comply with social and communal norms.4 Based on this assumption I outline and define four 
components that are essential to the decision of loan take up from an MFI, and therefore 
eventually affect MFI outreach.  
 The first of these components is the respondent’s personal stand point. This comprises 
two main parts. The first is a) what the respondents personally think about the services that 
the MFIs have to offer, in large part whether they feel that the MFIs indeed serve an important 
social function in offering loans and other banking facilities to the poor. The second is the 
degree of importance that they attach to their affiliations in various social circles – with 
neighbours, patrilineal clan/ kinship ties, affiliations of caste, and religious and other 
communal groups (hereafter “actors”). I argue further, that the viewpoints and perceptions of 
the respondents on the MFIs and the importance of their social affiliations are formed and 
instilled in turn by the second component, namely the respondent’s opinion of the actors’ 
opinions on MFIs in general and MFI membership in particular. The third component is the 
attitude/ actions of these actors towards (potential) MFI client HHs; and the fourth is the 
domestic or male guardians’ reactions to the women’s MFI membership. Figure 3 depicts a 
visual presentation of the four components that influence whether potential MFI clients take 
out a loan. This whole process is complex, with components influencing one another and/ or 
taking place simultaneously. 
 MFI membership is the dependent variable that results from the combination of the four 
independent variables, as depicted in the four components of Figure 3. The subsequent 
analysis will explore these components and their interactions, based on the interviews, to 
establish whether or not the incidence of MFI membership is in fact influenced by these four 
components. In doing so, I will also try to establish which of the components have the 
strongest role to play in making the household to either opt for or to refrain from opting for an 
                                                          
4
 Families and men are also to be considered as a kind of “group”, furthering their common interest of exercising 
power over the women in their families. This is fully in line with the bargaining framework, where social 
interactions allow the participants of social institutions to gain the benefit of joint activity by determining ways 
for the distribution of the benefits of social life (Knight 1992: 22) 
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MFI loan, even when there is a need for one. Though the analysis is mostly qualitative in 
nature, contingency tables have been used in the following chapters as a tool to examine the 
relationships between the different categorical variables and to test if the two sample sub-
groups, of borrower and non-borrower household, differ from one another significantly. 
 
Figure 3 – The four components influencing the loan take up decision 
 
 
 
3.4 Field settings, systems design and choice of MFIs 
 
The locations selected for the country surveys were the adjoining northern states of Uttar 
Pradesh (UP) and Bihar in India and the north western province of Punjab in Pakistan (See 
Map 1, below). These field settings and their concentration in the northern states within both 
countries were chosen through MSSD for the survey. Comparisons of the field sites across the 
regions or countries are of much greater relevance than the comparison of their national 
contexts. Certain characteristics like population density, literacy rates, vocational skills, 
labour force participation rates are held constant as control variables, while other covariates of 
interest, including familial, social, religious and cultural settings, are taken as independent 
variables in investigating the differences in regional outcomes for MFI loan take up. Table 3.1 
presents some comparative statistics of the two countries and the states. 
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Map 1:  States of India and Provinces of Pakistan  
 
Source: Zonal map of India (2015); Administrative map of Pakistan (2013).     
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Table 3.1: Literacy and labour force participation rates for India and Pakistan and selected states 
Indicators \ Country 
 
India Pakistan 3 
National UP Bihar National Punjab 
Female literacy rate (%) 65 1 59 1 53 1 48 53 
Male literacy rate (%) 82 1 79 1 73 1 71 70 
Female labour force participation rate (%) 26  2 17 2 19  2 22 26 
Male labour force participation rate (%) 53  2 48  2 47  2 69 70 
 
1. Literacy rates for persons age 7 and above for 2011 data (Census of India 2011a).  
2. Persons between the ages of 15-64 years for each category. Figures reported here are for 2011 
(Census of India 2011b).    
3. Literacy rates and labour force participation rates reported here are for 2012-2013; and the statistics 
for the respective categories include the population of people aged 10 years and above (Pakistan 
Bureau of Statistics Pakistan 2014a and b respectively). 
As table 3.1 shows the female literacy rates and female labour force participation rates 
for the two Indian states and the Pakistani Punjab are quite comparable to one another. This is 
not the case, however, when compared to other states and provinces within their own 
country’s borders. While Punjab in Pakistan has the highest rates of female literacy and labour 
force participation rates in the nation, figures for the same statistics in UP and Bihar lagged 
far behind other states in India (see appendices 4 and 5 for comparisons). Nonetheless, the 
comparability of these statistics between the countries is important for the analysis. This 
ensures that decisions to opt for MFI loans in a particular area is not subject to women in one 
particular area having better employment chances, or being more enterprising, qualified or 
skilled, than their counterparts in another region.  
Also generally speaking South Indian women fare considerably better women in North 
Indian or Pakistan in terms of their autonomy—like decision-making, mobility, freedom from 
threatening relations with husband, and access to and control over economic resources (see 
Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). For the analysis it is important to have societal and family 
structures which resemble more or less in their core life styles with hierarchical structures, 
every day practices and norms as failure to do so could lead to a misrepresentation of the 
results. Furthermore, both UP and Bihar have high populations, and correspondingly high 
population density. The latter is the most populous state in India, while the former is number 
four out of a total of twenty eight states (Census of India 2011c). Likewise, Punjab is 
Pakistan’s most densely populated province with 55% of the total Pakistani population 
according to the 1998 census data (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2014c) (see Appendix 5 for 
comparison of the regions). This is of considerable importance for MFI outreach and 
  
77 
 
sustainability, as it is easier for staff members to work cost-effectively in densely populated 
areas. 
3.4.1 Choice of MFIs 
 
In India I worked with the Network for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development 
(hereafter NEED) and in Pakistan with the Kashf Foundation. NEED operates in the states of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (North India), whereas Kashf operates in the provinces of Punjab and 
Sindh, in western Pakistan. NEED and Kashf share important institutional similarities, which 
are relevant to their pairing in the MSSD design. Both MFIs target women exclusively. While 
both originally sought to replicate the Grameen model, both NEED and Kashf have evolved 
and grown into organisations with their own specific institutional features. Most importantly, 
both MFIs share a much larger agenda of financial literacy for their clients, proceeding from 
their initial loans to facilitating gradual access to conventional banks. Both NEED and Kashf 
have long-time clients who, despite having progressed to opening accounts with mainstream 
banks, still take out loans with the MFI. This focus is crucial to the analysis, as it shows how 
MFIs can not only facilitate credit, but also improve their clients’ financial management skills 
and increase their control over their economic aspects. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a more 
detailed account of the MFIs’ origins and operations.  
3.4.2 Field sites and interviews 
 
I conducted field work in India from October to December 2010, working with NEED 
branches in the UP and Bihar neighbourhoods. I started out in Lucknow, the capital city of 
UP, where I spent the first four weeks visiting households in the slums of Lucknow district. 
The next three weeks I spent travelling daily from Lucknow to the rural town of 
Mehmoodabad in the neighbouring district of Sitapur, some 60 kilometres north of Lucknow. 
While the households in the slums of Lucknow can be classified as urban or peri-urban, the 
households in the northern town of Mehmoodabad of Sitapur District were rural. I spent one 
week in December 2010 in Bihar in the town of Motipur in the district of Muzaffarpur, where 
households in neighbourhoods were either from semi-urban or rural locations. In all the 
districts, I worked in the neighbourhoods where NEED was actively running operations 
through their branches for the area. Map 2 shows all districts in the states of UP and Bihar. 
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Map 2: Districts of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (India) 
  
Source: District map of Uttar Pradesh (2013); District map of Bihar (2013). 
In Pakistan, I conducted the same survey with the clients of Kashf, from February to 
April 2011 in four different districts of Punjab; namely, Kasur, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala and 
Lahore. All four districts lie in North-West Punjab bordering India. The rationale for the 
selection of Punjab districts was based on the feasibility of collecting data efficiently, as it 
was important to gain prompt access in light of a delay in field work due to the destructive 
floods Pakistan suffered in 2010. Map 3 shows all the districts of Punjab. The districts are 
quite representative of the Punjab, though they are comparatively among the larger ones from 
the 36 districts of Punjab in terms of population, with Lahore being the largest. The district of 
Sheikhupura was of particular interest, as it was the core area of the delinquency crisis in the 
microfinance sector that rapidly spread all over Pakistan in 2008/2009, which is discussed at 
length in Chapter 5. The household data collected in each district, and the interview data, 
along with response rate per district for the households, is listed in Table 3.2 in the next 
section. 
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Map 3: Districts of Punjab (Pakistan) 
 
Source: District map of Punjab (2012).  
 
All field work and the data collection were carried out by myself personally, without 
any third party involvement. The MFI staff and management were helpful in providing 
logistical and client information where necessary. My regional language skills in Urdu and 
Hindi, and knowledge of the cultural settings in both the countries allowed me to accomplish 
all fieldwork without an interpreter or a guide. Given the nature of the survey, where asking 
considerable confidential and intimate questions about the households were unavoidable, both 
language skills and a good knowledge of the cultural mindset were essential. It was critical 
that responses from the survey respondents (both men and women) on sensitive issues such as 
domestic violence could be discussed in the absence of interpreters or third parties.  
In India there was a lot of curiosity about my background and language skills, as these 
seemed to not quite match my physical appearance. To avoid any biases that might be created 
due to my Pakistani origin, I simply stated my citizenship (which is different than my origin) 
and that I have mastered the language over many years via academic training and being 
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closely acquainted with many South Asians. In general though, my Pakistani origin and my 
familiarity with the societal norms and practices within the regions often helped me to suggest 
prompts in the right direction when non-verbal cues and communication (body language, 
uneasiness, silence or facial expressions) suggested that there was a need for it. It is likely that 
I received a better response rate for most of the questions put to the respondents, than would 
have been the case without the language proficiency or cultural knowledge. 
As already discussed, the interview respondents included men and women from 
borrower and non-borrower HHs, MFI employees and management and local moneylenders 
in the areas of MFI operations. Thus in all there were seven sets of interview questionnaires 
(see appendices 3A-3G for details). At no point were any of the survey respondents given 
questionnaires to fill in on their own. All the interviews were personally carried out by me 
with the help of a detailed written interview protocol. The interviews were partly structured 
but mostly semi-structured, with open ended questions. Though written in English, the 
interviews were conducted in Hindi and Urdu mostly with the survey participants from the 
households. With MFI staff, however, interviews were also carried out partly in English. A 
core set of questions were part of every interview for the household respondents like personal 
background, HH structure and size, personal opinions on MFIs, communal groups, social 
affiliations etc. However, each questionnaire also deployed a unique set of questions relevant 
only for the category of participant being interviewed. There were some problems confronted 
during the survey, which will be discussed in the following section. 
3.5 Sampling: household selection, response rates and problems 
 
As mentioned above, a total of 55 HHs per country made up the sample. Table 3.2 
presents details of the interviews conducted per country, state and district. 
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Table 3.2:  Breakdown of interviews conducted per country, state and district 
Country 
 
State/Province or District 
 
 
Total HHs Borrower HHs 
Non-borrower 
HHs 
Women 
Response rate 1 
Men 
Response rate 1 
NEED/ 
Kashf staff 2 
Money-
lenders 
India 
 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 
Lucknow 3 
Sitapur 
Bihar:        Muzaffarpur 
40 
20 
20 
15 
28 
16 
12 
11 
12 
4 
8 
4 
100 % 
 
 
100 % 
88 % 
90 
85 
76% 
8 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 Total 55 39 16 100 % 4 82 % 11 3 
Location HH 
 
Rural 
Urban 
29 
26 
18 
21 
11 
5 - - - - 
Pakistan 
Punjab 
Kasur 
Sheikhupura 
Gujranwala 
Lahore 
55 
10 
11 
15 
19 
43 
8 
10 
12 
13 
12 
2 
1 
3 
6 
100% 
80% 
75 
86 
90 
70 
14 
3 
1 
4 
6 
4 
- 
2 
- 
2 
 Total 55 43 12 100% 5 80% 14 4 
Location HH Rural Urban 
21 
34 
18 
25 
4 
8 
- 
- - - 
1. Pooled response rates together from borrower and non-borrower households.  
2. Loan officers, middle and senior management together. 
3. The cursive form shows the categorical breakdown per district of the state/ province total in bold. 
4.  The rate consists of 93% of the initially sampled HHs and 7% of replacement HHs. 
5. The rate consists of 95% of the initially sampled HHs and 5% of replacement HHs.  
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The sample was drawn using stratified random sampling across two dimensions. The 
first dimension was specifying a semi-urban and rural geographic distribution, such that both 
the sub-populations were well represented. I initially intended a 50:50 split of the sample, but 
due to the size of the largest districts of Lahore in Punjab (Pakistan), which is mostly urban, 
the final sample of 110 HHs covered 50 HHs in rural areas, and 60 HHs in urban ones. The 
second dimension was the lending status, with roughly 2/3 of the HHs as the “treated” stratum 
(on the basis of a current active borrower status with the MFIs) and the remaining 1/3 of the 
HHs as the “non-treated” stratum, (non-borrowers, without a loan from the MFIs). 
Oversampling of borrower HHs makes sense, since I am specifically interested in details of 
experiences from the treated HHs to distinguish what differentiates them from their 
counterparts. 
The non-borrower status of the households applied only to the MFIs under question, 
namely NEED in India and Kashf in Pakistan respectively. All the HHs shared a similar 
socio-economic background. The selection of the borrower households followed from the 
client base records of the MFIs in both the countries such that random draws of every fifth 
house on the loan officer’s list who was responsible for the given area was selected. In case 
the woman was not at home, I inquired in the neighbourhood about her place of work or any 
other place where she might be and went to see her there. In the rare cases (6%) in which I 
could not reach her, the next household on the list (below the unavailable HH) was picked as 
a replacement. When the women were available, but the men were not, I interviewed the 
woman and tried to meet the men at another date. The lower response rate among men, 
reported in Table 4.2, reflects the fact that there were certain cases where a meeting 
eventually turned out to be impossible.  
The non-borrower households were randomly picked from within the same 
neighbourhoods, without any pattern, with the help of their borrower peers. For all the HHs, 
borrowing and non-borrowing, the women and their male guardians or heads of the HHs were 
interviewed separately. 
The number of households per district was approximately proportional to the size of 
the district, but also to the MFI operations within the districts. For example, both the districts 
of Lucknow and Lahore are large in terms of population, but also have a sizeable MFI client 
base; therefore more households from these districts make up the sample in India and Pakistan 
respectively, as shown in table 3.2. The women originally sampled were relatively easy to 
reach. They were mostly engaged in domestic chores or working from or near their homes, 
and thus available and mostly also willing for an interview. Most of the MFI clients had 
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invested in retail micro businesses like food stalls, tailoring, craft and embroidery, or shoe 
making. A major part of all such activities could be carried out from home by the women. 
Activities where mobility was needed, like the selling, marketing or delivery of the goods, 
were then taken over by men. Also, in the rural areas of both countries, women who had 
invested in cattle with the MFI loans tended to the animals from their homes. Thus, even 
when women were economically active they were likely to be available for an interview in 
and around their places of residence.  
There were rare cases of men (3 in India and 2 in Pakistan) being available but 
declining to be interviewed. Reasons for this were either not given by the men, or were 
expressed as discomfort being interviewed by a woman or an unfounded fear that talking to 
me would get them in some kind of trouble. In a particular case in a Bihar district in India, a 
respondent refused an interview stating that he was a simple and poor man and did not want to 
do anything that could cause him unwanted trouble. I was confronted with a similar attitude 
by another respondent in the Pakistani district of Sheikhupura.   
 With a few (2 in India and 1 in Pakistan) exceptions of men from non-borrower 
households, men in both countries were very cooperative and had no issues whatsoever 
exchanging information on and about their family life. Many of the respondents engaged in 
their daily work shifts for their micro-enterprises while I interviewed them; this gave me an 
insight into their daily schedules and work relations with fellow workers (if any). Each 
interview was carried out at the homes of the respondents with a promise of anonymity to all 
respondents for their private and personal household information. Privacy during the 
interviews was of utmost importance for the respondents as considerable intimate household 
information was sought. For many respondents it was extremely difficult to talk about partly 
traumatising experiences regarding marital or familial violence, as well as other unpleasant 
experiences of intimidation by others in their social circles like neighbours, loan officers of 
MFIs or other members of their communities. Acknowledging such hard realities was best 
done in the absence of family, neighbours or MFI staff. It was important to win over the trust 
of the women in many of such situations. My clear statements at the start of the interview that 
all information would be treated as anonymous, and would help in designing better 
microfinance services and products, helped in establishing this trust. A majority of the 
respondents were quite keen to aid this cause.  
 However, it was at times extremely difficult to communicate this to very inquisitive 
and curious neighbours in certain localities, especially in India. A characteristic of the peri-
urban slums of UP, for example, was that there was absolutely no concept of privacy 
  
84 
 
whatsoever between neighbours and peers (most of the neighbours were peers in a group with 
a joint liability for a loan). The concept of having a private sphere or individual preferences 
was an alien concept. Living spaces were scarce, and sometimes quarters were as small as 15 
metres square for a family of 8-10. These would in turn be accessible at all times of the day or 
night to all the neighbouring households (given that the relations within the neighbourhood 
were generally amicable). To deal with such situations, I would usually either arrange another 
time to return to the HH or ask the respondent to suggest another more private place, which 
might be a neighbour’s or relative’s house, or simply the roof top. This in turn posed a new 
challenge, however, as this reticence was considered rude according to the local custom, and 
many in the neighbourhoods were then either offended or sceptical. To mitigate this problem, 
I made a habit of returning to the furious and curious neighbours with a bag of local sweets 
and candy to win back good will for the respondent. This would generally resolve the issue 
quite well. 
Interviews with the MFI staff were carried out at the respective MFI branches. 
Interviews from the MFI staff were simply sought by the loan officers in charge. This means 
that the loan officers who were responsible for the operations of the areas from where the HH 
samples were drawn were also interviewed. The management staff interviewed included both 
high ranking executives of the state level operations and mid management branch managers. 
More details on the content of the interviews of both loan officers and MFI management will 
be discussed in Chapter 4 for India, and Chapter 5 for Pakistan.  
Another problem was to meet and even to identify moneylenders in both countries. 
There is no data available on informal moneylenders. Informal money lending without a state 
grant licence is forbidden by law in both India and Pakistan and there are laws on the 
practices and registration of all such businesses and activities (see Reserve Bank of India 
2007 and Pakistan Legislation 2005). Nonetheless, these figures were prevalent in the 
communities where fieldwork was undertaken, and in urban areas the local marketplaces 
offered many different spaces for all kinds of pawnshops, leasing societies, traders and 
wholesale dealers who engage in official and unofficial money lending. Most of the informal 
moneylenders do not abide by laws, formalities or regulations, which among others make 
punishable by law the unethical practices of the moneylenders like violence or intimidation 
against the debtor or their family members (Ibid). The fear of legal prosecution is possibly 
one reason why persons functioning as moneylenders refrained from an interview. However, 
talking to the household respondents and the MFI staff, I got the feeling that anybody who 
was in desperate need of money would get a loan, usually at rates as high as 500%, from 
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many on the market. The moneylender either had to know him or her directly, or guarantors 
would liaise between the borrower and the moneylender. In both the countries, I did manage 
to meet some moneylenders who were local landlords, local politicians or influential men in 
their areas, doing money lending “on the side” (as two of them stated). Their activities are 
usually carried out as a clandestine activity, camouflaged or run parallel to another business 
such as land leasing, grain wholesale or retailing. Some of these moneylenders reluctantly 
agreed to give me informal interviews that were carried out at their homes.  
 In India, I interviewed three moneylenders, two from Sitapur District in UP and one from 
Motipur in Muzaffarpur District in Bihar. Two of the moneylenders were lending directly to 
borrowers. However, one of the moneylenders in Sitapur would accept in kind payment, in the 
form of cheap and hard agricultural labour on his lands, by the borrowers. This moneylender 
from Sitapur also claimed to have the largest loan portfolio of the three (according to his own 
statements, in hundreds of thousands of Indian Rupees, but he would not say how much 
exactly). The second moneylender from Sitapur was a landowner, but also a local politician, 
and also ran another retail business providing tent rental services for weddings and occasions. 
According to his statements he had an open loan portfolio of some INR 100,000 (approx. 
USD 1,560). The third moneylender was a retail provisional store keeper in Bihar who did 
money-lending in addition to his retail store. His loan portfolio was under INR 100,000. 
 In Pakistan, I managed to interview four moneylenders in the Sheikhupura and Lahore 
districts. The moneylending market is a complex one, and there were several channels, either 
direct or working through middlemen/women. Two of the moneylenders were direct lenders 
and two were middle-women, borrowing from one source (from MFIs among others) and 
lending at much higher rates to others, with loan portfolios, according to their own statements, 
ranging from PKR 100,000 (USD 1,120) to PKR 1,000,000 (USD 11,200). Being in the 
money lending business for over ten years, the two lending directly had parallel businesses 
running, but admitted that their main source of income was from moneylending. 
 Having now discussed the several problems faced in the field during the surveys, the next 
chapters will present the information generated by these surveys. In doing so, the chapters 
will also provide an analytical account of the information from the interviews. 
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4 India: Microfinance in the poorest states of Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the challenges that MFIs face from local actors within the 
communities, which can hamper their outreach to their clientele. By drawing its insights from 
the testimonies of men and women from the targeted households, MFI employees and 
moneylenders in the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, this chapter explores what 
kinds of pressures (persecution/stigma or sanctions) MFIs and their clientele face from 
different groups within their communities and families. In doing so, it seeks to answer the first 
three questions proposed in Chapter 1, namely: 
1. Is the fear of persecution/stigma or sanctions from various actors within a 
community dissuading potential clients from MFI membership? 
2. Do interventions from various local actors within the working areas of MFI affect 
the MFIs’ operations?  
3. Is the opposition to MFIs at domestic level from male guardian and family a 
deterrent for women who want to opt for MFI membership?  
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.2 will introduce NEED, an MFI 
operating in northern India, and discuss its placement within the loan linkage programme of 
India. Section 4.3 will present descriptive statistics on household backgrounds and client 
profiles. Section 4.4 will provide an analysis of the four components from Figure 3, relating to 
the clash of preferences in the socio-political spheres, conflicts within the domains of family, 
how these are perceived by the respondents, how these power relations are played out and 
what impact it can have on the decision of the HHs women’s MFI loan take up. Section 4.5 
concludes. 
4.2 Network for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (NEED) 
 
 The Network for Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (NEED) started out in 
1995 as a non-governmental organisation (NGO). Its initial goal was to mobilise communities 
and strengthen human resource potential among the poor through interventions in areas such 
as health, education, vocational training, entrepreneurship skills – and last but not least, the 
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provision of entrepreneurial capital. Today NEED focuses on microfinance loans to both self 
help groups (SHGs) and joint liability groups (JLGs), with a client base of about 38000 
borrowers in 2011 (NEED 2011). JLGs and SHGs are two of the several lending strategies 
employed by MFIs worldwide; Appendix 6 provides detailed definitions, including the main 
characteristics and composition of the two groups. NEED lends mostly to groups of married 
women between the ages of 18-45 years. These loans are meant to finance income generating 
activities of the women themselves or of their immediate family members.  
 NEED’s lending methodology was originally replicated from that of the Grameen Bank, 
but has evolved since its inception, adjusting to the local needs of the institution and its 
clients. Loan cycles are one year for JLGs and 2 years for SHGs with monthly instalments 
and a 26 percent interest rate. Loan size ranges from approximately 90 to approximately 275 
USD1 for JLGs, and 275 USD and above for SHGs, with clients gaining access to loans in the 
upper range as they develop a credit history with NEED. NEED’s main sources of funding are 
large national banks, including the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Bank of India (NABARD) and the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), 
among others. NABARD is the largest provider of a micro loan linkage programme not only 
in India, but also in the world. Loan linkage programmes provide funds and assistance to 
MFIs and banks for promoting bank linkages through SHGs to the poorest and most 
marginalised populations. SHG members are mostly women with a homogeneous socio-
economic background who normally do not have access to commercial banks. NABARD 
defines the profile for SHG membership as an individual from a very poor household whose 
per capita income does not exceed Indian Rupees (INR) 250 per month/ 3000 per annum 
(USD 5.4 per month/ 64.6 per annum), with a land holding not exceeding 2.5 acres, and 
usually from a scheduled caste or tribe (NABARD 2003)2 (see Appendix 5-2 for a discussion 
of scheduled castes and tribes).  
 Thus, NABARD supports microfinance operations in the form of funders and investors 
but does not lend directly to the poor. NEED is one among many MFIs supported by 
NABARD. NEED has a total of twelve branches, nine of which are in Uttar Pradesh and three 
in Bihar. This focus on two of the poorest states of India made NEED an ideal organisation 
with which to work, and was a key factor in its selection for inclusion in this dissertation.  
                                                          
1
 Exchange rate (Indian Rupee to US Dollar) dated 18.12.12 
2
 According to the World Bank (2015), average per capita income (GDP PPP) for India in 2012 was USD 124 
per month (1484 per annum). 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
4.3.1 Sample households and respondent profiles 
 Table 4.1 presents some selected background characteristics of the HHs surveyed.  
Table 4.1; Descriptive background Statistics, absolute numbers, {average} 
Household-level background characteristics Borrower 
Households 
Control Group Household Total 
N 39 16 55 
State 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 
Districts 1 
Lucknow 
Sitapur 
Bihar (District: Muzaffarpur) 
 
28  
 
16 
12 
11 
 
12 
 
4 
8 
4 
 
40  
 
20  
20 
15  
Location Household 
Rural 
Urban 
 
18 
21 
 
11 
5 
 
29 
26 
Religion 
Muslim  
Hindu 
 
10 
29 
 
3 
13 
 
13 
42 
Caste 
Lower 
Middle 
Upper 
 
14 
12 
13 
 
4 
4 
8 
 
18 
16 
21 
Living Conditions/ Standard 2 
Very Poor  
Poor 
Relatively better off 
 
16 
13 
10 
 
4 
6 
6 
 
20 
19 
16 
No. of children in Household {2.17} {2.56} {2.28} 
Average household size {6.13} {7.81} {6.61} 
Education in years (of schooling) 
Female  
Male Guardian 
{5.5} 
{3.9} 
{7.2} 
{6.8} 
{5.4} 
{8.3} 
{5.9} 
{4.3} 
{7.5} 
Marital Status 
Married 
Single 
Widowed/ divorced/ separated 
 
37 
0 
2 
 
13 
1 
2 
 
50  
1  
4  
Marriages within kin group 2 2 4 
Joint family system 2 
Yes 
No 
 
9 
 30 
 
13 
 3 
 
22 
 33 
Number of Siblings (Natal Family) 
Female 
Male Guardian 
 
{4.3} 
{4.4} 
 
{5.4} 
{4.6} 
 
{4.6} 
{4.4} 
Female economically active 
Yes 
No 
 
28  
11 
 
8 
8 
 
36 
19 
Female employed before marriage 5  7  12 
Female supports parents financially 5 1 6 
Female able to support self and (immediate) family 33  8  42  
1.  Shows the breakdown of data for the State of UP as in number of HHs per district, such that Lucknow and 
Sitapur together total to 40 HH for UP. 
2. A note on key definitions and clarifications on the classification of living conditions and joint family systems 
is provided in Appendix 7. 
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  Since NEED has a stronger presence in Uttar Pradesh, roughly 70% of the data 
represents households from UP and about thirty percent from Bihar. Slightly more than half 
of the households included in the survey were located in rural areas with a relatively 
representative sample of all castes along social lines, as rough percentages of each caste 
grouping in the survey were comparable to state level statistics (see Government of India 
2011). About a fifth of the survey households were Muslim and the rest were Hindu 
households.3 The majority of the households surveyed were very poor, and over 70% of all 
households were classified as either poor or very poor. The classification of poverty level is 
subjective and deduced from onsite observation of the living quarters, hygienic conditions, 
availability or lack of basic facilities like electricity, running water, toilet, cooking and 
heating facilities, household size, living space available per household member, the condition 
of living premises and ownership of residence.  
 For the analysis, the tables and figures in all the sections of this chapter and the following 
one, in Chapter 5, are a means to provide guidance for the reader. I make use of quantitative 
and qualitative methods; where necessary the differences between the two groups of the 
sample will be shown as either significant or not in a statistical sense. Although the analysis 
relies on individual answers in a qualitative sense, the use of figures is a means to better 
categorise the data and show the differences between the HHs.  
 Data on the livelihood status of all HHs showed that a majority of all women respondents 
were economically active. However, more women from the borrower HHs were working, 
most having started shortly before or at the same time as their loan disbursement. 
Interestingly, figures for women who were economically active before marriage in the control 
group were more than three times higher than those of the women from the borrower HHs. 
This suggests that women from the control group were either unwilling or hindered from 
continuing to be economically active after marriage even when capable. This will be analysed 
later in section 4.4. Women from the borrower HHs were also more likely to support elderly 
parents after marriage, perhaps because they were more financially independent or 
contributing to their family incomes. The majority of the small enterprises started by borrower 
households operated in the local market within the sectors of agriculture and cattle, textile and 
handicrafts, cosmetic services, transport services, food vendors and other retail businesses. 
Many of the survey households had multiple incomes with women in the rural areas tending 
to cattle and working in the fields. 
                                                          
3
 This is close to state level statistics, where about 19.3% of the total population in UP and about 16.9% of the 
total population in Bihar is Muslim. Muslims represent about 14.2% of the total Indian population according to 
the 2011 Census (The Times of India 2015). 
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4.3.2 Credit background of NEED clients  
 
  More than four fifths of NEED’s clients stated that loans were used for some kind of 
economic activity. However, in my interviews about one fifth of the loans were admitted to be 
misused by the respondents’ own statements.4 Table 4.2 presents some important statistics on 
the borrower HHs credit backgrounds.  
 
Table 4.2: Loan specific and banking statistics, absolute numbers, (%) 
 Borrower 
HHs 
Control 
Group 1 
!"##$%$&'$("&()*+,-$(
+$*&)(.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(2 
HHs 
Total 
N 39 16  55 
Purpose for which borrowers used loan 
Economic activity 
Other, misuse  
 
32 
7  
 
- 
- 
  
(Previous) Loan or instalment outstanding  4  -   
Loan misuse and outstanding instalment  1  -   
Loan size (approx. in USD) 3 
% of loans ≤ 255$ 
% of loans >255$ 
255 
(51) 
(49) 
- 
- 
- 
  
First time loan 11  -   
Loan enterprise main source of income 
Yes 
No 
50% household income 
 
22 
16 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
  
Income, financial situation has improved due to loan 32 -   
Source of recruitment to MFI 4 
Self motivation 
Friends, neighbours 
Husband 
NGO, Bank 
Animators, others 
Combination of at least two listed above 
 
2 
10 
0 
17 
3 
7 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  
Loan application refusal by a financial institute 1        1 0.02 (0.49) 2 
Household has a bank account 26 12 0.13 (0.20) 38 
Female respondent has a bank account 16 3 -0.15 (0.15) 19 
MFI membership or loans other than NEED 8 0 -0.10 (0.37) 8 
Multiple loans 8 0 -0.23 (0.12) 8 
1. The blank spaces (-) in this and all following tables indicates that the questions were not put to the 
respondent or were not part of the respective questionnaires. 
2. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
3. Exchange rate 1$= 54.88 INR (daily average 19.12.2012).  
4. See Appendix 7 for definitions. 
 
At the time of fieldwork, very few of the borrower HHs had an instalment that was 
due but had not been paid on time. This was cross checked with the client’s records with 
NEED for verification of open loan instalments. Average loan size for the borrower HHs of 
                                                          
4
 Loan misuse here means having used the loan for purposes other than that stated in their loan application or 
stipulated by NEED. For example, some borrowers used their loans for consumption or unexpected expenses.   
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the sample was approximately 255 USD, with 49 percent of loans being larger than the 
average loan size. Almost 60% of the borrowers surveyed said that the loan enterprise was 
their family’s main source of income and 82% said that the HH’s financial situation has 
improved due to loan. The most widespread channel for recruitment by NEED as a borrower 
was reported to be either via direct promotion of NEED’s loan officers who were referred to 
as “livelihood service advisors (LSAs)” or through friends and neighbours recommendation 
(see Appendix 7 for definitions). NEED’s use of social networks and channels for outreach 
affirms the importance of social networks and community embeddedness in affecting the 
MFI’s activities within communities.  
4.3.3 Financial institutes for all of the sample participants 
 
 There were clear differences between the averages of the two sub-groups (borrower 
and control), although these were not statistically insignificant. In general, non-borrower HHs 
within the sample were more likely to have a bank account than the borrower HHs. However, 
women within the borrower HHs had more than twice the rate of having a personal bank 
account than their counterparts in non-borrower HHs (see Table 4.2). Furthermore, about one 
fifth of borrower HHs also reported being borrowers with other MFIs or credit associations, 
holding multiple loans from several institutes or MFIs. HHs that were not borrowers with 
NEED, on the other hand, also did not borrow with any other MFIs or credit associations, 
even though they were well aware of these institutions and their local operations.   
4.4 The socio-political framework, representation of preferences and 
power struggles 
 
According to the framework outlined in Chapter 3, this section provides an analytical 
narrative that will analyse and verify the four components, mentioned in Figure 3, that 
influence the MFI membership decision process. Below in Illustration 1, is the excerpt from 
Chapter 3, showing Figure 3 that illustrates the four components influencing the loan take up 
decision and a brief explanation of this.   
These four components are to be explored in the following sub-sections to see the 
subsequent expected effects of these socio-economic and at times politically motivated 
actions and attitudes of the actors on the incidence of MFI membership.  
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Illustration 1:   The loan decision process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this chapter and the following one on the case of Pakistan, the same framework for 
analysis of the four components as listed in the box above will be applied. I thus put the 
following hypotheses, derived from the research questions listed above, to the test: 
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the power position of men in the family (society), the 
more difficult is the outreach to women. 
Hypothesis 2: The operations of the MFI are negatively influenced by a strong 
establishment/presence of local traditional moneylenders.  
Hypothesis 3: MFI outreach will be more difficult when the feudal structure is very 
strong. 
Hypothesis 4: MFI outreach is negatively influenced when there is fear of 
persecution, stigma or sanctions from the community and religious factions.  
 
Figure 3: The four components influencing the loan take up decision 
 
The first of these components is the respondent’s personal stand point; i.e., a) what the respondents 
personally think of the relevance and services that the MFIs have to offer; whether they feel that the MFIs are 
indeed doing a significant service in offering loans and other banking facilities to the poorer masses and have 
a very important social function as such. And b) how important are their affiliations to them in various social 
circles like with their neighbours, patrilineal clan/kinship ties, affiliations of caste, the religious and other 
communal groups (hereafter actors). I argue further, that the viewpoints and perceptions of the respondents 
on the MFIs and the importance of their social affiliations are formed and instilled in turn by the second 
component, namely the respondent’s perceived opinion of the actors’ opinions on MFIs in general and MFI 
membership in particular. The third component is the attitude/actions of these actors towards (potential) MFI 
client HHs; and fourth the domestic or male guardians’ reactions to the women’s MFI membership. This 
whole process is complex, due to the interaction between different components influencing one another and 
taking place simultaneously. 
 
1. 
Personal 
standpoint 
on the 
relevance 
of MFIs 
and other 
actors 
2. 
Perceived 
opinions of 
respondents 
of other 
actors on 
MFIs and 
membership 
3. 
Attitudes/ 
Actions of 
external 
actors 
towards 
(potential) 
MFIs and 
clients   
4. 
Domestic and 
household 
reactions to 
to women’s 
MFI 
membership 
Loan take 
up decision / 
MFI 
membership  
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The next sections will analyse the components in Figure 3 above one by one, such that 
Section 4.3.1 will discuss components one and two, Section 4.3.2 will discuss component 
three and Section 4.3.3 will discuss component four respectively. 
4.4.1 Personal standpoint on the relevance of MFIs and other actors (Component 1); 
and perceived opinions of respondents of other actors on MFIs and 
membership (Component 2) 
 
I postulate that social viewpoints on institutions in general and on MFIs in particular 
gain weight when the HH respondents of the sample explicitly perceive them as important. 
Important here basically means that the HH respondents might let their own opinions be 
influenced by those of the other actors in their communal milieus.5 Communal and social ties 
are vital networks for individuals and families, and offer a last resort in difficult times. These 
strong social ties require constant care, maintenance and cultivation for harmonious 
communal interactions. Neglecting or disregarding the opinions of communal actors on 
private or public decisions of possible interest to others in the community can endanger the 
social fabric of the community. Thus, to be well integrated and accepted within the 
community, most members of the community give in and comply with the social and 
communal norms that dictate the rules of the game in society (cf. Chapters 2 and 3).  
Table 4.3 presents survey responses on the importance of social institutions and actors, 
the first component in the decision-making process to take up a loan. For many of the 
respondents, from both the sample groups, their social ties and the acceptance of peers and 
kin within their communities seemed to play a very important role. In addition biradari – 
caste-based or tribal kinship groups or extended lineages – seemed to occupy a vital space in 
the lives of community members (see Appendix 7 for a more detailed discussion of the 
biradari). As pointed out in the category of religious and community groups, almost four 
fifths of the respondents noted them as either important or very important in the daily lives of 
their HHs. Predominantly MFIs were regarded either as important or very important for the 
provision of affordable credit services by many of the respondents. Nonetheless, the 
difference in the two sample means (borrower and non-borrower HHs) is shown to be highly 
significant. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Wherever necessary, the term “important” has been further qualified to encompass other meanings too, like in 
the case of MFIs and moneylenders as “service providers”. During the interviews this term was clearly explained 
to all the respondents and their answers accordingly noted. 
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Table 4.3: Component 1: viewpoints on the importance of MFIs & other actors 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
In addition, we observe large differences of opinion within the control group. Almost 
all women respondents from the control group ranked the MFIs as either important or very 
important, while most of the men from the same category found MFIs not important or 
redundant. The respondents who found MFIs to be important or very important were of the 
opinion that the terms of the loan (i.e., interest rates, smaller monthly instalments and the ease 
with which the loan was serviced) were much better suited to their needs than alternative 
credit sources (e.g., moneylenders). Many respondents from the borrower HHs said that the 
loan provided much-needed capital, enabling economic activities that would otherwise not 
have been realised. 
During interviews it was revealed that most of the men from non-borrower HHs, 
considered borrowing in general as something that should be shunned, and that they 
personally would be willing to do so only under conditions with absolutely no other 
alternatives. This sentiment was best conveyed in a statement by a respondent from UP: 
“Borrowing is a curse.... once you cannot pay back, then the little respect that 
we poor have is also taken from us. I would rather sleep hungry, than borrow or 
allow a member of my family to do so” (interview with male non-borrower, 
Sitapur, UP). 
 Borrower HHs Control Group Total !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(1 
N 39 35 16 13 103 
Reported by women men women men - 
Opinion on the importance of 
religious and community groups 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
 
 
1 
29 
7 
 
 
8 
17 
6 
 
 
0 
12 
4 
 
 
3 
7 
2 
 
 
12 
65 
19 
 
0.048 
 (0.70) 
Opinion on the importance of MFIs 
for services 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
Important but should be avoided 
 
 
0 
12 
26 
0 
 
 
2 
21 
11 
1 
 
 
1 
9 
5 
0 
 
 
8 
3 
1 
1 
 
 
11 
45 
43 
2 
 
 
-0.48 *** 
(0.00) 
Opinion on the importance of 
moneylenders as service providers 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
Important but should be avoided 
 
 
7 
6 
0 
24 
 
 
5 
7 
1 
20 
 
 
0 
5 
0 
11 
 
 
0 
4 
1 
6 
 
 
12 
22 
2 
61 
 
0.19 
 (0.45) 
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 Elaborating on this comment, the respondent explained that moneylenders and loan 
officers of MFIs show “little or no mercy” when they want to collect their loan. Poor 
borrowers who do not have the money to pay when a loan comes due suffer shame and are 
ostracised from their communities for improper conduct (that is, taking out a loan and not 
repaying it). This fear of ostracism for non-conformity to proper conduct, losing face among 
peers in case of non-repayment, seemed to deter many from borrowing from an MFI. As 
heads of their households, the men were probably the deciding authority in the family 
regarding loan take up. This suggests that the perceptions of men may have an effect on 
whether the women opt for a loan or not. 
For the second component, it is important to note that actors’ opinions of MFIs are 
assessed indirectly. The survey measures the respondents’ (both borrowers and non-
borrowers) views on the opinion of these actors. It is possible that the same actor’s opinion 
could be judged or construed differently by different HHs or respondents. Table 4.4 presents 
the general sentiments on MFIs (as perceived by the HH respondents) from the various actors 
within their communities, which forms the basis for the second component of decision 
making on whether to opt for a loan. Now except for the religious community’s foreman and 
the local politicians, Table 4.4 clearly demonstrates the statistically highly significant 
differences between the sample means for all other actors MFIs (as perceived by survey 
respondents within the HHs). Actors who differ in their perceived opinions on MFIs between 
the sample means include first and foremost the male head of the household, the family (both 
immediate and extended), but also the community or caste chief, neighbours and peers within 
the community and the local moneylenders. Unlike the men from borrower HHs, very few 
men from the control group would approve of MFI membership of the HH’s women. 
Concurrently, control group female respondents reported a much higher opposition from 
husbands or male guardians than from any other actors like the immediate and extended 
family, the community headmen, neighbours and peers and the local moneylenders 
concerning MFI membership than did borrower HHs.  
The relevance of how much the first component (personal standpoint on the relevance 
of MFIs and other actors) might be influenced by the second component (perceived opinions 
of other actors)6 can perhaps be best demonstrated from the statement of a control group 
respondent from Bihar: 
                                                          
6
 This includes the opinions of men within the HHs. Though the opinions of the men within the HHs have a 
stronger weight, nonetheless men’s opinions are also subject to influence and pressures from their larger familial 
and communal circles. 
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“...[generally] we poor people are easily intimidated ....so when the extended 
family or biradari [social kinship sub-classes along castes lines] think that 
women should rather look into household matters and not waste time with such 
[all SHG related work to microfinance] activities, then we have to agree” 
(interview with male non-borrower, Bihar).  
Table 4.4: Component 2: General viewpoint on MFIs (as presumed by the respondents) of various actors 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. See Appendix 7 for a definition. 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(1 
N 39 35 16 13 
Reported by women men women men 
Husband/ male guardian (would) approve(s) 
of MFI membership 
34 32 1 1 -0.84 *** 
(0.00) 
Immediate family (would) approve(s) of 
MFIs 
32 20 3 3 1.10 *** 
(0.00) 
Extended family’s opinion of MFI 
membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
18 
13 
8 
 
 
12 
19 
2 
 
 
3 
5 
8 
 
 
2 
5 
5 
 
 
1.10 *** 
(0.00) 
 
Community or Caste chief/ headman’s 2 
opinion of MFIs 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
20 
13 
5 
 
 
17 
12 
4 
 
 
5 
4 
7 
 
 
4 
2 
6 
 
 
0.53 *** 
(0.00) 
Neighbours’/ peers’ stand on MFI 
membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
23 
11 
5 
 
 
18 
12 
3 
 
 
4 
4 
8 
 
 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
0.67 *** 
(0.00) 
 
Religious community/ foreman’s opinion of 
MFI membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
  
 
16 
17 
5 
  
 
11 
16 
6 
 
 
 4 
9 
3 
 
 
 4 
6 
2 
 
 
0.11  
(0.44) 
Local politicians/ Feudal lords opinion of 
MFI membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
10 
24 
5 
 
 
6 
23 
4 
 
 
4 
12 
0 
 
 
3 
8 
1 
 
 
-0.11 
(0.35) 
 
Local moneylenders/ traders opinion of 
MFI membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
7 
11 
21 
 
 
4 
7 
22 
 
 
 0 
3 
12 
 
 
 0 
0 
12 
 
 
0.44 *** 
(0.00) 
Government employees opinion of MFI 
membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
0 
36 
0 
 
 
0 
32 
0 
 
 
0 
16 
0 
 
 
0 
12 
0 
 
 
- 
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The statement possibly illustrates two important things. First, the lower economic (and 
potentially social) standing of the HH is one reason why HHs might be intimidated into 
compliance by their biradari. Second, it is quite possible that the male head of the HH 
compensates for this relatively weak position within his society by imposing his authority 
upon his female counterpart within the HH, where his authority might not be questioned.  
Contrastingly compare the statement of this respondent from UP: 
“I faced a lot of opposition from my family and clan members initially over my 
wife’s membership with NEED, however, my wife kept assuring me that our 
embroidery business will benefit from the loan and we would have more 
work...which finally made me to stand up against all the others and allow my 
wife to opt for [MFI/ NEED] membership”, (interview with male borrower, 
Sitapur, UP).  
Comparing the latter statement with the former, it is clear that the support and consent of the 
male guardian is the critical influence on loan take up, even when there is opposition from the 
wider family and social circles. However, it is important that the male guardian feels secure 
and is assured that his male authority within the HH will not be challenged.  
From the interviews there was a clear pattern in many of the borrower HH’s familial 
and societal surroundings. Most of the borrower HHs who had been with NEED for over a 
year had in fact seen an improvement or a change in the opinions of the people regarding 
MFIs within their social circles over time. In any case, the figures and statements seem to 
suggest that for the borrower HHs of the sample, most of the actors within their immediate 
circles either approve of MFI membership and assume a positive stance on MFIs, or at worst 
are indifferent to them.7 According to all HH respondents in all samples, these actors are 
linked by important social ties to HHs and their families. Therefore it is quite probable that 
HH opinion would be subject to influence from them regarding MFI loan take up if and when 
there is a need for one.  
Regarding moneylenders, a majority of all respondents, regardless of status or gender, 
reported that though their services were important they nevertheless “should be 
avoided” (Table 4.3). The reason is that in emergencies they are the only source of guaranteed 
and speedy cash, even if on exorbitant and exploitative terms, as one respondent commented: 
“.... [moneylenders] offer a service which is unmatched by any other [credit 
servicing agency]....one can be in need of money in the middle of the night or for 
                                                          
7
 As mentioned with the exception of the religious community’s foreman and the local politicians from among 
the actors. 
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any reason, the moneylender will provide you with credit without questions 
asked...even if it is expensive, those in need are indifferent to the conditions at 
that point in time” (interview with male borrower, Lucknow, UP).  
This suggests that the moneylenders were serving a wider market of borrowers who do not all 
qualify for MFI loans. This renders moneylenders important service providers for cash when 
other alternatives are not an option. One moneylender from Sitapur, who had multiple 
businesses running, owned much land and was a local politician and a moneylender all at the 
same time said: 
“...I [am] forced to lend money when people come to me in times of need....no 
one else would lend to them” (interview with moneylender, Sitapur, UP).  
Many of the HH respondents of the survey had similar sentiments which are best reflected in 
the following statement made by one of the NEED branch managers: 
“...[moneylenders] serve a market that MFIs might never cater to, as they will 
lend right away, for any purpose and at all hours....because then they also know 
that they can use all means to extract their money....without any regard to 
borrowers condition”, (interview with development manager, Sitapur, UP).  
While this suggests that there is no competition between the moneylenders and MFIs, rural 
moneylenders might still be indignant if MFIs take the most desirable clients. There is more at 
stake in the stance of the moneylenders towards the MFIs than just direct lending competition. 
For example, MFI loans usually also serve as a source to pay back loans from moneylenders 
on time. By breaking the cycle of continual indebtedness, this threatens to bring the 
moneylenders’ stranglehold over their clients to an end. This issue will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section, which examines the actions of actors towards MFI staff and clients 
in more detail. Moneylenders benefit from their clients not only from the interest on their 
loans, but also in other ways. This was explained by another moneylender in Sitapur, with the 
largest loan portfolio of all the moneylenders interviewed, who was also a powerful and rich 
landowner:  
“....since these MFIs turned up, I cannot be selective in lending to the people 
who come to me. I charge interest from those who can afford it and those who 
can’t, have to work on my lands for a maximum of 50,-INR [0.91 USD] a day 
until the money is worked off.....I am still at the losing end as those who come to 
me are not the most able bodied [to later work off the loan on his land]” 
(interview with moneylender, Sitapur, UP).  
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According to the NEED manager, the moneylender charged a minimum of ten percent interest 
rate on a monthly basis (effective interest rate of 120% annually) for loans. In most cases 
borrowers were unable to pay this back and had to work on the moneylender’s fields longer to 
account for the principal plus interest on their loans. Their daily labour was counted against 
the loan at half the rate of what he would have paid a normal, non-indebted labourer.8  
 The wages that this moneylender was paying for the labour on his land was far below 
the market rate. Yet the moneylender expressed his displeasure at the “quality” of the labour 
acquired like this. According to him, usually “better quality” labourers were not reliant on 
him for work or loans as they had other sources for credit (MFIs) and/or work.9 NEED had 
failed to establish any lending activities in the village of this particular moneylender, 
according to the NEED manager; an effort years earlier failed miserably. This was mostly 
because the village inhabitants had avoided taking out loans due to the moneylender’s wrath, 
but also because the clients were not disciplined enough in their regular meetings or 
instalment payments. After an initial pilot phase, NEED had wrapped up its activities in the 
village, leaving the moneylender as the only source of credit for the villagers. It was not clear, 
however, whether the moneylender had directly threatened the people of the area to 
discourage them from taking out loans. In this particular case, none of the villagers were 
willing to say anything about the moneylender even when asked explicitly.10 In addition, there 
were no other MFIs in the village, so that no comparisons could be made. However the 
moneylender’s open views on MFIs and the uneasiness of the villagers to comment on the 
moneylender/landlord is an interesting indicator in itself, keeping in mind that any alternative 
sources of credit from MFIs was most probably an unwelcome option for the moneylender. 
My interpretation of the situation was that the moneylender had the benefit of living in and 
among the community, and that this gave him an added advantage of exercising more 
pressure on his clients than could the MFIs. Moreover, the moneylender had more freedom in 
using mechanisms of coercion to induce discipline with repayments. The MFIs, in contrast, 
could not exercise this option for ethical reasons.  
Thus, the moneylender would be better off without any MFIs in his immediate or 
neighbouring vicinities, as the local populations would then be reliant upon him for loans. As 
                                                          
8
 In comparison, the daily wage rates in agricultural occupations in rural India for 2009 ranged from 70 – 131,-
INR (1.3 – 2.42 USD), depending on the type of agricultural work (ploughing, harvesting, sowing, weeding etc.) 
and gender (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2011). 
9
 Most MFI clients were also leasing land from loans for their own agricultural produce. This left them less 
reliant on work from large land owners on miserable terms.  
10
 Note that none of the villagers from the moneylender’s village were part of the survey sample, as they were 
not current NEED borrowers. The additional efforts to probe the villagers with questions were simply to get 
more information on lending practices and options in the village. 
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they would probably not be able to pay these off without other sources of lump sum cash, this 
situation would leave them only the option of supplying cheap labour, working the 
moneylender’s lands for wages well below market rates. Note also the respondent HH’s 
opinions on how moneylenders react to and think about MFIs in general, as depicted in table 
4.4. Almost two thirds of all the respondents, regardless of borrowing status and gender, 
reported that moneylenders have a negative attitude toward MFIs, and that they openly 
demonstrate to their clients and indirectly threaten not to lend if clients go to MFIs. No other 
actors, whether part of a community, religious or a government representative group, were 
systematically reported by the HHs interviewed to have such negative opinions of MFIs. For 
the respondents, it was clear that once they opted for a loan from an MFI, they might no 
longer have the option to turn to the moneylender when in financial need. One could argue 
that an MFI might even benefit from such a scenario. If a client with repayment obligations 
simultaneously has repayment obligations with a moneylender, he or she will probably find it 
difficult to pay back both, and will prioritise repayment for the moneylender. Nonetheless, the 
fact remains that for many, not being able to borrow from a moneylender could be very 
problematic, as there would be few (or no) other ways to cope with financial emergencies and 
unforeseeable needs such as death, illness or the need for medical treatment. The HHs took 
these threats quite seriously and this attitude of the moneylenders towards the MFIs and their 
clientele was presumed to mean an end to their potential borrowing from the moneylender 
when in financial need. This pattern of behaviour by moneylenders is not case-specific and 
has also been widely reported and documented in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and other parts of 
South Asia (see Ilyas 2015, Baloch 2013 and Hashemi and Schuler 1997). 
From the discussions in this section on how the respondents feel and view both the 
MFIs and the various actors within their social circles, it seems that there is an inclination to 
be partly influenced by the opinions of the various actors within communities. Beyond this, 
the perception towards borrowing in general plays an important role in determining whether 
or not a HH opts for loan from an MFI or not. Conformity to appropriate behaviour and fear 
of losing face among peers and caste members in case of non-repayment of loans in close knit 
communities deters many from borrowing from an MFI. The relationships maintained by the 
HHs within their familial and social networks like extended family, caste members, 
neighbours and peers and even moneylenders are of much importance to the respondents, and 
probably the opinions of the members within these networks cannot be totally ignored. Of 
these, most important were the male counterparts within the families, lack of support from 
whom may most definitely cause the women to refrain from an MFI membership. However, 
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backing from the male head of the HH usually makes all other influences from other social 
actors secondary. To many HHs the threat of cutting off credit possibilities from the 
moneylender, if the moneylender takes an oppositional stance to MFIs, is also very real. For 
many HHs the threat of losing future credit from moneylenders can be serious enough for 
them to reconsider their options of MFI membership.  
Having reviewed evidence for components one and two from Figure 3, the next 
section discusses the third component, namely the actions of these actors towards (potential) 
MFI client HHs.  
4.4.2 Attitudes and actions of external actors towards MFIs and (potential) 
clients (Component 3)  
 
 The opinions that the various groups harbour regarding MFIs and their clients within the 
surveyed communities can be evaluated by their attitude towards the (potential) borrowers 
and employees of MFIs. Any kind of threats, warnings or provocations that might have been 
encountered by any of the respondent HHs of the sample is presented in Table 4.5 along with 
borrower status information within the HH’s community. This outlines the basis of the third 
component of the decision to take out a loan.  
 
Table 4.5: Component 3: MFI borrower information and threats/ warnings/ provocations encountered by 
the respondents 
 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(
+$*&)(1 
N 39 35 16 13 
Reported by women men women men 
Male guardian/ husband knows of borrower status  37 2 35 - - - 
MFI status confidential (not made public to peers 
in the larger community)  
3 2 - - - 
(Potential) MFI membership has been a cause 
of threat/ provocation from 
     
extended family 4 1 4 2 0 .14 ** 
community chief/  headman 0 0 3 2 0.17 *** 
neighbours/ peers  1 1 2 1 0.07 
religious factions  1 2 3 1 0.10 * 
local moneylenders/ traders  6 3 0 0 -0.12 ** 
public officials 1 0 1 0 0.02 
local politicians/ councillors 1 0 0 0 -0.01 
other MFI loan officers 4 3 0 0 -0.09 * 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. The two male guardians not knowing of wife’s borrower status had deserted their families according to 
the women interviewed. In one case, the husband has been missing for 12 years and the son was the 
loan nominee. In the second case, the husband was abusive and violent and had been kicked out of the 
house by his wife and children who fended for themselves and had a woodwork business, financed by a 
NEED loan. Male nominee was the borrower’s son. 
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As discussed in the previous section, borrowing in general is an act that many are 
rather uncomfortable with. This was explicitly depicted in the responses of five borrower HH 
respondents, who wanted to keep a low profile by keeping their borrower status confidential 
to their extended family and peers. This was corroborated by the employees of NEED (see 
Table 4.6), who said that some members preferred to hide their MFI membership status from 
their families or relatives. From the interviews it became clear that considerable stigma was 
attached to the act of borrowing. Many respondents automatically assumed that borrowing 
pointed to living beyond ones means, and assumed that their neighbours and peers would hold 
this view as well. In turn, this association threatened to tarnish the family’s credibility in the 
long run. In other words, the perceived danger was that community members, peers and 
neighbours would look down upon a family seen to be risking its credibility by borrowing, 
which would eventually displace that family’s social stature within these social milieus. 
Given this context, the action of wanting to hide MFI client status for fear of reputational 
damage or displacement of social stature is therefore in line with the general perceptions on 
borrowing within their communities. 
Furthermore, respondents from both the borrower and non-borrower HHs reported 
having encountered threats and warnings, of one sort or another directly from their extended 
families, community headmen, neighbours, peers, the religious faction, moneylenders and 
loan officers of other MFIs. However, local moneylenders and loan officers of other MFIs 
were reported to be more active in threatening and intimidating the actual MFI (NEED) 
clients, whereas for all other actors, the control group HH were more affected. The differences 
in the two sample means between the two HH groups regarding such intimidation from 
extended family, community headmen, the religious faction, the moneylenders and loan 
officers of other MFIs were also statistically significant. For respondents from the control 
group HHs, these intimidating encounters were seen as a preventive and precautionary act 
from all such actors seeking to dissuade a potential loan take up from an MFI by the HH. The 
borrowers, on the other hand, were rebuked outright by actors within their social milieus for 
borrowing from MFIs.  
Acts of intimidation, as reported by the respondents, included anything from verbal 
threats, disputes, quarrelsome attitudes, warnings of sanctions and isolation from family, 
community and caste members to physical intimidation. Such acts did not have to be violent 
or vehement, yet the recipient was sensitised to the cues for consequences that might follow. 
The following statement from a respondent from Sitapur explains the way that these sanctions 
operate: 
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“...my husband’s disposition [regarding MFI membership] is not as harsh as 
those of his extended family or of our community [chief and men]....my husband 
is scared of the consequences [of the community’s angered members] in case we 
were to defy their wishes [meaning refrain from joining a credit group]” 
(interview with female non-borrower, Sitapur, UP).  
In general, women respondents reported a higher rate of such provocations and threats from 
the extended family than did men. Upon further probing, it was revealed that the “community 
members” that the respondent(s) kept referring to were mostly senior men from their family 
and caste members. Non-borrower HHs also reported confrontation with their community 
heads who were strongly opposed to the idea of borrowing with MFIs because they were of 
the opinion that MFIs distract women from their traditional obligation of caring for their 
families. According to one respondent: 
“The men of my community are of the opinion that all [the obligations]  that 
come with an MFI membership like weekly or monthly meetings are a waste of 
time and distract women from their first and foremost obligations of serving 
their families” (interview with female non-borrower, Bihar).  
This sentiment was echoed by another respondent who exclaimed that “...if she [his 
wife] were to waste all her time with these useless meetings of the SHGs, who would 
prepare the meals for me when I come home from work or take care of the children and 
family” (interview with male non-borrower, Lucknow, UP).  
SHG meetings can take quite a lot of the women’s time. Meetings take place weekly to 
fortnightly. At these meetings, which are obligatory for all members, all matters of concern to 
the 20-25 women members are discussed, savings collected and loans, if any, disbursed. In 
contrast, JLG groups meet only once a month for collections or payment of instalments. All 
the members do not need to appear at the branch office in person; instead, members can take 
turns to collectively bring in the instalments of the other members along with theirs. However, 
SHGs have a much broader social agenda, and thus have a greater overall impact on the 
women who take part (and also on their children), as they address other social issues and 
woes, whereas JLGs are formed only for the sole purpose of credit (see appendix 4.1 for 
details on the structure and functions). Since it is easier for the MFI and its clients to manage 
communal pressures better when it comes to women’s time allocation, NEED too has changed 
tracks, focussing more on JLGs than on SHG lending methodologies. This is yet another sign 
that MFIs have to adapt to the perceptions and preferences of local actors to target their 
clientele.  
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A lot of the men within the communities were of the opinion that the loans from MFIs 
were a cause of disruption in the “natural” flow of family affairs. They were of the belief that 
the women’s first obligation is seeing to the comforts of the other family members, and 
expressed the opinion that this obligation came before her decision for a loan for some 
economic activity that might not only bring her more financial independence but also benefit 
the family in terms of income. These conservative opinions regarding women’s roles within 
households and communities is a clear indication of considerable potential for strife and 
confrontation if the women were to still opt for a loan despite opposition from immediate or 
extended families or peers and community members. The time that women invest in the group 
meetings required by MFIs, or in the economic activity undertaken with the support of the 
loan, inevitably comes at the cost of time that they normally spend in unpaid household work, 
like preparing meals, taking care of the family and children and attending to other domestic 
chores. The norms of family lifestyle and the respective gendered roles within the HHs were a 
central theme amongst many of the respondent conversations during interviews. This was also 
one reason why many of the control HH women who were employed and had an income 
before their marriages (see Table 4.1) did not continue working after their marriages, despite 
the fact that many of them wished to do so. The perceptions of the family and of the men of 
the family in particular, were decisive eventually. The fact that the women’s willingness to 
take out a loan for an economic activity, or work after marriage for that matter, would 
eventually contribute to the family’s income and the general well-being of the HH’s children 
seemed to be secondary. The concerns over women failing or falling short of their primary 
obligations to their families were paramount.  
Intimidations from the local religious faction, preacher or foremen were reported 
mostly from the Muslim HHs among the control group, due to the fact that Islam prohibits 
interest-based loans and local religious leaders therefore deem them as un-Islamic. Indeed, all 
the respondents answering in the affirmative for intimidation regarding MFI membership 
from the religious foremen of their communities in Table 4.5 above were Muslims. Thus this 
resistance to MFIs on behalf of the religious groups is justified on ideological grounds and is 
much in line with the theoretical argumentations as presented in Chapter 2.    
Borrower HHs also reported being harassed or verbally threatened by the loan officers 
of other MFIs operating in their areas, presumably in trying to dissuade them from borrowing 
further with NEED. According to NEED clients, employees of other MFIs operating in the 
same areas as NEED were among those who harassed them and spread misconceptions about 
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NEED operations.11 Loan officers and NEED staff, however, denied engaging in any such 
activities themselves towards their competing MFI staff members, who covered the same 
villages and operational areas. Such harassments from rival MFIs were, however, not the only 
examples of cutthroat competition.  Most of what the HHs had to report on such unpleasant 
demeanour from the various actors, like employees of other MFIs or moneylenders, towards 
them was (at least partly) also confirmed by the loan officers of NEED. In particular, 7 out of 
10 loan officers explicitly reported moneylenders hindering them in their work when in the 
field (see Table 4.6). Within this context one loan officer reported: 
“.... moneylenders have no license for officially lending money on commercial 
rates, so they are wary of us – and since they are mostly influential men, their 
devotees are always ready to provoke and cause trouble – like spreading 
misconceptions about NEED, thus creating extra work for us” (interview with 
development manager, Sitapur, UP).  
Note that private money lending is regulated and illegal in India unless registered (see Verma 
2014). NEED employees in the field reported of agents-cum-goons engaged by moneylenders 
to spread negative propaganda regarding their activities, which meant that NEED employees 
had to put in additional work educating communities and dispel the negative impressions 
created by this propaganda. For the employees of competing MFIs and moneylenders, perhaps 
such acts of discrediting NEED’s reputation were simply a means to hamper NEEDs 
operations in the hope of extending their own operations or winning over more clients. This 
might appear short-sighted of rival MFI employees, as it damages impressions of the 
microfinance sector as a whole. Nonetheless, reaching their personal targets of winning over 
clients might be a priority that entails financial compensation for individual employees, 
giving them additional incentive to prioritise building the client base of their own organisation 
over the long-term image-building of the sector. 
The case of moneylenders here deserves special attention. According to one loan 
officer’s statement  
“....my client was forced to use his loan from NEED to pay off an older loan of 
the moneylender...[the moneylender] also intimidated my client with never ever 
coming to him for a loan again because he now borrows from NEED” 
(interview with NEED loan officer, Sitapur, UP).  
                                                          
11
 This spreading of misconceptions included, but was not limited to, maligning the company’s image in areas 
where local populations are more or less ignorant or scarcely informed of the larger agendas of community 
development NGOs or MFIs like NEED. This local lack of information provided ample opportunities for goons 
to spread bad publicity for competing MFIs through word of mouth. 
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Other NEED employees also reported loan misuse (use for reasons other than the one 
stipulated with NEED) due to the need to pay back loans taken out from moneylenders. One 
might also argue that this is an issue of careless screening regarding the intended purpose of 
the loan on the part of MFI loan officers. Nonetheless as already touched upon in the last 
section, it is important to understand that when moneylenders get their loan repayment back 
on time, this means that they lose the ability to negotiate exploitative repayment terms to their 
own advantage with their clients. In other words, it is quite possible that when moneylender 
loans are paid off in time via loans from NEED or other MFIs (even if it is loan misuse for the 
MFI), it will end the power of the moneylender over the borrower, resulting in a financial loss 
or loss of power for the moneylender. Thus the negative stance and the resulting actions of the 
moneylenders toward MFIs become comprehensible when one considers that their 
preferences lie beyond direct lending competition with the MFIs.  
Varying attitudes towards MFIs were dealt with differently by the respondents. The 
respondents from the borrower HHs had a much more pragmatic attitude to threats from 
several actors within their social circles. In general, they were less intimidated by such issues 
as loss of face or fear of moneylenders or loan officers of other MFIs, although they were 
aware of these threats. Also, most of the male respondents from borrower HHs were less 
restrictive in their attitudes towards women, their daily activities and roles, leaving the 
women more freedom in deciding their daily routine. Control group HHs and the women of 
these HHs in particular were, however, seen to be more restrained by patriarchal forces within 
their social circles.  
On the provider side, NEED employees have also had to encounter trouble in 
delivering credit services to their targeted clients. Table 4.6 presents some statistics on 
challenges from various groups that NEED employees faced when working within the 
communities. As already mentioned, moneylenders topped the list of troublesome actors 
identified by NEED employees. They were followed on this list by family members of 
borrowers, loan officers of other competing MFIs and the religious factions. Moneylenders 
were mostly reported to be indirectly involved in hindering the loan officers’ activities in the 
communities. The main targets were always the clients, who were harassed or intimidated in 
different ways. According to NEED loan officers, when they confronted the moneylenders 
regarding harassment of their clients, the moneylenders would simply deny having said 
anything to the borrowers. According to NEED staff there was little that they or the borrowers 
themselves could do to counter such behaviour.  
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Table 4.6: Responses from NEED employees concerning problems/ hindrances they face 
N 10 
When in the field always cautious/ wary of attitude/ surroundings/ people/ language 8 
Have faced difficulties/ were hindered in approaching clients from different groups 10 
Has encountered clients preferring to keep membership secret from extended family/ neighbours/ 
peers  
4 
Groups specified as causing trouble/ difficulties that hinder employees in their work 
Moneylenders  
Family members of the borrowers 
Loan officers/ employees of other MFIs/ banks 
Members of the religious faction 
 
7 
3 
3 
2 
Officer has had clients hindered in paying instalments due to external (third party) influence 7 
External influence (third parties) specified via client complains as hindrances in timely 
instalment payments 
Family 
Peers/ neighbours 
Moneylenders 
Loan officers/ employees of other MFIs/ banks  
 
 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Trouble or support from government agencies in general  
Trouble 
Support 
None 
 
1 
0 
9 
Specification of government agencies/ employees who cause trouble 
Government officials in the bureaucracy 
 
1 
 
Many loan officers also reported that family members of borrowers would sometimes 
intimidate the women into not paying the loan instalment when it was due, even when she had 
put aside money for the instalment to pay back. This created a most difficult situation for the 
women borrowers, as proving their honesty and loyalty to NEED meant having to disobey the 
head of the HH, who would usually be her husband or a senior family member.  According to 
the loan officers of NEED, the family members of their clients usually feel that not paying 
back MFI loans would not entail any sanctions, as only the women are directly responsible for 
the loans and the money set aside for loan instalments can be put to other uses within the 
family. Due to this issue NEED, ironically, has had to institute the requirement of having a 
male nominee, ideally the husband, for every loan issued to a woman within the HH. The 
reason behind this requirement was stated by NEED management and staff as a strategic 
practicality. Without this measure, they felt that women would probably be pressured into 
taking up a loan and in case of non-payment be held accountable for it even when not directly 
at fault. Senior management indicated this to be a common practice among regional and 
national MFIs in India. Imposing the condition of a male nominee for a micro-credit was 
meant to generally curb the attitude of free riding and not taking the loan undertaking 
seriously as it comes through the women. The family members might be short-sighted and 
only hope to get away with non-repayment of the instalments, with or without the women 
borrowers consenting to such behaviour. Also it would be easier for the women who have 
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borrowed to simply blame the rest of the family in case of non-payment. Yet, this widely 
practiced male nominee conditionality by MFIs would seem to fall far short of the women’s 
empowerment typically touted by the industry. It implies that women who do not get the 
support of a male guardian as a nominee, or who do not have a qualifying male family 
member, are not eligible for an MFI loan. This issue is further discussed in the next section 
when the fourth and most important component, namely opposition to MFI membership at the 
HH level, will be discussed.   
Other incidents of trouble reported by the NEED employees were smaller incidents 
involving the local politicians or ministers (called “Pradhan,” or a member of the Panchayat 
or village council), their followers or other individuals like the local traditional healers or 
doctors. These groups were mostly opposed to the work of MFIs or NGOs in general, as they 
are doing a lot of advocacy on social awareness programmes. These programmes, of which 
NEED was one, influence the positions of people within the communities, and lead them to 
demand accountability rather than to blindly follow authorities within their communities. For 
example, traditional local quack doctors or mid-wives who were hardly trained as health 
professionals, would offer medicines and medical advice to the illiterate poor and extort 
money from them for illegitimate pregnancies, keeping the information confidential, or 
performing illegal (late term) abortions. The fear of losing the honour of the affected victims, 
who are unmarried young women in a conservative society, led many from among the local 
population to pay these quack doctors for their services. With the awareness programmes of 
NGOs and MFIs, the citizens were better informed – not only about contraceptive methods, 
but also of their rights and the proper places of help that they could approach without being 
coaxed into a compromising or vulnerable situation.  
It is likely as well that local politicians and councillors were more often confronted by 
the local public for the neglect of local infrastructure facilities within their jurisdiction and 
were held accountable for any embezzlement of funds. Before such social awareness 
programmes, few challenged the state of affairs. However, an uptick in awareness and 
challenges to corrupt authorities led these authorities to push back against MFIs and all their 
operations. On many occasions NEED was also active in reporting government employees 
within the bureaucracy or the rural banks for misuse of their public authority for personal 
gain. One incident reported was that of a government official who hoarded ration cards meant 
to allow the poor to purchase utility services from the government licensed utility provider for 
the poor. He would then sell the cards on the black market at higher rates. Many NEED 
clients were affected, as the ration cards are a means of getting good quality utility goods at 
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subsidised rates. Such incidents, when an MFI was involved in reporting malfeasance by 
authorities caused agitation and anger from those who were used to benefitting from such 
corrupt schemes. 
Thus one can conclude that much of the opposition to NEED operations was due to 
their support for their clients, which extended beyond financial service provision to advocacy 
and awareness of basic rights and means of self-help. The services that they offered helped 
the (potential) borrowers within the communities to avoid many vulnerable situations. At the 
losing end, however, were all those who had something to lose from shakeups in the status 
quo – whether financial loss, loss of public standing, loss of power or simply being held 
accountable for misuse of official duty. 
4.4.3 Domestic & household reactions to women’s MFI membership (Component 4)  
 
 Up till now, the bulk of the discussion and analyses has focussed on perceptions and 
actions of the wider social surroundings of the HHs. This section will further discuss and 
analyse the fourth and effectively the most important component of the decision process for 
taking out a loan, namely reactions and attitudes within the immediate family circle, 
especially of men towards women’s MFI membership.  
 As already mentioned, NEED’s lending policy is that loans can and will be only issued 
conditional to a male nominee for the loan. This is considered legitimate on the grounds that 
in a patrilineal society like (North) India, the consent of the family head not only safeguards 
family harmony and ensures the timely return of the loan, but in case the women should 
default, also holds the head of the HH accountable. However, this does not change the fact 
that women aspiring to greater economic independence via investments in their small 
enterprises will have no recourse should their male guardians refuse their desire to access 
credit. In addition, as per NEED’s policy, only married women are considered for a loan, 
because if the woman were to marry and move in with the husband’s family, the in-laws 
might object and hinder the women from paying open instalments. Thus single women are 
also discriminated against, while without male consent, even a married woman is not able to 
take out a loan for an enterprise that she might want to run, independently or jointly.  
 Take for example the case of the young daughter of one of NEED’s clients in Bihar, 
whose statement was quoted in the introduction of this thesis. The young woman (in her early 
twenties with two small daughters) whose mother was a client with NEED, had been sent 
back to her parents’ home in Bihar after the birth of her second daughter, due to the desire for 
a male child by her husband and in-laws. Although young, healthy and able-bodied, a skilled 
bangle maker working in her parents’ bangle making micro business from home and willing 
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to expand with a loan of her own, she did not qualify for a loan from NEED. Although her 
father and brother in the HH were willing to pledge as a male nominee for her, she did not 
qualify for a loan, as her husband was not around to support her loan application. A loan from 
an MFI would help her expand the family business and earn more, yet not only NEED, but all 
local MFIs, would not consider her as an eligible loan candidate. 
Table 4.7 lists some statistics regarding male nomination and domestic disharmony due to 
MFI membership. Though by now established, still the table lists the male nominee obligatory 
condition along with the relationship of the male nominee with the MFI client. 
Table 4.7; Male nomination, domestic violence/ conflicts and MFI membership 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(1 
N 39 35 16 13 
Reported by women Men women men 
Male nominee condition obligatory by the MFI 
for issuance of loan 39 35 - - - 
Husband male nominee for MFI loan 35 - - - - 
Physical and verbal violence common in 
household 14 8 9 3 
0 .11 
(0.26) 
Conflict/ domestic disharmony in household 
due to (desire for) MFI membership 8 6 7 7 
0 .34 *** 
(0.00) 
Relationship between the respondents has 
deteriorated due to (desire for) MFI 
membership 
6 3 5 
 
2 
 
 
0.14 * 
(0.08) 
MFI membership (perceived) as means to more 
economic strength and way to deal with marital 
violence   
5 - 4 - 
 
0.12 
(0.27) 
HHs where violence was already present before 
MFI membership and the level of violence/ HH 
disharmony has gone up post MFI membership 
9 2 - - - 
 
- 
 
Physical/ verbal violence from family members 
other than the male guardian due to (desire for) 
MFI membership 
5 - 4 - 0.12 (0.27) 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. Note that about half of the HHs in this category where violence was reported to have gone up was due to 
the husband’s excessive alcohol consumption. With the income from the MFI loan, the main point of 
conflict was the husband’s demands of wanting to spend more of the HHs income on alcohol. 
   
 Responses from both sample sub-groups reveal that there is conflict and domestic 
disharmony due to MFI membership or a desire for it. Women respondents from both sample 
sub-groups also reported that their relationships with their male guardians had deteriorated 
due to the loan or expressing the wish to take out a loan, and that they had encountered 
violence from family members other than their male guardian. Some respondents, from both 
the sample groups, also saw their (potential) MFI membership as a means to more economic 
strength and way to deal with marital violence. For this, a combination of questions were put 
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to the respondents. The respondent was asked if a (potential) MFI membership would help 
them deal with marital violence basically because the women would be less dependent on 
husband economically. According to one respondent in Bihar: 
“I had to force my husband into signing the loan application after he sold 3 bighas 
out of the 8 bighas ancestral land that we had for alcohol consumption,.....I wanted 
to use the loan for cultivating parwal on the land to feed my five children and us 
before he sold off the rest of it as well....my husband gave in because we were 
starving and because I had had enough; but he is very upset at my attitude of 
putting up a fight with every liquor vendor in the village not to sell alcohol to him 
and overpowering him.....and even now I am afraid at night that he will beat me up, 
so I always have a male relative staying over to avoid such a fate”12 (interview 
with female borrower, Bihar).  
Another borrower explained her husband’s ambivalent stand on her MFI borrower status: 
“...he is quite aware that the additional income we have due to the loan investment 
in cattle is helping us meet ends, but he is still very unhappy about the fact that now 
I have started to take decisions on how and what to spend and do not ask him 
constantly for money for the HH’s expenses the way I did before” (interview with 
female borrower, Lucknow, UP). 
Thus even when men give their consent to their wives to take out a loan, they are not always 
content with this decision, even though the extra income generation from the loan is helping 
the family. This discontentment is demonstrated by bouts of quarrelsome or vexed behaviour 
towards their wives, mostly for wanting to share decision-making on financial issues in the 
house (among others, spending less on alcohol) or enjoying small freedoms that they did not 
have before. This would also explain why the number of HHs where the level of violence has 
gone up after taking out a loan is higher than the number of HHs where women saw MFI 
membership as a means to more economic strength and a possible way to deal with marital 
violence. The following statement from one respondent in Lucknow helps demonstrate the 
point further: 
“....he [husband] used to get upset and abusive before [the NEED loan] when I 
asked him for money for the households expenses, but now that I do not ask him for 
money because I earn enough to run the house with the provision store [set up with 
                                                          
12
 Bhiga is a traditional unit of measurement of area of a land commonly used in several parts of India, and 
varies in size from one part to another. In Bihar, 1 bigha is equivalent to approximately: 27232 sq. ft or 0.625 
acres of land (Land Zone 2012). Parwal is a local vegetable produced in North India and commonly sold on the 
local markets. 
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the help of loan], he gets upset and angry [violent] because he feels that we [wife 
and children] do not respect him enough” (interview with female 
borrower, Lucknow, UP).  
The respondent above refers to her husband’s inability to provide financially for the family 
before the loan was taken out for her small provisions store. The earlier bouts of violence 
were due to his helplessness, pressure or inability to look after his family. The more recent 
violence after the loan and financial support for the family due to his wife’s income, however, 
seems to be a result of his frustration, insecurity and failure to stand up to his responsibilities 
as head of the household in the wake of his wife shouldering what he should have.  
 The scenario for several such HHs was very similar. Men seemed very insecure in their 
traditional roles as heads of the HHs. Due to the change in the income status of their wives, 
men were probably not being asked or waited upon to take all important and petty decisions 
the way they expected their wives and families to do, and therefore resorted to aggressive 
behaviour towards their wives and families. A differentiated pattern, however, is worth 
mentioning here. Most respondents from the borrower HHs who were clients with NEED 
longer than a year or two, admitted that over time this attitude of men towards their wives had 
eventually improved. This may have occurred because the men realised that women assuming 
a decision-making role does not necessarily lead them to revolt against the traditional societal 
status of the men.  
 The same could not be said for the non-borrower HHs. Note that the differences in the 
two sample means for responses regarding conflict and domestic disharmony and eventual 
deterioration in marital relationship are statistically significant (see Table 4.7). This shows 
that the attitude of men from the control group HHs were more rigid than was observed in 
borrower HHs. One could well argue that the change in the attitude of men towards women’s 
decisions and choices of MFI membership were also a result of the women having realised 
their desire to attain a loan and start a business. Thus for the women from control group HHs 
who had not been allowed to realise their desire of opting for a loan, the attitudes of the men 
remained unchanged and rigid.   
 The incidents where women from both sample sub-groups faced violence from family 
members other than their husbands or male guardians were women in HHs where the male 
guardian or the husband was not necessarily the head of the HH and families were extended 
and living jointly. The perpetrators of the violence inflicted on women were senior members 
within the family, usually in-laws, both male and female. Table 4.8 lists statistics on the 
disposition of power positions within the HHs. The frequency of control group women living 
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in joint family set ups where their husbands were not the head of the HHs is much higher (see 
also table 4.1 on joint family figures for both sub groups). This meant that these women (and 
their husbands) had to take into account the opinions of further family members, who were 
much higher in the familial hierarchy and living under the same roof, regarding MFI 
membership. 
 In general, responses from the interviews indicate that women in the borrower HHs had 
relatively more freedom of self-determination, were subject to fewer restrictions from their 
husbands and families, were less intimidated by their spouses and were more mobile 
compared to their counterparts from the non-borrower HHs. For all these categories, the 
differences in the sample means were also statistically highly significant, as shown in Table 
4.8. For example, three quarters of borrower women reported that their male guardians would 
allow them to improve their education in comparison to just over half of the women from the 
control group.  
Table 4.8; Power positions, interpersonal attitudes and intra-household dynamics 
  Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&()*+,-$(
+$*&)(.,/0*-1$(2#(3/(3$)34(1(N 39 35 16 13 
Reported by women men women men 
Male guardian is the head of household 34 - 10 - -0.25 ** (0.03) 
Respondent has a say in how earnings are 
to be spent 36 28 8 11 
-0.15 ** 
(0.04) 
Respondent is afraid to disagree with 
male guardian 18 - 12 - 
0 .30 ** 
(0.04) 
Male guardian would permit the female 
protégé to improve education 29 30 9 9 
-0.18 ** 
(0.04) 
Male guardian has a restrictive attitude 
towards women 2  11 9 6 8 
0.22 ** 
(0.03) 
Mobility of female respondents is 
restricted due to family confinements 11 12 9 8 
0.28 *** 
(0.00) 
Male guardian finds derogatory 
behaviour/ physical violence towards 
women normal/ commonplace 
11 9 7 7 0.22** (0.03) 
Male guardian finds women’s 
independence of choice normal/ 
commonplace 
15 25 3 5 
-0.39 *** 
(0.00) 
 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. See Appendix 7 for an explanation. 
 
 Similarly, significantly more men from the control group had a tendency to have a 
restrictive attitude toward women in their HHs.  Much of the information on the “restrictive 
attitude of men towards women” were gathered from responses of both men and women 
respondents via a number of questions that relate to general sentiments and attitudes among 
the men as they see themselves and as this is perceived by the women. The questions ranged 
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from attitudes to women making their own decisions, to humiliating behaviour and violence 
(physical, verbal and emotional) against women within the HHs, and also in their 
communities. They also addressed how this behaviour was perceived or seen by men and how 
it eventually influenced their own attitude towards women in their own HHs. There were also 
questions on the freedoms of movement that the women enjoyed in general and within their 
communities in particular, like seeing friends and family or talking to male acquaintances. 
Men and women from both HHs were quite open in admitting that such freedoms were 
restricted, without much sense of having to justify these restrictions when they were there. 
 Similarly, the inclination of men from borrower HHs to support women’s independence 
of choice concerning their education, working status and self-determination was higher than 
for their counterparts from the control group. The crucial point is whether the attitudes of men 
from borrower HHs were “better” towards women earlier on, or whether this change come 
about after the women had become MFI members. From what I could gather from interactions 
with the women from borrower HHs, their male counterparts were less possessive or 
controlling in their attitudes towards women in general. Still there were many cases where 
these women had encountered violence, hardships and opposition regarding their personal 
choices, freedoms and space. However, even for the women from borrower HHs where there 
was opposition and restrictions regarding their decision-making on issues such as MFI 
membership, it is possible that the women’s persistence, together with the relative flexibility 
of the male counterpart in comparison to men from non-borrower HHs, had eased the path to 
loan take up. Furthermore for those reporting violence in HHs, there were issues of excessive 
alcohol consumption that might explain for this. For example, half of the HHs reported some 
violence before taking out a loan and higher levels after taking out the loan (see Table 4.7). 
Husbands were reported to consume excessive alcohol and the resulting violence after loan 
take up was mostly due to expenses regarding alcohol. 
 Those reporting violence before loan take up, particularly women from borrower HHs 
who were borrowers over a longer period of time, reported that the attitudes of men had 
improved over time. Some even reported that the level of violence had stopped over time 
since taking out a loan. Most of the long-time borrowers admitted that even when there was 
opposition from the immediate or extended family, if the husband backed the decision to take 
out a loan, the women had in most cases managed to take up the loan. This was the case even 
when micro-lending was not so common in their villages or areas.  
 The following statement from a respondent in Sitapur best describes this scenario: 
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“...there were many in the family and community who were very angry when I first 
started with NEED 6 years ago... mostly because there were few who had opted for 
a loan... [My] husband was also scared of how the people might react in the long 
run, but he still supported the loan application, as he was sure that I would never 
do something which would harm my children or him” (interview with female 
borrower, Sitapur, UP).  
Even though such first movers within the communities were confronted with much opposition 
and scepticism regarding association with an MFI, they supported their wives’ loan 
application. This indicates that men from borrower HHs were probably not only more 
adaptable, but also more accommodating and open in their attitudes compared to others within 
their communities, who showed scepticism regarding borrowing from or membership with an 
MFI. It is possible that these individuals helped to open paths within their communities for the 
others to follow in their footsteps. This indicates a positive correlation between more open 
attitudes of men within the community and MFI outreach. In other words, loan take up by the 
HHs depends on how the men within the communities deal with various pressures or 
opposition within their families or communities at large. First movers play an important role 
in this context.  
 Further evidence that the non-liberal stance of men decreases women’s self-determination 
and financial leeway in their affairs, hindering them from opting for a loan, was provided by 
the control group HHs. Table 4.9 presents statistics for the control group HHs only, focusing 
on their attitudes toward MFI association.  
Table 4.9: Selected characteristics of non-borrower HHs regarding MFI association 
N 16 13 
Reported by Women Men 
Awareness of credit possibilities on the market ranging from formal banks to 
informal credit associations (ROSCA/ ASCAs) 
16 13 
Income situation of the household 
Earn enough to make savings 
Income only just enough to meet expenses 
Income not sufficient to cover all living expenses 
 
7 
7 
2 
 
5 
8 
- 
Female respondent has considered taking a loan from an MFI 13 7 
Reasons for not opting for a loan from an MFI 1 
Husband/ family oppose 
There is no need for a loan 
Community shuns it/ religion forbids it 
Other means of cheaper credit like ROSCAs/ ASCAs preferred  
MFI would not lend/ husband male nominee a hindrance 
 
10 
3 
3 
3 
1 
 
9 
4 
2 
1 
- 
Opinion of husband/ family on loans from MFI 
Negative/ oppose MFIs 
Indifferent 
Positive 
 
11 
4 
1 
 
10 
2 
1 
1.  More than one reason could be provided for not opting for a loan from an MFI 
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 Out of every five, four of the female respondents from the control group HHs had 
considered taking an MFI loan. Of these, three out of every four could not opt for a loan as 
the decision was not backed by husband or their immediate family. In some cases there was 
opposition from the community or the religious faction. Even when the HHs were financially 
in a fragile situation, and the women wanted to help by investing in self-employment or some 
other income-generating venture, it could not be realised due to such opposition and the 
necessity of male nomination for the loan. Responses from male respondents from within the 
control group HHs accorded with the responses of their female counterparts regarding their 
own and their families’ opposition to MFIs. Consequently, this clearly points to the fact that 
MFIs’ target populations are hampered in their decisions to opt for loans due to opposition 
within their HHs’ familial settings.    
 The empirical evidence from the previous sections clearly shows that, when looking at 
the combination of all four components in the loan take up decision process, the socio-
political milieus of MFI clients play a decisive role in whether or not a household takes out a 
loan. The most important role is that of the immediate familial circles of the women, 
especially the attitudes and opinions of men towards women’s membership with an MFI. 
Opposition or a negative stance towards MFIs in general, and a restrictive attitude towards 
women in particular, within HHs would most probably not result in a positive decision for a 
loan take up. On the contrary, wherever the husband or male guardian within the HH backs 
the loan take up, opposition from the family, community or peers was in most cases 
secondary. Thereby the men within HHs who were sure of themselves and were relatively 
strong in character could dare to take a stand and support their wives’ loan decision against 
opposition from the family or larger social circle. As discussed above, this is one of the main 
reasons why NEED requires a male nominee requirement for all loans issued, to safeguard 
family harmony and to back the loan against possible default (especially when non-repayment 
by the women might occur mostly on the pretext (founded or unfounded) of the male guardian 
or family opposition). Therefore there is ample evidence to accept Hypothesis 1, that a 
stronger position of men in the family or society will make outreach to women more difficult.  
At the same time, respondents from non-borrower HHs, especially the men, seem to 
also be very receptive to the opinions of people and groups in their social milieus on their 
ideas and perceptions regarding MFIs. This together with a negative attitude within the 
communities toward borrowing in general makes them very reluctant to opt for a loan even 
when the HH is in financial need and the women are ready to start some kind of a small 
enterprise with a microfinance loan. Moreover, men’s insecurity about how women might 
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rebel against traditional norms, neglecting their obligations to their families should they have 
more decision-making powers or financial freedom, makes them very rigid in their stance 
against MFIs, which they believe is an instrument for such a development. When therefore 
men from within the communities (clan and kin members) insist that women squander 
precious time in wasteful activities of SHG meetings, for example, then they are probably 
trying to maintain the status quo at least within their immediate clans or extended families. 
Furthermore, the strong sway held by religious leaders within the Muslim communities seems 
to deter some of the potential customers from opting for a loan. Therefore, there is some 
evidence to accept Hypothesis 4, that outreach will be negatively influenced when there is 
fear of persecution, stigma or sanctions from the community and religious factions.  
  Regarding the strong presence of established local moneylenders and the strong 
feudal structures affecting MFI outreach negatively or making it more difficult, as stated in 
hypotheses 3 and 4 respectively, the scenario is more complex. The interactions with the 
survey respondents, including moneylenders, provides ample evidence that rich and powerful 
landlords are also usually the moneylenders in the rural areas of UP and Bihar. In addition to 
being moneylenders, most of these men are also relatively wealthy, with large amounts of 
landholding and high social standing due to their belonging to upper castes. All these 
characteristics give them an advantageous position over the poor peasants and villagers in the 
vicinity. Even when money lending is not necessarily the main business or source of income 
of these moneylenders-cum-feudal lords, it benefits them in many other ways, such as 
providing a source of cheap labour for their fields. Interviews showed that the negative stance 
of these influential moneylenders against MFIs is also due to the fact that microfinance may 
actually help local people to repay their loans with moneylenders. This reduces the ability of 
the moneylender to benefit from the vulnerable position of a peasant or a villager in his debt. 
Thus, even when on the surface it might appear that the MFIs and the moneylenders serve a 
different clientele, it seems that clients do overlap, and this affects the preferences of the 
moneylenders.  
On a different level, but closely related to this feudal setting, is the role played by 
other powerful local men like local politicians (Pradhan or Panchayat members), or certain 
groups like local traditional healers or quack doctors that might benefit from the ignorance or 
powerlessness of local populations. These would then definitely oppose the operations of 
MFIs or NGOs, who might threaten their position through social awareness programmes or 
financial aid schemes for income generation. Thus there is also evidence for accepting 
hypotheses 2 and 3, that the performance of the MFI is negatively influenced by a strong 
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establishment of local traditional moneylenders and that outreach will be more difficult when 
the feudal structure is very strong.  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The familial, communal and political milieus of the targeted women borrowers seem 
to have a significant effect on the outreach and operations of the MFIs. Findings reveal that 
without a male loan nominee, loan issuance is not possible. This in turn reflects the tension 
generated in the HH due to challenges to the male guardians authority and women wanting to 
opt for a loan for more financial independence. Opposition from a male guardian and the 
family (both immediate and extended) was found to deter many women and HHs from opting 
for a loan from an MFI, even when women themselves clearly wanted to opt for a loan. HHs 
where men were more open and adaptable in their attitudes towards borrowing and MFIs in 
general, and also in their attitudes towards women and their basic freedoms in particular, were 
more likely to support the decision to take out a loan even when there was opposition from 
the immediate family and community. 
Beyond the family, men’s age-old gendered perceptions about women’s obligations to 
their families, and the belief that MFI loan membership is the cause of distracting women 
from their obligations, seemed to affect MFI loan take up. Furthermore, religious decrees 
from the Muslim religious factions were also a force in hindering potential Muslim HHs from 
MFI membership. In the case of moneylenders, their negative stance and aggressive attitude 
towards MFIs and borrowers does negatively impact MFI outreach. Local populations within 
the communities fear that moneylenders might not lend to them in case of a financial 
emergency, and this fear makes most of them stay away from borrowing from MFIs, as in 
time of financial crisis they would have nowhere else to go. The moneylenders, who are 
usually also rich and of a better social standing, derive other benefits from the subordination 
of their clients within the local populations, such as cheap labour to work off debts. In the 
absence of MFIs, most of a moneylender’s clients will not be able to leverage loans from 
MFIs to pay off his debts, helping the moneylender to continue to benefit from the 
vulnerabilities of local people who are indebted to them.  
Other actors within the communities were groups of individuals like local politicians 
and their followers, local traditional physicians and midwives or government officials, all of 
whom might face accountability for their actions due to the presence of MFIs within the 
communities or from their operations. Most MFIs, including NEED, in addition to their credit 
services also run social awareness programmes in the communities for their clients. The 
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services and advocacy offered help the (potential) borrowers within the communities to avoid 
the exploitative situations from which other community members, like the groups mentioned 
above, can benefit.  
In conclusion, MFIs can be hindered in reaching out to their targeted populations when 
they do not take into account the various pressures that their clients have to confront within 
their HHs, families and local communities. Their success depends quite a lot on their ability 
to adapt and come up with solutions to deal with such pressures, even if it means shifting 
away from their initial operational practices. NEED has had to do this too, first, by requiring 
male signatures for female borrowing and second, by shifting the focus to JLG formation 
rather than SHGs. This has brought adjustments in the focus of NEED’s lending 
methodologies (reducing group sizes and loan disbursements, and holding fewer group 
meetings). They have also cut back on their complementary function as social awareness 
advocates, which was part of the SHG system.  
These adjustments, however understandable, are not necessarily the optimal ones. The 
stipulation of a male nominee is counter to the goal of women’s empowerment. It particularly 
discriminates against women who are most in need due to lack of male support, financial or 
otherwise, for themselves and their families. Gender of the loan nominee and marital status of 
the women wanting to opt for a loan should not play a role in qualifying for a loan or 
fulfilling the requirements. Also, focussing only on lending instead of wider complementary 
functions that NEED, had been offering like financial literacy or social advocacy regarding 
health, reproduction, hygiene and sanitation, can hamper the crucial social impact that MFIs 
might have in the long run. This is in line with the relatively common claim that women’s 
empowerment may be increased when credit is offered as part of an integrated package that 
includes other services like non-productive loan facilities, insurance, enterprise development, 
and welfare-related activities (Garikipati 2008, Berger 1989, Holvoet, 2005, Johnson and 
Rogaly 1997 and Mayoux 2005). The findings here suggest that the benefit to women might 
be greatest where loans are accompanied by programmes aimed at women’s emancipation in 
terms of affecting her household position and allocation of her work time (also see EDA 
2005 and Hunt and Kasynathan, 2001).  
Finally and most importantly, the findings suggest that where patriarchal structures are 
entrenched in the household and in the community in general, lending to women may not 
benefit these women personally. For this to happen, the patriarchal hold on the family’s 
productive assets needs to be challenged. One of the ways in which this could be achieved is 
to make credit conditional on asset transfers in favour of the women concerned. Effective 
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transfer is likely to be achieved where assets are acquired using the woman’s own loan money 
(see also Garikipati 2008). This is outside the realm of this dissertation, however, and these 
suggestions need further research.  
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Interviews 
 
NEED 
 
NEED, Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Interview 23.11.2010 
NEED, Branch Manager: Mehmoodabad (Sitapur/ UP). Interview 12.11.2010 
NEED, Branch Manager: Motipur (Muzaffarpur/Bihar). Interview 06.12.2010 
NEED, Development manager (middle management) and loan officers (LSAs), Uttar Pradesh 
(UP): 7 interviews in all 
NEED, Development manager (middle management) and LSAs, Bihar: 3 interviews in all 
 
Moneylenders 
 
Moneylender 1, Siroli Purwa, Mehmoodabad, Sitapur, UP. Interview 16.11.2010 
Moneylender 2, Behrolli, Ichawli, Sitapur, UP. Interview 22.11.2010 
Moneylender 3, Purwi Champara, Mesi, Motipur, Bihar. Interview 04.11.2010 
  
 
Households 
 
Household interviews Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (UP): 26.10.2010 – 10.11.2010 
Household interviews Mehmoodabad, Sitaput, Uttar Pradesh (UP): 11.11.2010 - 24.11.2010 
Household interviews Muzzafarpur, Bihar: 02.12.2010 - 07.12.2010 
 
Investor Bank experts 
 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD): Mr. Sudhir Kumar Roy 
(NABARD Senior manager): 25.11.2010 
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI): Manager wished to remain 
anonymous: 29.11.2010 
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Having discussed the case of the Indian states of UP and Bihar, I now turn to the case of 
Pakistan. Focussing on the Pakistani province of Punjab, I again explore how the performance of 
MFIs is affected by the direct or indirect intervention of societal power struggles. Based on 
quantitative and qualitative information, this chapter examines the challenges created for both 
MFIs and their clients by actors including families, neighbours, community members, religious 
groups, government agencies, local politicians, local moneylenders and other powerful elites. By 
drawing its insights from the testimonies of men and women from the targeted households, MFI 
employees and moneylenders in the areas of MFI operations, the chapter addresses the same 
three questions that have also been examined for the Indian case, namely: 
1. Is the fear of persecution/stigma or sanctions from various actors within a community 
dissuading potential clients from MFI membership? 
2. Do interventions from various local actors within the working areas of MFI affect the 
MFIs’ operations?  
3. Is the opposition to MFIs at domestic level from male guardian and family a deterrent 
for women who want to opt for MFI membership?  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 will give a brief description of the 
partnering MFI selected for the study in Pakistan, while Section 5.3 will present descriptive 
statistics on the households’ background and the respondents’ profiles. Section 5.4 will provide a 
discussion of the clash of preferences in the form of the four components as discussed in Chapter 
3 and Figure 3, and Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Kashf Foundation1 
!
  Kashf was set up in 1996 as a nongovernmental foundation with the aim of providing 
microfinance services. However, it was only in 1999 that Kashf launched its microfinance 
programme, claiming to be the first specialised programme in Pakistan to do so (Kashf 2015). 
Like in the case of NEED, the lending methodology of Kashf was inspired by and replicated 
from the Grameen Bank. However, Kashf has now transformed itself into Pakistan’s first wealth 
management company for women from low income households. The organisation focuses on 
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"!The word “Kashf” is originally Arabic and means “to unveil” or “unveiling”.!
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enhancing the role that women can play in improving the economic status of their families by 
building their entrepreneurship skills through access to business loans, improving their financial 
management skills by delivering financial education trainings and reducing family level 
contingencies by providing micro-insurance services (Kashf 2015).  
 Kashf is the 6th largest microfinance provider in Pakistan in terms of outreach, with 233,674 
active borrowers, and 8th largest in terms of gross loan portfolio (41,373,107 USD) for the year 
2015 (MIX Market 2015, see also Kashf 2014 for an overview of the MFI’s own statistics for 
comparison). From the information during the field visit, Kashf only lent to individuals and 
target clients were basically women between the ages of 18-50 years. However, loans could also 
be taken out for the businesses of husbands or male family members. Loan cycles were one year 
with monthly instalments and a 20 percent interest rate. Loan size ranged from approximately 
230 to approximately 585 USD. As the clients developed a credit history with Kashf, they could 
access larger loans in the upper range.  
 At the time of my field visit, Kashf was active in the two western provinces of Pakistan, 
namely Punjab in the north and Sindh in the south. Since the organisation started out in Punjab, 
their operations were established and running all over Punjab. Sindh, however, was a territory 
that they had just ventured into, and were only actively working in the peri-urban slums of 
Karachi, the largest city in Sindh (and in Pakistan). Focussing on Punjab, I picked out the four 
adjoining districts of Lahore, Kasur, Sheikhupura and Gujranwala where Kashf was fully 
operative for the survey.   
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5.3.1 Sample households and respondent profiles  
!
 About three quarters of the data represents HHs from the district of Lahore, which was the 
largest, most populous and urban of all the districts in which I undertook fieldwork. Table 5.1 
presents some selected background characteristics of the HHs. Roughly 60% of the HHs were 
urban and the remaining 40% were rural HHs. This is because the bulk of HHs coming from the 
district of Lahore are categorised as urban. About a fifth of the HHs surveyed were Christian, 
whereas the rest were Muslims. The districts are practically homogeneous by religion, with 
Muslims constituting the overwhelming majority (over 95%). However, in Punjab as in Pakistan, 
it is quite common for neighbourhoods to be segregated by religion or ethnic background. This 
meant that minorities tended to be found in neighbourhoods where their group was in the 
majority, so that a majority of the HHs in such a neighbourhood would be Christian, Hindu, or 
another minority. The majority of the survey HHs (54%) were relatively well off, with roughly 
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36% classified as poor and only 10% classified as very poor. As in the previous chapter, the 
classification of poverty level is a subjective deduction from an onsite observation of the living 
quarters, hygienic conditions, availability or lack of basic facilities like electricity, running 
water, toilet, cooking and heating facilities, household size, and living space available per 
household member, the condition of living premises and ownership of residence.  
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive background statistics, absolute numbers, {average} 
HH-level background characteristics Borrower HHs Control Group HHs Total 
N 43 12 55 
District 
Kasur 
Sheikhupura 
Gujranwala 
Lahore 
 
8  
10 
12 
13 
 
2 
1 
3 
6 
 
10 
11 
15 
19 
Location HH 
Rural 
Urban 
 
18 
25 
 
4 
 8 
 
21 
 34 
Religion 
Muslim  
Christian  
 
34 
9 
 
11 
 1 
 
45 
 10 
Caste 
Lower 
Middle/ Upper 
 
14 
 29  
 
2 
 10 
 
16 
 39 
Living Conditions/ Standard 1 
Very Poor  
Poor 
Relatively well off 
 
5 
 17  
 21 
 
0 
 3 
 9 
 
5 
 20 
 30 
No. of children in HH {5.30} {3.41} {4.89} 
Average HH size {10.93} {7.25} {10.12} 
Education in years 
Female  
Male Guardian 
{5.1} 
{3.7} 
{7.0} 
{5.5} 
{5.5} 
{5.5} 
{5.2} 
{4.1} 
{6.7} 
Marital Status 
Married 
Single 
Widowed/ divorced/ separated 
 
36 
1 
6 
 
11 
0 
1 
 
47 
1 
7  
Joint family system 1 
Yes 
No 
 
28 
 15 
 
6 
 6 
 
34 
 21 
Number of Siblings (Natal Family) 
Female 
Male Guardian 
 
{5.1} 
{5.9} 
 
{5.8} 
{5.2} 
 
{5.2} 
{5.8} 
Female economically active 
Yes 
No 
 
33  
10 
 
8 
4 
 
41 
14 
Female employed before marriage 11  4  15 
Female supporting parents financially 6 1 7 
Female able to support self and (immediate) 
family 
29  5  34  
1. A note on key definitions and clarifications on the classification of living conditions is provided in Appendix 7. 
 Comparatively speaking, the level of poverty in the districts studied in India was more 
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pronounced, largely due to the inequality of income distribution among the general population, 
but also due to regional specificities, where UP and Bihar contain particularly large populations 
of India’s poorest people. These geographic differences in poverty levels might have an effect on 
the HHs’ decision for a loan for an MFI. This shall be elaborated in the next sections. 
 From the table above, the livelihood status of all the HHs shows that a majority of all 
women respondents were economically active. However, more women from the borrower HHs 
(77%) were economically active than from the control group, of whom about 66% were 
economically active. Women from the borrower HHs were more likely and able to support 
elderly parents and immediate family than the women from the control group. Just as in India, 
the majority of the small enterprises run by the households operated at the local market within 
the sectors of agriculture and cattle, textile and embroidery, shoe making, cosmetic services, 
transport services, food vendors, provisional stores and other retail businesses.  
5.3.2  Credit background of Kashf clients 
!
 Table 2 presents some loan specific and banking statistics of the HHs. More than three 
fourths of the loans were used for an economic activity.  
 Only about one fifth of the loans were reported to have instalments overdue. A closer look at 
the loan status of the borrowers showed that there was a strong correlation between loan misuse 
and open instalments, since 5 out of the 9 borrowers of those defaulting on previous instalments 
coincided with those who admitted loan misuse. Average loan size for the sample data was 
approximately 300 USD, with 44% of loans being larger than the average loan size. The most 
widespread channel for recruitment by Kashf (see Appendix 7 for details) as a borrower was 
reported to be either through the recommendation of friends and neighbours, or through direct 
active promotion of Kashf via its loan officers, referred to as Business Development Officers 
(BDOs) locally. The reliance of Kashf on these social networks for new clients is important, as 
word of mouth from peers in the closely knit community aids in influencing a HH’s decision to 
become a borrower. 
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Table 5.2: Loan specific and banking statistics, absolute numbers, (%) 
 Borrower 
HHs 
Control 
Group 1 
!"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(.,/
0*-1$(2#(3/3$)34(# 
HHs Total 
N 43 12  55 
Loan size (approx. in USD)  3 
% of loans ≤ 300$ 
% of loans >300$ 
300 
(56) 
(44) 
- 
- 
- 
  
First time loan 10  -   
Purpose of loan 
Economic activity 
Other, misuse  4 
 
34  
 9  
 
- 
- 
  
(Previous) Loan or instalment outstanding  9  -   
Loan misuse and outstanding instalment  5  -   
Loan enterprise main source of income 
Yes 
No 
50% household income 
 
18  
 20  
 5 
 
- 
- 
- 
  
Income, financial situation has improved due to loan 36 -   
Source of recruitment to MFI 5 
Self motivation 
Friends, neighbours 
Husband 
NGO, Bank 
Animators, others 
Combination of at least two listed above 
 
0 
16 
0 
16 
2 
9 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  
Loan application refusal by a financial institute 4  3 0.1739** (0.018) 7 
Household has a bank account 39 9 -0.1612** (0.037) 48 
Female respondent has a bank account 8 2 -0.0622  (0.525) 10 
MFI membership or loans other than Kashf 8 3 0.1701  (0.1330) 11 
Multiple loans 7 1 -0.0794  (0.4991) 8 
1. The blank spaces (-) in this and all following tables indicates that the questions were not put to the respondent 
or were not part of the respective questionnaires. 
2. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).  
3. Exchange rate 1$= 89.55 PKRs (daily average 21.12.11).  
4. Loan misuse here means having used the loan for purposes other than the one stated in loan application or as stipulated with 
Kashf. 
5. See Appendix 7 for definition. 
  
5.3.3 Financial institutes for all the sample participants 
!
In general, the borrower HHs had a higher rate of having a bank account than the non-
borrower HHs, with the difference between the two groups being statistically significant. The 
share of women account-holders within the borrower HHs was also slightly higher than that for 
the control group (see Table 5.2). Interestingly, more control group HHs had been refused a loan 
by regular banks. These rejections were for larger loans that the households had applied for in 
the past, indicating that there had been times where there was a need for credit. Reasons for loan 
rejections were various, and included lack of adequate guarantors, lack of proper collateral or no 
credit history with the banks.  
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About one fifth of the HHs reported being a member of an MFI other than Kashf. Women 
from the non-borrower HHs were more likely to be part of other credit associations, such as 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs)2 than MFIs. Interviewees reported that they 
found the ROSCAs to be not only more economical, but less prone to engender family 
opposition, as many stated, “... Kametis (ROSCAs) are in accordance to our religion for it is 
interest free”3 (interviews with several control group respondents in all districts). Indeed 
ROSCAs are a more economical and Sharia-compliant way of pooling money and forwarding it 
as a credit to the members of the ROSCA. They can and do serve as a reasonable substitute to 
MFI loans for all those who have issues with paying interest on loans, though the instalments 
have to be just as regular. Still, group cohesiveness and trust among peers can be difficult to 
establish in the absence of a vigilant group leader, and there is always the issue of having to wait 
for loan to be rotated, as all members cannot get the loan disbursed at the same time and it is not 
guaranteed for exactly when they want or need it. 
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This section provides an analysis of the process that leads to the loan take up decision by 
the women. Thereby the four components will be discussed and verified as a systematic process 
as depicted in Figure 3 of Chapter 3. As in the case of Chapter 4, I will reiterate the four 
hypotheses that are to be tested for the case of Pakistan:  
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the power position of men in the family (society), the more 
difficult is the outreach to women. 
Hypothesis 2: The operations of the MFI are negatively influenced by a strong 
establishment/ presence of local traditional moneylenders.  
Hypothesis 3: MFI outreach will be more difficult when the feudal structure is very 
strong. 
Hypothesis 4: MFI outreach is negatively influenced when there is fear of persecution, 
stigma or sanctions from the community and religious factions. 
5.4.1 Personal standpoint on the relevance of MFIs and other actors (Component 1); and 
perceived opinions of respondents of other actors on MFIs and 
membership (Component 2) 
!
 Table 5.3 presents the viewpoints of all the respondents on the importance of the social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 ROSCAs are basically groups of people who decide to pool their money, make regular contributions, and then give 
money to members on a rotating basis without any cost or interest (Rutherford 1997, p. 355). 
$!The word “Kameti” is a local name for ROSCAs in Pakistan.!
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institutions and actors, which make the basis for the first component in the decision to take out a 
loan. A majority of the respondents from the borrower HHs were of the opinion that the MFIs 
were very important for the provision of affordable credit services, contrary to the opinions of 
control group HHs, particularly the men. The difference in the opinions of the two sample means 
(borrower versus control group HHs) was also statistically significant. However there was a clear 
difference of opinion among the men and women of the control group, with all women 
respondents ranking the MFIs as either important or very important and most of the men 
characterizing MFIs not important or redundant. 
  
Table 5.3: Component 1: viewpoints on the importance of MFIs & other actors 
 Borrower HHs Control Group Total !"##$%$&'$("&()*+,-$(
+$*&)(.,/0*-1$(2#(
(3/3$)34(" 
N 43 35 12 9 99 
Reported by women men women men - 
Opinion on the importance of MFIs for 
services 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
Important but should be avoided 
 
 
0 
5 
38 
0 
 
 
0 
3 
31 
1 
 
 
0 
7 
5 
0 
 
 
6 
2 
1 
0 
 
 
6 
17 
75 
1 
 
 
-0.9091 *** 
(<0.0001) 
Opinion on the importance of religious 
and community groups 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
 
 
2 
35 
6 
 
 
1 
22 
12 
 
 
1 
9 
2 
 
 
1 
3 
5 
 
 
5 
69 
25 
 
 
0.0407 
(0.752) 
Opinion on the importance of 
moneylenders as service providers 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
Important but should be avoided 
 
 
6 
0 
6 
31 
 
 
7 
4 
3 
21 
 
 
1 
5 
0 
6 
 
 
1 
2 
1 
5 
 
 
15 
11 
10 
63 
 
 
 
-0.2631 
(0.357) 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
 Social ties within the community with peers, kin and religious groups seemed to play a vital 
role for both the sample groups. The religious community was regarded as important4 in the 
daily lives of all HHs. However, there was a strong tendency of men from the control group to 
report the religious community as very important, compared to men in the borrower HHs. While 
only one third of the men from the latter affirmed the religious community as very important, 
half of the men from the former held it to be very important. In line with the survey, they 
adhered strongly to what the religious heads preach as immoral and un-Islamic – including the 
practice of interest-based loans. One respondent from a deeply religious neighbourhood in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
 Important here means that the HH respondents might let their own opinions of the same be influenced by those of 
the other actors in their communal milieus (Chapter 4). 
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Sheikhupura expressed this in the following statement: 
“....(t)he preacher gives sermons after Friday prayers (in the mosque) against all 
loan institutes that operate on the interest based system and warns that true 
Muslims will shun such practices and all who are devout believers will refrain from 
such (credit) services” (interview with female non-borrower, Sheikhupura, Punjab, 
Pakistan). 
Friday prayers are a special weekly event where the men from the local community get together 
in the afternoon for the Muslim midday prayers. After the prayer, there is usually a brief sermon, 
in which the Pesh-Imam (the person who leads the prayer) addresses the devotees who gathered 
for the prayers. It was such a gathering that the statement from the respondent above referred to, 
making it clear that the clergy or the religious headmen within the neighbourhoods have a 
regular platform to disseminate their opinions and influence the local community. Any issues 
that these religious headmen might find unsavoury or objectionable in the light of religion (or 
their own interpretation of it) is then addressed, attacked or admonished in these weekly 
sermons. Men who are regular visitors of these sermons might well take up the advice or the 
guidance of these religious community leaders when they are constantly addressed on various 
matters. The religious leaders or imams also serve as counsellors on all issues, ranging from 
family matters to problems of livelihood, and people seek their guidance and advice on religious 
decrees and rules as well. This is largely an esteemed position, and provides these religious 
counsellors with a certain amount of power and social standing within the communities, so that 
their word cannot be ignored or challenged. Thus, when these religious counsellors advise 
against interest-based loans or MFIs, then it might induce the local communities, and especially 
the men within these communities, to adhere to their advice.  
Beyond this feature, which was quite specific to the Pakistan context, the sentiments on 
borrowing in general among the survey HHs in Pakistan were quite similar to those expressed by 
their survey counterparts in India. Many in the communities were not keen on borrowing even 
when in dire need. As in India, it was an act that was socially scorned and looked down upon. 
This general discomfort with borrowing as a practice was one reason for many to regard MFI 
membership as taboo (regardless of the issue of interest-based loans). This was also a relevant 
theme for many Kashf employees who were well aware of this stance toward borrowing. One 
branch manager described this discomfort with MFI membership as the fear of “loss of face or 
self esteem or honour” (interview with Kashf branch manager) if instalments are not paid in 
time. This sentiment appeared in many interviews across all the districts in Punjab. According to 
a male survey respondent: 
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“....[I] have a need for credit, only I dare not approach them, [MFIs] for fear of my 
honour.... in case I am not able to pay and the loan officers come shouting about it 
in my neighbourhood.....that would be too big a shame for me to take” (interview 
with male non-borrower, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan).  
As in the case of India, fear of ostracism or the fear of losing face and the household head’s wish 
to keep all control of family matters are several facets of the same negative attitude towards 
borrowing. 
Regarding moneylenders, a majority of all respondents, regardless of status or gender, 
reported their services as important, but felt that they “should be avoided” at best. The reason 
many in the Punjab districts gave were the same as in India: that in emergencies they are the only 
source of guaranteed and speedy cash, even if on exorbitant and exploitative terms, as one 
respondent commented: 
 “.... [moneylenders] will lend you money 365 days a year regardless of whether 
it is a weekend or a public holiday or the middle of the night” (interview with 
male borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan).  
The respondents of the survey felt that moneylenders indeed were an important buffer for cash 
needs to poor HHs and that the moneylenders did not necessarily have a friendly or amicable 
stance toward MFIs within their communities. Contrary to the responses of the HHs, however, 
none of the moneylenders interviewed admitted having a negative stance toward MFIs, or being 
robbed of clients due to their presence on the market, reporting that there were always people 
pressed for cash in emergencies, and that they (moneylenders) would always be needed as the 
lenders of last resort. As in the case of India, the coexistence of moneylenders alongside the 
MFIs is explained by the fact that moneylenders cater to the credit needs of individuals and HHs 
mostly for purposes other than those catered to by the MFIs. Also in contrast to India, where 
moneylenders normally enjoy a high social standing in terms of wealth, family or caste, 
moneylenders in Pakistan were not necessarily of a higher social standing. Mostly their activity 
was commercial in nature, and their social stature was not dominant, as lending on interest in 
general was considered un-Islamic and immoral.  
Of the four moneylenders interviewed, the one in Sheikhupura had the largest loan 
portfolio, with outstanding loans amounting to about ,-.!"/+++/+++!0123!""/#++45According to 
this moneylender: 
“... (I) am just helping people in need. When I lend to them, I tell them the terms 
openly, even if I am lending at 300 percent, they know it and they agree to the 
terms. These people will obviously not get money from MFIs as they need it for 
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personal consumption or medical treatment etc.” (interview with moneylender, 
Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Contact with this moneylender was established through a Kashf loan officer who knew the 
locality, including all the local moneylenders, very well. After the interview with the 
moneylender, and once we had parted ways, the Kashf officer told the story of the 
moneylender’s second wife. She was less than half the age of her husband, and was the daughter 
of one of his old clients, who was a widow herself. The marriage resulted from an unpaid loan, 
plus the accrued interest on it that the poor widow could not pay over the years. All this could 
not be verified by the second wife or her mother under discussion, nor could another valid source 
confirm its validity – it could only be confirmed that the moneylender acknowledged having two 
wives. This story does highlight, however, that loans from moneylenders can be paid in kind. In 
UP and Bihar, this took the form of cheap labour, while in Pakistan it was the (alleged) case of a 
client being obliged to give their child as a second wife. Similar situations or scenarios no doubt 
occurred is imaginable in which moneylenders benefit from the vulnerabilities of their poor 
clientele. This might be avoided, however, if there were alternate sources of credit on the market. 
For example the fate of the poor widows’ daughter might have ended up differently if her mother 
had other options than selling her off. In turn, this would mean that moneylenders would have to 
adjust, loosening the grip on their clients that allows them to benefit from their vulnerable 
situations.  
A small-scale female moneylender I interviewed in Lahore was an MFI client herself. 
She openly stated that she would channel the money from several MFIs (whose names she 
refused to disclose) into moneylending, at much higher interest rates, and made a living on this 
scheme. She was able to accomplish this by giving the MFI other reasons for the purpose of the 
loan, such as a cosmetic salon that she ran parallel to her money lending. Other, more 
mainstream moneylenders therefore might harbour ill-intentions towards contemporary MFIs for 
effectively enabling such channels of upstart competition. Their sentiments and attitudes towards 
MFIs might not therefore necessarily be amicable.     
Table 5.4 presents the general sentiments and attitudes toward MFIs (as perceived by the 
respondents) of various actors within their communities, which is the basis for the second 
component in the loan take up decision. As the table demonstrates, the differences of perceived 
opinion regarding MFIs for all actors in the two sample means are mostly highly significant. 
These actors to whom varying opinions on MFIs were ascribed within the samples include first 
and foremost the male head of the household, the family (both immediate and extended), but also 
the community or caste chief, the neighbours and peers within the community, the local 
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politicians and feudal lords and partly government officials.  
Table 5.4: Component 2: General viewpoint on MFIs (as presumed by the respondents) of various actors 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34("(
N 43 35 12 9 
Reported by women men women men 
Husband/ male guardian (would) approve(s) of 
MFI membership 39 32 3 2 
-0.6722 *** 
(<0.0001) 
Immediate family (would) approve(s) of MFIs 42 34 4 2 -0.6743 *** (<0.0001) 
Extended family’s opinion of MFI membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
4 
30 
9 
 
3 
29 
3 
 
0 
5 
7 
 
0 
2 
7 
 
0.6 *** 
(<0.0001) 
Community chief/ headmen / biradari’s  2 
opinion of MFIs 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
8 
31 
4 
 
 
8 
24 
3 
 
 
0 
9 
3 
 
 
0 
4 
5 
 
 
0.497 *** 
(0.0002) 
Neighbours/ peers’ stand on MFI membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
6 
34 
3 
 
6 
27 
1 
 
0 
10 
2 
 
0 
8 
1 
 
0.2337 ** 
(0.035) 
 
Religious community/ foreman’s opinion of MFI 
membership 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
17 
26 
 
 
10 
25 
 
 
2 
10 
 
 
2 
7 
 
 
0.1557 
(0.175) 
Local politicians/ Feudal lords’ opinion of MFI 
membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
0 
40 
3 
 
 
0 
32 
3 
 
 
0 
12 
0 
 
 
2 
7 
0 
 
 
-0.1732 ** 
(0.0126) 
Local moneylenders/ traders’ opinion of MFI 
membership 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
22 
21 
 
 
14 
21 
 
 
4 
8 
 
 
3 
6 
 
 
0.1499 
(0.2449) 
Government employees’ opinion of MFI 
membership 
Positive 
Indifferent 
Negative 
 
 
0 
41 
2 
 
 
0 
35 
0 
 
 
0 
11 
1 
 
 
1 
8 
0 
 
 
-0.0889 * 
(0.081) 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. See Appendix 7 for a definition. 
The differences are not statistically significant among the sub-sample means for the 
categories “moneylenders” and the “religious community foremen” in their opinions on MFIs. 
Nonetheless, not a single respondent interviewed in Pakistan identified the stance of these two 
particular actors as positive towards MFIs, in contrast to their counterparts in India. According to 
the HH respondents, they are indifferent at best. Actors like local politicians, feudal lords and 
government officials are a special case, as perception of their attitudes is related to the 
delinquency crisis that the whole sector experienced in 2008/9 and will be discussed at length in 
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the next section.  
Contrary to the men from borrower HHs, very few men from the control group would 
approve of MFI membership of the HH’s women. Concurrently, control group respondents 
reported a much higher level of opposition to MFI membership from all other actors, including 
the immediate and extended family, religious faction, the local moneylenders and the community 
headmen, than did borrower HHs. On all accounts, the control group respondents perceived the 
opposition to MFIs to be much stronger amongst these groupings than did the respondents of the 
borrower group. However, the family of the HHs, both immediate and extended, seemed to be of 
far greater importance to the HHs than the community, neighbours or the clan at large. Though 
these were also important and significant, they were comparatively secondary to the familial ties.  
The relevance of the (extended) family’s importance in all (immediate) family matters 
was conveyed in one such statement from a respondent in Gujranwala: 
“.... [In our society] it becomes very difficult to function as a family unit if there 
is bad blood in the family. Everywhere you go or move [within the community] 
you are recognised as a unit of the family and hardly ever as an individual.... 
[one] is always referred to as the son [daughter] or brother [sister] of so and so, 
it therefore is easier to stick together and have harmonious relationships. When 
the [family] elders and others in the family do not bless something [a decision or 
an event], then there is no need [no way] to carry it out” (interview with female 
non-borrower, Kasur, Punjab, Pakistan). 
 Families are thus quite close knit and looking at the statistics (Tables 4.1 and 5.1), there were 
markedly more joint-family structures in Pakistan than in India, making the familial support 
indispensible in everyday matters for a harmonious co-existence (see appendix 7 for definitions 
of joint family structures).  Relative to these familial ties note the statement of one respondent 
from Lahore: 
“Good relations with your biradari and community are important at all times 
but it is best done when one takes them into account over larger issues .....not 
[one’s] personal daily decisions or issues. We have to find [pragmatic] ways to 
maintain ties and skilfully avoid interference in matters that can be avoided” 
(interview with male borrower, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan).  
From these statements, two things can be inferred. First, the community and the social ties along 
caste and kinship ties are important for the family in general. Second, the HHs have to be 
selective and pragmatic in their approach to dealing with these matters. In short, the larger 
community can be flexibly and skilfully handled if and when the HH’s decisions diverge from 
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those of the biradari or clan members. Yet family, both immediate and extended, might be more 
difficult to handle when there are clashes of preferences over really important matters. Agreeing 
on the matters of greatest importance can help a HH to gain some freedom in the smaller 
decisions of daily life. 
This intriguingly differentiated stance of the borrower HHs towards different actors was 
also revealed in their dealings with other actors in their communities, such as the religious 
foremen (pesh-imams) in their communities. Although proportionately there is not a big 
difference between the responses of the men from both the sample groups concerning the 
religious foremen having a negative opinion of the MFIs, the men from the borrower HHs were 
less prone to taking this opposition seriously. For instance commenting on the opposition from 
the religious faction regarding loans, one respondent from a borrower HH sarcastically 
commented:  
“They [religious foremen] initially warned and strongly preached against the 
interest based loans; however... they are now clandestine clients themselves” 
(interview with male borrower, Kasur, Punjab, Pakistan).  
During the interview the respondent was most amused when relating how many religious 
imams who had previously openly admonished people against interest-based loans were now 
themselves clients with MFIs. When those who preach against interest based loans start taking 
up such loans themselves, it gives the others within the community the right to question the 
validity of such preaching. Some might defect from following the advice of such religious 
headmen. Others may take a more rigid stance, in which they still adhere to the principle of 
interest free loans and still shun MFIs, but condemn the actions of the religious leader under 
discussion.  
To sum up, responses reveal that there is an inclination to be influenced in a decision to 
refrain from MFI membership when there is opposition or a negative stance towards these from 
the various actors. In addition to this, opinions on borrowing in general is another major element 
that affects the HHs decision to borrow or not from an MFI. The relationships maintained by the 
HHs within their informal networks, like family (both immediate and extended), religious 
foremen, clan and kin members (biradari), neighbours and peers are quite important to the 
respondents, so that probably the opinions of the members within these networks cannot be 
totally ignored. Among these actors, the most vital role for the women’s membership decision 
for an MFI loan were their male counterparts within the HHs, opposition from whom can make it 
very difficult to pursue a loan decision. Beyond that the immediate family and the religious 
foremen within the community had a relatively strong role to play, and influenced many HH’s 
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decisions against a loan take up from MFIs. For the discussion of the third component from 
Figure 3, namely the actions of these actors towards (potential) MFI client HHs, the next section 
presents a discussion.  
5.4.2 Attitudes and actions of external actors towards (potential) MFIs and 
clients (Component 3)  
!
 The opinions that the various groups harbour regarding MFIs and their clients discussed in 
the last section can be evaluated by their attitude towards the respondent HHs and Kashf 
employees for their (potential) membership and employment with Kashf. Any kind of threat, 
warnings or provocations encountered by Kashf clients, or by non-borrowing HHs who seek a 
potential membership with Kashf, is presented in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: Component 3: MFI borrower information and threats/ warnings/ provocations encountered by the 
respondents 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(" 
N 43 35 12 9 
Reported by women men women men 
Male guardian/ husband knows of borrower 
status  
 42 2 35 - - - 
 
MFI status confidential (not made public to 
peers)  
 3 2 - - - 
(Potential) MFI membership has been a cause 
of threat/ provocation from 
     
 extended family 6 1 2 1 0.0519 
 community chief/  headman 1 1 0 0 -0.0256 
 neighbours/ peers  6  5 1 0 -0.0952 
 religious factions  6 6 1 1 -0.0586 
local moneylenders/ traders  2 2 0 0 -0.0519 
 public officials 1 1 0 0 -0.0128 
 local politicians/ councillors 1 0 0 0 -0.0259 
 Other MFI loan officers 7 6 0 0      -0.1688 ** 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. A case of the male nominee being the brother in law and not the husband, who opposed MFI membership. 
 The previous section highlighted that borrowing in general is an act that many would want 
to avoid. Similar to the number of cases in India, there were an equal number of respondents in 
Pakistan who wanted to keep a low profile by keeping their borrower status confidential to their 
extended family and peers. Five respondents (3 HHs) admitted to hiding their loan status from 
family and peers in their communities. These statements were backed by Kashf staff (see Table 
5.6), who admitted that some members preferred to hide their MFI membership status from their 
families or relatives. Similar to the situation in India, borrowing was not something which a HH 
would want to be associated with. Within the communities, humility and living humbly, even 
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hand to mouth, was a status which would still be looked upon with empathy and appreciated by 
many. However, the appearance of living beyond one’s means and taking up loans might be 
interpreted as a sign that the family was extravagant and not in control of their lives. As one 
respondent in the district of Lahore put it, in the words of a common old adage, one should not 
go beyond his means or capacity.  
 Apart from this perception of borrowing, respondents from both the sample groups reported 
having encountered unpleasantness in the form of threats and warnings of one sort or another, 
directly from extended families, neighbours and peers, MFI loan officers, the religious faction, 
public officials and moneylenders. However, of all such encounters the most active and 
bothersome were those with the religious foremen within the communities. This was confirmed 
by the loan officers of Kashf. Of the 11 loan officers and managers interviewed, 10 reported 
members of the religious faction specifically as a group hindering them in their work when in the 
field (see Table 5.6). According to one loan officer: 
 “… [As employees of the MFI] when we are in the neighbourhoods on work, we 
are harassed by the members of the religious faction and their supporters; who 
follow us in the streets within communities and call us names like ‘dozakhi’ 
[meaning dweller of hell in the hereafter] and give us a difficult time in doing our 
work” (interview with Kashf loan officer, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Obviously, these religious groups were a cause of such nuisance as they believed they were the 
community’s moral police, and obligated to make sure that immoral acts (interest-based loans) 
were curbed and discouraged. This risk of harassment associated with religious influence within 
communities is a real one in Pakistan (Haq and Khaliq 2011). One such strong opinion was 
handed down by a non-borrower’s young son who was active in the local community with a 
group who possessed anti-MFI sentiments: 
 “Riba [charging interest] is a great sin… banks may do that on a state level, but we 
in the local communities will not have it tolerated when this [ideology/ practice] 
creeps into our neighbourhoods and streets. I and like-minded fellows often discuss 
this and have many times tried to persuade them [loan officers of MFI] to stop their 
activities.... there are also other Sharia-compliant alternatives to microfinance” 
(interview with male non-borrower, Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Upon further probing, the respondent claimed that MFIs were also operating on the local markets 
in communities offering loans which were compliant with the Islamic economic laws. The 
respondent did not name any particular MFIs, but insisted that such MFIs were not only Sharia-
compliant in the range of products that they had to offer, but also made sense for low-income 
!"$(!
!
communities like theirs as they were cheaper. Elaborating on this, he referred to how some MFIs 
used local mosques as their operating base within communities offering interest free loans based 
on the concept of Qarz-e-Hassana. Qarz-e-Hasana is an Islamic benevolent loan, which is 
basically based on the principle of “spending in the path of Allah without expectations of return 
in this world. If the party to which the loan is given is able to repay, then one might get the loan 
back, but otherwise not” (Zaman 2013: 12). The respondent also stressed the point that such 
Sharia-compliant lending and borrowing practices would find general acceptance within the 
communities without much opposition, as they were in accordance with the beliefs of the 
majority within the communities, and would not discriminate against minorities either. This 
helps explain the fact that more control group HHs were part of credit associations like ROSCAs 
(see Table 5.2) than borrowers with conventional MFIs. As ROSCAs pool savings and 
technically operate interest-free, few people would have reservations toward becoming a 
member in a ROSCA for religious reasons.   
Relating all this later to a colleague at the Economics Department of the Punjab University in 
Lahore, I was able to gather further insights on how MFIs with Sharia-compliant microfinance 
loans were operating within Punjab and Pakistan for over a decade. Akhuwat is an NGO MFI in 
Pakistan, one of the largest in the country with branches all over Pakistan. It provides interest 
free microfinance to the poor, with the aim of enhancing their standard of living by creating a 
system based on mutual support in society (Akhuwat 2015). A look at Akhuwat’s website 
confirms that they offer loans which are interest free (Sharia-compliant). It operates from 
religious venues like mosques, usually addressing crowds after Friday prayers, and seeks to 
inspire and harness the spirit of volunteerism in society (Akhuwat 2015).5 The interesting point 
here is that MFIs that offer products which are more Sharia-compliant will eventually compete 
for the same clientele as MFIs that do not. This alternative is always better for the borrowers, as 
there is no interest and no pressure to return the money. However, credit may be in short supply 
for many of the borrowers, as there is no obligation to return the money needed to continue 
lending. Furthermore, more conventional MFIs like Kashf are perhaps more established and have 
a loyal clientele who are otherwise satisfied with the services being offered to them. This 
clientele might not be willing to switch easily to alternatives like Akhuwat.6 Yet there might be 
indirect support and pressure from within the communities on behalf of Sharia-compliant MFIs, 
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5
 The MIX market also lists Akhuwat as the 3rd largest in Pakistan in terms of active borrowers and 7th largest in 
terms of loan portfolio (larger than Kashf in both the terms). 
6
  Disclaimer: Akhuwat is just an example being quoted as a possible alternative to conventional MFIs mostly 
because of the scale of its operations which is compatible with Kashf. At no point whatsoever was Akhuwat 
mentioned by the respondents of the survey in any context regarding the operations of Kashf or other MFIs 
whatsoever.!
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either voluntarily or perhaps even with support from MFIs to those who endorse them. 
Understandably, the fact that Sharia-compliant MFIs operate from religious sites such as 
mosques would make them more approachable and perhaps more popular with local 
communities that are predominantly Muslim. The respondent in Sheikhupura, who was very 
vocal in expressing his displeasure at conventional MFIs like Kashf that operate through interest-
based loans, denied all claims of support from such alternative Sharia-conforming MFIs or their 
supporters for his efforts in confronting conventional MFIs. However, MFIs with products for 
the local communities based on conflicting ideologies or principles, may confront strife or 
opposition amongst the supporters or employees of rival MFIs, due to their motivation to endorse 
MFIs that are more in accordance with prevailing beliefs or culture. Therefore the imam who 
opted for an MFI loan despite his stance against interest-based loans, could be a part of such a 
Sharia-compliant MFI, due to their close associations to mosques. Unfortunately, this could not 
be verified.    
Beyond the issue of ideology, in general, women respondents reported a higher rate of 
provocations and threats from the extended family than did men. In addition to the extended 
family, neighbours and peers were also among the major provocateurs militating against MFI 
membership. The main reasons cited for these provocations were opposition on religious grounds 
and envy. As stated in the previous section, the respondents from the borrower HHs, especially 
men, had a much more pragmatic attitude and were less intimidated by such issues as loss of face 
or fear of religious leaders. As long as they themselves were convinced of the decision to opt for 
a loan, and secure in the fact that they did not have to fear the loss of authority in the home, it did 
not matter that the official recipients of the loans were the women. One such respondent from 
Gujranwala stated: 
“We were already married seven years when my wife first suggested that we 
borrow from Kashf to invest in a motorbike for speedy delivery of the milk from our 
cows. My parents and brother were extremely unhappy about the decision as they 
thought my wife would then make claims [on the revenue generated from the sale of 
the milk]. I knew that even if she did, the money would be invested back in our 
children and we would be able to deliver milk faster especially in summers [to 
avoid the milk from going bad] and make more money” (interview with male 
borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan). 
Credit appropriation by women within social institutions like the HHs or communities is usually 
followed by a pattern of rivalries and envious struggles within these units, and this pattern has 
been commonly observed (see Guerin et al. 2010 and Maclean 2010). In the case of joint HHs 
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like that of the respondent, some relatives feared that his wife opting for a loan would affect the 
households’ decisions like resource allocation and management, and were concerned that the 
wife would bargain and negotiate a new place in the pre-existing familial hierarchy due to her 
contribution to the household budget (see Guerin et al. 2010). The loan materialized despite 
opposition from the senior members of the immediate joint family, because the male guardian in 
this case felt secure enough in his position and convinced of the net benefits of the loan to his 
HH.  
On the provider side, Kashf employees have also had a tough time conducting their 
operations within the communities. Table 5.6 presents some statistics on this.  
Table 5.6: Responses from Kashf employees concerning problems/ hindrances they face 
N 11 
When in the field always cautious/ wary of  attitude/ surroundings/ people/ language 11 
Have faced difficulties/ were hindered in approaching clients from different groups 10 
Clients prefer to keep membership secret from extended family/ neighbours/ peers  8 
Groups specified as causing trouble/ difficulties that hinder employees in their work 
Members of the religious faction 
People of the locality (local leaders) 
Family members of the borrowers 
Loan officers/ employees of other MFIs/ banks 
Advocates/ lawyers 
Landlords/ rich powerful men and their devotees 
OD clients 1 
 
10 
8 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
Clients have been hindered in paying instalments due to external (third party) influence 6 
External influence (3rd parties) specified via client complains as hindrance in timely  
payments 
Moneylenders 
Loan misuse 
Envious family (jealousy) 
OD clients  
 
2 
2 
1 
2 
Trouble or support from government agencies in general and during crisis 
Trouble 
Support 
None 
 
8 
1 
3 
Specification of government agencies/ employees who cause trouble 
Local politicians/ nazims/ councillors 
Police officers 
Public prosecutors/ advocates 
 
4 
2 
2 
1. OD (over draft) clients are clients who are current defaulters of loans disbursed in and before 2008 and the 
delinquency crisis resulting in major default from clients of Kashf.  
 
From the discussion in the previous sections, it comes as no surprise that topping the list of 
troublemakers within the communities, as identified by the Kashf employees, were members of 
the religious faction. Almost all loan officers interviewed referred to one encounter or another by 
the religious faction or their supporters, which caused the loan officers difficulties in their work. 
Other groups identified for such behaviour were people of the locality and neighbours, family 
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members and loan officers from competing MFIs, advocates and lawyers were specified as a 
group on the list of trouble makers. The trouble encountered from the categories “people of the 
locality or local leaders”, “advocates and lawyers” and “OD clients” have been mostly associated 
with the crisis that the microfinance sector faced in 2008/2009 in Pakistan. In this context, one 
Kashf branch manager stated that: 
“…since MFIs in Pakistan work in a very volatile and strenuously increasing 
competitive environment, any rumours from any faction, especially legal advisors, 
local political leaders or police and government employees about MFIs’ 
‘helplessness to take any legal action in case of default’ or loan write offs have 
proved to have grave consequences for the MFIs” (interview with Kashf branch 
manager, Punjab, Pakistan)7. 
The statement from the branch manager of Kashf above was made in reference to the 
delinquency crisis in the years 2008/9. At the very centre of this sector crisis was Kashf, where 
clients all over Punjab and Pakistan stopped repayments due to aggressive and harmful 
interventions from several actors that initially started off in the district of Sheikhupura, Punjab, 
and then spread uncontrollably to all parts of the country (see Burki 2009). The spark for this 
mass default is said to have been a local politician, who is reported to have promised his support 
in having the loan of a woeful MFI client who was behind in her/his repayments to Kashf 
cancelled. The politician had basically used the woeful client’s plea for intervention as an 
opportunity to gain political mileage from the local community members before the upcoming 
elections. The following section will discuss the crisis in more detail. 
Microfinance Delinquency Crisis 2008/ 2009  
According to a report commissioned by the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN), 
“Groups of borrowers of one of Pakistan’s largest microfinance provider (MFP) – referred in 
this report as MFP-X – refused to repay loans amidst rumours of mass loan write offs” (Burki 
2009, p.1). The “MFP-X” in the commissioned report is Kashf as confirmed by several 
interviews with the Kashf employees and clients. The facts of the whole story as stated by the 
interviewed respondents of this study and those stated in the report conform perfectly. Kashf 
management itself would not confirm this. However, one senior executive staff member did 
provide a cue, in a discussion, to refer to this commissioned report by Burki 2009. 
From discussions with the Kashf employees and clients, the crisis was reported to have 
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 The branch manager wished to remain anonymous for this statement, so the district of the branch is intentionally 
omitted. 
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started in the administrative unit of Muridke of Sheikhupura district, where a local politician 
backed borrowers of Kashf in resisting repayments, encouraging the clients to default. This was 
then exacerbated by all kinds of goons who saw some window of opportunity to benefit in 
economically by lending their supports to rival MFIs, local elites and rich landlords, 
moneylenders and politicians who jumped on the bandwagon to advance their vested interests. 
One of the most prominent channels employed to dissuade Kashf’s clients from going about their 
regular course of action were spreading mass rumours of the death of Kashf CEO, who had 
allegedly written off all loans before her death (Burki 2009). According to multiple respondents 
in Muridke, Sheikhupura, for this purpose several hundred copies of bogus newspaper articles in 
the local daily newspapers were doing the rounds in the locality, allegedly with Kashf’s CEO’s 
last interview on her deathbed. This wreaked havoc upon Kashf’s normal operations. The 
lending mechanism of Kashf before 2009 was group lending, but during the crisis “unzipping” of 
the groups occurred. This is a phenomenon described by Matin (1997) as when the entire group, 
burdened by excessive or multiple default, sees no further hope of continuing loans and decides 
to default en masse8 (Wright and Rippey 2003, p. 4).  
All the claims related by the survey respondents in Sheikhupura were corroborated in the 
report by Burki (2009, p. 12): “...the rumour was spread through word of mouth carried by 
borrowers social network, and through province wide sale of photocopies of an article of local 
newspaper, being sold to borrowers for PKR 500 (USD 6.25) to PKR 3000 (USD 37.5) per 
copy.” A potential defaulter, having instalments of several thousands of PKR open, would have 
been tempted to pay just 500 PKR for the paper, in the hope of securing it as a piece of evidence 
for not having to pay back, or to convince the rest of his group members to defect from regular 
repayments. For those offering these, inciting default products was therefore a lucrative business 
to make high profits as long as the opportunity was there. Likewise, several other opportunists, 
including advocates and legal representatives, started offering services of legal action for a fee to 
all the defaulters in the court of law. Like the producers of the fake newspaper articles, these 
professional groups probably saw a window of opportunity to make money. Still other defaulters 
were supported by local government officials and union councils. The reasons for such support, 
however, are unclear and open to interpretation; this may have been due to social or familial 
associations, or to economic favours and compensation for such support.  
The report also listed a number of other factors contributing to the crisis, like the rapid 
growth of the microfinance industry, increasing competition and overlap, and multiple 
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 The term “unzipping” was used by Rutherford first in 1992 and cited in Burki (2009), Wright and Rippey (2003) 
and Matin (1997); however none of them list the original source in the references.  
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borrowing. However, support from local politicians for political mileage and legal advisors of all 
sorts trying to cash in on the opportunity seemed to have been the trigger for the revolt from the 
borrowers, and the crisis spread before it could be contained. During this delinquency crisis, 
interference from all sorts of agencies (private and government), groups and individuals, trying 
to turn the Kashf crisis into an opportunity to benefit personally, caused twofold damage. One, 
these actions affected Kashf’s performance, both in terms of outreach and sustainability. Second, 
these actions damaged the sustainability of the sector in general, undermining the reputation and 
image of the microfinance industry, which had been built up over decades through the hard work 
of several serious and reputable organisations.  
In the wake of this delinquency crisis, Kashf partially stopped new disbursements. This 
curtailed growth immensely for the coming quarters and years, in contrast to the rapid growth 
that the organisation had experienced in the past (see Kashf quarterly report 2009). The over-
draft (OD) clients were offered incentives to return their loans and reconcile as clients. Many 
opted for this, but quite a few have still not paid back their instalments. In addition, Kashf has 
had to overhaul its lending mechanisms and come up with more stringent, elaborate and formal 
instruments for repayment of loans post-crisis. Kashf is now more selective in who qualifies for 
a loan, and obviously this has an enormous effect on what kinds of borrowers are targeted, and if 
they are bankable. Group lending has been abandoned and loans are now issued on an individual 
basis, relying on individual responsibility rather than building centres that promote joint liability 
(Ibid). Account holding with a bank by either the borrower or the male nominee is now 
mandatory as an active policy choice by senior management. Kashf also undertook intensive 
strategic measures to mitigate operational risks concerning external actors during and following 
the quarters after the crisis in 2009. First and foremost among these were “...developing a strong 
contact with external stakeholders including the politicians, the administration and media 
through a proactive PR strategy” (Ibid: 4). 
Conclusively, for Kashf and its clients, interventions of all sorts from external actors was 
a cause of harassment on different levels. Individuals or groups representing members of the 
religious faction, rival MFIs, local politicians, people of the locality, government officials and 
clients’ families have affected Kashf’s operations in general, and hampered its operations 
massively during the delinquency crisis in particular. Religious ideology, especially an often-
stated preference for replacing conventional MFIs with Sharia-compliant MFIs on local and 
national levels, is a major motivation for the interventions of the members of religious faction in 
local communities.  
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5.4.3 Domestic & household reactions to women’s MFI membership (Component 4)  
!
  Up to this point, this chapter has focussed on the perceptions and actions of the wider social 
milieus and ties of the survey HHs, both borrowers and non-borrowers. This section will analyse 
the fourth and most important component in the loan take up decision process, namely 
opposition (if any) at the HH level from intimate family circles, like the spouse, in-laws or the 
immediate family, to women’s MFI membership.  
 Table 5.7 lists statistics regarding male nomination and domestic disharmony due to MFI 
membership. Similar to the case of NEED in India, as per Kashf’s lending policy, loans can and 
will only be issued conditional upon having a male nominee for the loan. When I questioned the 
requirement of male nomination, it appeared to be a bit confusing for both the Kashf 
management and staff and for the respondents of the survey, who took it as a matter of course. 
Very few seemed to have an opinion on why this was so and why the women could not opt for a 
loan even when they did not have a male nominee or the backing of one. The condition of a male 
nominee was deemed logical and legitimate on the grounds that in a patrilineal society like 
Pakistan, the consent of the family head is a natural course of things and would only safeguard 
family harmony and ensure the timely return of the loan. Women themselves were regarded as a 
secondary authority (if at all) amongst the HHs even for their personal decisions and choices.   
Table 5.7: Male nomination, domestic violence/ conflicts and MFI membership 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(" 
N 43 35 12 9 
Reported by women Men women men 
Male nominee condition obligatory by the MFI for 
issuance of loan 43 35 - - - 
Husband male nominee for MFI loan 31 - - - - 
Female respondent has considered taking a loan 
from an MFI - - 8 6 - 
Physical and verbal violence common in household 19 15 5 3 -0.0549 (0.655) 
Conflict/ domestic disharmony in household due to 
(desire for) MFI membership 12 8 2 1 
-0.1135 
(0.278) 
Relationship between the respondents has 
deteriorated due to (desire for) MFI membership 11 7 0 0 
-02307 ** 
(0.014) 
MFI membership (perceived) as means to more 
economic strength and way to deal with marital 
violence 
8 - 3 - 0.0639 (0.631) 
HHs where violence was prevalent to membership 
and the level of violence/ HH disharmony has gone 
up post MFI membership 
13 - - - 
 
- 
 
Physical/ verbal violence from family members 
other than the male guardian due to MFI 
membership 
9 - 1 - -0.1184 (0.3765) 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
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   This male nominee conditionality was not unique to Kashf. Other MFIs operating in 
Punjab and indeed across Pakistan had this policy for loan applications. However, this 
conditionality for the loan does not account for the state of women who aim for economic 
independence through investment in their small enterprises and either have male guardians who 
would refuse their desire to access credit or have no male guardian at all. Neither does it help 
women who would want to escape domestic violence by making efforts to fend for themselves or 
their children without depending on male guardians or spouse. Relatively speaking, Kashf was 
more flexible in the nomination of male guarantor compared to NEED in India, whose policy of 
“married only clients” and “husband as male nominee” mostly failed to serve the many women 
who were unable to comply with this policy. The fact that almost a third of Kashf clients did not 
have their spouses as their male nominee, compared to only one in every ten NEED clients, is 
one indication of this flexibility. Nonetheless, this rule still discriminates against women who do 
not have the support of a male nominee. 
 When looking at the responses from the interviews of the women from both the sample 
groups, it becomes difficult not to judge the adjusting and compromising nature of the control 
group women. Although two thirds of the women from the control group acknowledged wanting 
to opt for a loan from an MFI for some micro economic activity, few would persist in the face of 
initial opposition by their husband, male guardian or immediate family, as indicated in Table 5.7. 
Only a fifth of women from the control group stated that their persistence in their desire to 
acquire an MFI loan was indeed a cause of disharmony in the HH. This could be interpreted in 
multiple ways: either the women were not serious or motivated enough to go through with their 
goal of economic activity, or they were simply too acquiescent or perhaps intimidated by the 
opposition within the HH. From what the women who did actually want to opt for a loan, 
communicated, however, the latter was the more important factor. For many women their 
acquiescence and wariness in the face of intimidation put them off their path of realising a 
membership with an MFI.  
 One such statement from a respondent in Gujranwala illustrates the point here. 
“My husband is a very hard [strict] man. When he says no to something, you do not 
ask a second time. I am a skilled tailor [clothes/ dress maker] and have a manual 
sewing machine.....with a small loan, I can buy an electric one and earn quite a bit 
of money by sewing peoples clothes in the neighbourhood and my daughter can use 
my manual one to help me out with the smaller [easier parts of dress making not 
needing a lot of supervision] things after school. I did not even get to explain my 
whole plan to my husband, after I saw how angry he got even at the mention of a 
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loan from an MFI.....its’ been two years since my words froze in my mouth after I 
started off and I have not mentioned it again, I am too scared of his reaction” 
(interview with female non-borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Still another respondent, from Kasur, had a similar story to tell 
‘We live in a joint family with my husband’s three brothers, their families and my 
father in law. My father in law sees over all matters of the HH.....including the 
decisions that we as joint family have to take. My husband and I would not dare 
raise the question of an MFI membership, even though we have discussed this 
among us. My father in law and two of his sons would never allow any of us women 
in the HH to become an MFI member. It would cause a lot of stress and tension 
amongst the brothers and my father in law if I were to press or insist on getting a 
loan from an MFI...my husband has strictly advised me not to mention this in front 
of them [father in law and brothers in law]...he does not want me or himself to be 
the cause of strife within this family’ (interview with female non-borrower, Kasur, 
Punjab, Pakistan).  
As the stories above show, women are impelled or cajoled into conformity by their mostly male 
HH heads. Any inkling of protest whatsoever carries with it the burden of being labelled and 
blamed as the destroyer of peace within the mostly joint family HH structures. In such a scenario 
the husband might be a direct or indirect perpetrator of his wife’s coerced acquiescence or 
intimidation into conformity with acceptable behaviour as per the husband or his family’s desire. 
In any case the husband would get to maintain his authority (whether or not he is a direct 
perpetrator) and in most cases may prove to be the upholder of family peace and harmony, 
although wife might not see the whole scenario as harmonious. This acquiescence of women 
would then explain the fact (as depicted in Table 5.7) that even when there is disagreement or 
disharmony on the issue of MFI membership, the women would never let it get to a point where 
the relationship between her husband and herself would be negatively influenced.   
 Compared to the picture of acquiescence in non-borrowing HHs, however, in talking to the 
women from the borrower HHs, I got a totally different impression of how they dealt with and 
accommodated such issues of male dominance and intimidation into conformity with acceptable 
behaviour. Women from borrower HHs reported that their relationships with their male 
guardians had deteriorated due to the loan and this difference in reported deterioration of 
relationships was statistically significant. One explanation for this escalation can simply be that 
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MFI clients who reported their MFI membership as a means to deal with marital violence, have 
actually opted for a membership with an MFI so as to deal with relationships that were already 
not harmonious, in contrast to women from the control group who did not get to opt for a loan, 
again perhaps due to their acquiescent tendencies. Relationships of borrower women that were 
already violent before the loan might have taken another plunge downwards as these women 
attained a certain degree of financial independence. This financial independence might result in 
making the women less prone to previously unavoidable provocations whenever the women 
needed financial upkeep of HH needs from their spouses. The male spouse might perceive this as 
another challenge to his dominance over his female counterpart, and the ensuing increased 
violence may be interpreted as possible attempts to correct or resist this challenge. In comparison 
to India, there were no cases of violence due to alcohol abuse in Pakistan. According to the 
survey respondents from Muslim HHs, there was almost no alcohol consumption within these 
HH, with the exception of one. Several Christian HH respondents did acknowledge alcohol 
consumption, but none reported excessive alcohol abuse as was the case in multiple HHs in 
India. 
 Also approximately 21% of women from borrower HHs had encountered violence from 
their family members other than their male guardians, compared with only 8% of the control 
group women as reported in Table 5.7. Such incidents of violence from family members other 
than the husbands or male guardians were higher for women of borrower HHs, as more of them 
had dwellings of joint family structures (see Table 5.1). Again, similar to the case in India, the 
perpetrators of the violence inflicted on women were senior members within the family, usually 
in-laws both male and female.  
 It is also important to note that the women from borrower HHs in general described 
intensified or higher levels of violence with their HH initially due to their loans from Kashf. This 
level, according to many, had gone down over time and the relationship was stable. Women were 
relatively more confident in their relatively new attained status with their spouses and within 
their HHs. A respondent from Lahore, whose statement from her interview was quoted at the 
very start in the introduction, reported such a change of attitude and progress of her husband’s 
behaviour towards her over the years. The respondent was a client with Kashf for over four years 
and had started work through a loan invested in paying for a seasonal contract, a kind of a 
licence from shoe companies to make shoes with her whole joint family employed in the work 
from her home. During the entire interview at the respondent’s home, she was working 
simultaneously on making shoes alongside her husband and his brother, and insisted that she did 
not need to be interviewed alone as there was now no fear of talking about all the violence in her 
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relationship in the past. One could not help but notice how lightly and with what confidence she 
related the whole process of change over the past years, which were marked by physical and 
emotional abuse according to her own statements. This change of attitude toward an MFI loan 
may be compared to the similarly oppositional stances of men within the families of her 
counterparts from non-borrower HHs previously discussed. Many in the borrower HHs related 
similar stories and attitudes of their husbands or immediate in-laws or family members. 
 Another one from Sheikhupura who ran a small glass bangle works with her family of 8 
described a similar change having taken place: 
‘My husband and my in-laws now stand behind me 100%. However in the past, I 
have had to bear quite a lot of beatings and insults from them and was constantly 
made to feel useless.....my daughters were not sent to school and had to work 
several hours a day in making bangles. Initially my idea of a loan with Kashf was 
scoffed at by him [husband] and his family; however I did not give up and had 
others from the neighbourhood who had joined Kashf come over and convince how 
they were benefitting from the loans....after the first cycle of the loan of our 
neighbour was over my husband secretly let me join...later on his family found out 
and gave us a hard time....however that too got better with time’ (interview with 
female borrower, Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Conclusively, it was no easy journey for these women to go down the paths that they did. 
Despite their violent relationships and dominating husbands, they were quite steadfast in their 
undertakings. Their husbands eventually grew supportive of their decisions to pursue a loan and 
more financial independence in the face of the larger families and communities. Again as in the 
case of India, most of such stories came from clients who were long-time borrowers with Kashf 
and had also had to deal with the insecurities of their husbands and families, fearing men’s 
authority in the HH or a revolt against family hierarchal structures.  
 For the control group HHs, not only were the men less accommodating, but also the women 
were acquiescent and rather less inclined to challenge the authority of the men or complain due 
to fear of HH disharmony. Table 5.8 lists statistics on the disposition of power positions within 
the HHs. One can see from the table that although women in both the sample groups were just as 
likely to be afraid of disagreeing with their spouse, nonetheless, this did not stop the women 
from borrower HHs from adeptly finding ways to delicately place their agendas on the HH’s 
decision-making lists. In general, the figures show that the women in the borrower HHs have 
relatively more freedom of self-determination, fewer restrictions from their husbands and 
families and are more mobile compared to their counterparts from the non-borrower HHs. For 
!"%)!
!
example, three quarters of borrower women reported that their male guardians would allow them 
to improve their education, in comparison to only about half of the women from the control 
group. Similarly, the figures for restrictive attitudes toward women in the control group HHs 
were almost double those in borrower HHs. Likewise, the tendency of men from borrower HHs 
to have a more open and liberal attitude to women’s independence of choice concerning their 
education, working status and decisions of self-determination was higher than their counterparts 
from the control group.  
 
Table 5.8: Power positions, interpersonal attitudes and intra-household dynamics 
 Borrower HHs Control Group !"##$%$&'$("&(
)*+,-$(+$*&)(
.,/0*-1$(2#(
((((3/3$)34(5 
N 43 35 12 9 
Reported by women men women men 
Male guardian is the head of household 23 - 7 - 0.0484 
(0.770) 
Male guardian consumes alcohol/ drugs 7 3 3 2 0.1098 
(0.216) 
Respondent has a say in how earnings are to be 
spend 
34 32 9 9 0.0109 
(0.902) 
Respondent is afraid to disagree with male 
guardian 
23 - 7 - 0.0484 
(0.770) 
Male guardian would permit the female protégé 
to improve education 
32 28 6 4 -0.2930 *** 
(0.008) 
Male guardian has a restrictive attitude towards 
women  2 
 11 10 5 4 0.1558 
(0.173) 
Mobility of female respondents is restricted due 
to family confinements 
11 8 4 3 0.1064 
(0.341) 
Male guardian finds derogatory behaviour/ 
physical violence towards women normal/ 
commonplace 
7 5 2 2 0.0366 
(0.689) 
Male guardian finds women’s independence of 
choice normal/ commonplace 
16 25 2 4 -0.1843 
(0.2226) 
1. The p-value refers to a t-test of the difference in the means for borrower HHs – non-borrower HHs); *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
2. See Appendix 7 for a definition. 
 Interestingly, the difference between the sample groups regarding intra-HH power positions 
is hardly as pronounced as was the case between the two sub-groups in India. With the exception 
of one element, namely that the male guardian would allow the female protégé to improve her 
education, none of the other categories in Table 5.8 on the power positions of men and women 
were statistically significantly different between both the sample sub-groups. This means that 
there is not much significant difference in the attitudes of men towards women and their 
resulting respective freedoms between the borrower and non-borrower HHs, which might 
explain why control group women were hindered in opting for MFI loans given the obligatory 
male nomination for the loan. Still, more women from borrower HHs were challenging 
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patriarchal structures and less afraid of disturbing domineering familiar structures and 
hierarchies. The opposite could be said, however, for women of the control group, as discussed 
above.  
 Another point on the men of the borrower HHs is worth mentioning here. Unlike their 
counterparts from control group HHs, men from borrower HHs were more flexible and 
accommodating in their attitudes and could, if they wanted to, deal with the various pressures or 
opposition within their families or communities at large concerning a loan option for the women 
in their HHs from an MFI. However, for this to happen men within these HHs have needed time 
to realise that their female counterparts loan decision and financial contribution to their HHs 
must not necessarily come as a challenge to their male authority and insecurities regarding this 
issues have to be put aside.  
 Men’s non-liberal and inflexible stance in the control group HHs may explain the non-
borrowing women’s lack of initiation or self-determination regarding loan decisions. Table 5.9 
presents some statistics of the control group HHs regarding this.  
 
Table 5.9: Selected characteristics of non-borrower HHs regarding MFI association 
N 12 9 
Reported by women men 
Awareness of credit possibilities on the market ranging from formal banks to 
informal credit associations (ROSCA/ ASCAs) 
11 9 
Income situation of the household 
Earn enough to make savings 
Income only just enough to meet expenses 
Income not sufficient to cover all living expenses 
 
6 
5 
1 
 
2 
4 
1 
Female respondent has considered taking a loan from an MFI 8 6 
Reasons for not opting for a loan from an MFI  1 
Husband/ family oppose 
There is no need for a loan 
Community shuns it/ religion forbids it 
Other means of cheaper credit like ROSCAs/ ASCAs preferred  
 
8 
5 
4 
4 
 
5 
5 
3 
3 
Opinion of husband/ family on loans from MFI 
Negative/ oppose MFIs 
Indifferent 
Positive 
 
8 
2 
2 
 
6 
1 
2 
1. Checking more than one possibility per respondent was allowed such that there could have been multiple 
reasons given by the respondents for not opting for a loan from an MFI. 
 
 Out of every three, two of the female respondents from the control group HHs had 
considered taking an MFI loan; of these all had not opted to do so, as the decision was mostly 
not backed by husband or their immediate family. In over 50% of the cases there was opposition 
from the religious faction or the community, or interest-free versions of microcredit like 
ROSCAs were preferred. Even when the HHs are financially in a fragile situation and the 
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women would want to help out by wanting to invest in self-employment or some other income 
generating venture with a little capital from an MFI, it could not be realised due to such 
opposition and an obligatory male nomination for the loan. Responses from male respondents 
from within the control group HHs tallied with the responses of their female counterparts 
regarding their own and families opposition regarding MFIs. Consequently, this clearly points to 
the fact that MFI’s target populations are hampered in their decisions to opt for loans due to 
opposition within their HH’s familial settings.    
 In sum, the socio-political milieus of MFI clients play a decisive role in whether or not a 
loan is taken up or not, as the empirical evidence for the case of Pakistan from the previous 
sections clearly shows. Amongst the various actors, the most important role is that of the 
immediate familial circles of the women, especially the attitudes and opinions of men towards 
women’s membership with an MFI. In a patriarchal society like that of (Punjabi) Pakistan, 
women’s personal decisions and choices within the HHs are mostly secondary (or lower). Hence 
whenever there is a general restrictive attitude to women in their HHs and communities and an 
antipathy or opposition to MFIs from the male heads of the HHs, a woman’s decision regarding 
loan take up would most probably not materialise even if there is a need or desire for one. On the 
contrary, the male guardians’ support is critical for the decisions of the HH. When this support is 
given for a loan from an MFI, it will most probably result in a positive outcome for a loan 
decision. It is this crucial support that has brought about the obligatory requirement of a male 
nominee as a loan guarantor for Kashf and all potential MFI clients in the country. Thus there is 
undeniable proof to accept Hypothesis 1, that a stronger position of men in the family or society 
will make outreach to women more difficult.   
 Also, the difficult path of many women from borrower HHs reflected an important 
transition, from facing oppositional and violent relationships with dominating husbands, to 
relatively supportive ones willing to countenance their decisions for a loan and more financial 
independence in the face of the larger families and communities. The women’s steadfastness and 
dedication in their undertakings was a major contributor to this end. Despite little difference in 
the attitudes of men towards women and their resulting respective freedoms between the 
borrower and non-borrower HHs, more women from borrower HHs were challenging patriarchal 
structures, and they were less afraid of disturbing the domineering familial structures and 
hierarchies. For the control group HHs, not only were the men less accommodating, but also the 
women were acquiescent and rather less inclined to challenge the authority of the men or 
complain due to fear of HH disharmony. A difference in the attitude and nature of how men 
tackled issues of communal norm compliance or familial decisions like loans from MFIs was 
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observed within the two sample groups. The willingness of men from the borrower HHs not to 
involve others, like the extended family or community from within their social circles, made 
them less prone to the influences of actors like the religious leaders of the dominant Muslim 
society. However, many of their counterparts from within the control group HHs seemed to be 
strongly affected by the popular teachings of their faith against interest-based loans. Many would 
go a step further and preach against such financial practices voluntarily, promoting other 
interest-free alternative MFIs that operate from religious communal places. Also important in 
this context were the general attitudes towards borrowing, where it is generally scoffed at and is 
seen as best avoided. Therefore, there is some evidence to accept Hypothesis 4, that outreach will 
be negatively influenced when there is fear of persecution, stigma or sanctions from the 
community and religious factions.  
  Regarding hypotheses 3 and 4, regarding the presence of established local moneylenders 
and the strong feudal structures affecting MFI operations or outreach negatively or making it 
more difficult, the situation is not so grave. Moneylenders were relatively harmless and while 
feudal structures retained a strong presence, they did not pose a direct threat to MFIs operation as 
such. However, as was demonstrated in the section on the delinquency crisis of 2008-2009, 
interventions of all sorts from external actor’s including moneylenders and locally influential 
politicians and landlords, but also individuals or groups representing members of the religious 
faction, rival MFIs, people of the locality, government officials and clients’ families massively 
hindered Kashf’s operations. Thus, question 2 in this chapter – do interventions from various 
local actors within the working areas of MFI affect the MFIs’ operations? – can be answered 
with yes, especially in times of crisis. Under normal circumstances however, the evidence is 
rather weak and sketchy to accept hypotheses 2 and 3, that the outreach of the MFI is negatively 
influenced by a strong establishment of local traditional moneylenders, and that outreach will be 
more difficult when the feudal structure is very strong.  
5.5 Conclusion 
!
The social life of MFIs within the communities they serve, and the everyday life and 
perceptions of the target clientele within these communities play a central role in affecting the 
operations of MFIs. Findings show that women clientele cannot even access or apply for a loan 
without an obligatory requirement of a male nominee from within the HHs. Considerable tension 
arises from disagreements over whether to apply for a loan, as the household power positions 
were generally characterized by a domineering patriarchal set-up where men dominate all 
important HH decisions. Opposition from male guardian and family (both immediate and 
extended) in general was a deterrent for many HHs, particularly the women within them, opting 
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for a loan from an MFI, even when women themselves clearly wanted to opt for a loan. The 
intimidating and domineering male authority in many HHs, and hierarchal familial structures 
especially in joint family set ups leaves little room for women to pursue a loan from an MFI. In 
some instances the perseverance and steadfastness of the women, in pursuing a loan despite 
strong opposition and lack of support from her husband and family, resulted in a remarkable shift 
over time in the attitudes of the male guardians in particular and other extended family members 
as well.  
In general when men within the HHs had a more open and adaptable attitude towards 
borrowing and MFIs – as well as in their attitudes towards women and their basic freedoms in 
particular – they were more likely to support the loan take up decision even when there was 
opposition from the immediate family and community. Opposition to MFIs based on religious 
decrees from the religious factions was observed to be a strong force in hindering Muslim HHs 
from MFI membership. Negative propaganda after Friday prayers in religious places was one 
tactic employed by the religious leaders, pesh-imams and their supporters in order to keep 
potential HHs from opting for an MFI loan or allowing other family members to do so. The basic 
point of conflict between the supporters of the religious faction and the operations of 
contemporary MFIs is the concept of interest on loans, which runs counter to Sharia. Also there 
was a strong abhorrence toward borrowing or loans in general within the communities. Many felt 
that this would result in being publically shamed if the loan instalments were not returned on 
time and could mean a loss of face for the family, which might harm the social standing of the 
family and as a result lead to their ostracism within their communities and families. 
 Contrary to the case of India, the issue of moneylenders, local influential elites and 
feudal lords was less grave in Pakistan. Moneylenders were relatively harmless and not 
necessarily of a higher social standing due to the social stigma around interest-based lending. 
However, they still did not have an amicable stance to MFIs in general. The reasons for this was 
that there were several small channels of moneylending, created within the local communities 
and markets through MFI loans that had been basically misappropriated by clients-turned-
moneylenders. As far as feudal local elites were concerned, though feudal structures were much 
established and in place, they did not pose a direct threat to MFI operation as such. Kashf’s 
services basically encompass financial literacy and entrepreneurial micro-capital provision, and 
they offer hardly any direct advocacy or awareness programmes. Such programmes that exhort 
the poor against such feudalistic structures might have faced a more direct and stronger 
opposition from the feudal elites and local influential figures. However, during a crisis situation 
as was the case during the microfinance delinquency crisis in Pakistan in 2008/9, interventions of 
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all sorts from external actors, mostly individuals or groups representing members of the religious 
faction, moneylenders, rival MFIs, local influential elites and politicians, people of the locality, 
government officials, groups of professionals like lawyers and clients’ families massively 
hampered Kashf’s and the microfinance sector’s operations all over Pakistan. During this 
delinquency crisis, interference from all sorts of agencies (private and government), groups and 
individuals, sought to take advantage of the Kashf crisis and convert it into an opportunity to 
gain political, professional or economic benefits. 
Therefore, MFIs face a number of challenges, and their clients face a number of pressures 
from within their HHs and local communities. Failure to take into account measures that would 
accordingly deal with such pressures would result in their outreach and sustainability being 
compromised. Like NEED in India, Kashf in Pakistan has adapted and adjusted a lot to the local 
needs and demands of efficient microfinance services. Kashf has had to shift from joint liability 
lending to individual lending, while requiring a male guarantor for the loan. Such conditionality 
is understandable, in light of the patriarchal system that they operate in, where male authority 
cannot be sidelined at will without expecting dire consequences. Still, it is discriminatory against 
more vulnerable groups of women who lack male support in a system that endorses male 
dominance. Gender of the loan nominee and marital status of the women wanting to opt for a 
loan should not play a role in qualifying for a loan or fulfilling the requirements. There should be 
measures in place for cases where such conditions cannot be provided for by the women. Kashf 
has shown some leeway in entertaining loan applications and disbursing loans to single women, 
or to women who are married but do not have their husbands as male nominees for their loans. 
Nonetheless, no loan application in their records has a female loan nominee to date. This should 
be acceptable in cases of serious loan applications where only a male guarantor is missing. 
MFIs may change the nature of patriarchy in other ways through direct interventions. 
Randleman (2013) points out that for MFI loans to truly empower women as stated in the 
international discourse of MFIs: “MFIs should deepen their relationships with and support of the 
women’s lending groups through increased collaborations, include the rural women’s purposes 
and voices by employing more of the women at all levels of the organisation” (2013: 15). Thus 
by increasing the population of female employees within their institutions, these female 
employees could initiate a discourse in which the women and their families can perceive 
themselves and their daughters as subjects deserving of care, reciprocity, a voice and agency 
(Ibid). Furthermore, for the women borrowing from MFIs to benefit personally from the loans 
disbursed to them, a more durable change in their status within the HH has to follow. As 
suggested in the last chapter, in a patriarchal society, this can happen only when the patriarchal 
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hold on the family’s productive assets is challenged. Making credit conditional to asset transfers 
in favour of the women concerned is one way to ensure that women build up an economic base 
for their future. Also it would be most effective if the women were provided with basic financial 
literacy and account-keeping skills to maintain transparency and accountability of the enterprises 
operations. 
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Interviews 
 
Kashf Foundation 
Kashf, Head of Operations (senior executive). Interview 25.03.2011 
Kashf, Regional Manager: Kasur, Faisalabad, Sargodha (senior management). Interview 
28.03.2011 
Kashf, Senior Associate (middle management). Interview 28.02.2011 
Kashf Business Development Officers (BDOs) and Branch managers, Punjab: 11 interviews in 
all 
 
Moneylenders 
Money lender 1, Awaalkher, Sheikhupura. Interview 24.02.2011 
Money lender 2, Kot Abdul Malik, Sheikhupra. Interview 24.02.2011 
Money lender 3, Maraj Park, Sheikhupura. Interview 25.02.2011 
Money lender 4, Jallo, Lahore. Interview 17.03.2011  
 
Households 
Household interviews Kasur, Punjab: 14.02.2011 - 22.02.2011 
Household interviews Sheikhupura, Punjab: 23.02.2011 - 28.02.2011 
Household interviews Gujranwala, Punjab: 01.03.2011 - 07.03.2011 
Household interviews Lahore, Punjab:  - 17.03.2011 - 09.03.2011 
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6 Comparing the regions: Women microfinance clients 
in India and Pakistan in comparison 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have dealt with the individual country cases highlighting the various 
components within the communities at different levels that can affect the performance of 
MFIs. In this chapter I will compare the particular components in the two regions to bring out 
the differences and similarities of the surveys in India and Pakistan and try to come up with 
possible answers to the research questions 4, 5 and 6 as outlined in the first chapter: 
 
 
 
 
  
 A comparison across the regions is relevant to see if the outcomes of MFI memberships 
are the same or not for the two regions given their relative similar settings and external inputs 
with the exception of the communal interactions and the cultural norms within the MFIs 
operation areas. In analysing these differences (or similarities) I will once again refer to the 
Figure 3 from Chapter 3, to determine which of the four components are most relevant in 
affecting the outreach and performance of MFIs in the two neighbouring countries. Whenever 
there is a reference to comparing the households across countries or regions, it relates to 
information from the survey households in both countries. The general conclusions from this 
information can be extended to generalise the outcomes for a larger population within the 
wider geographical space. The study areas represent patriarchal societies where decision-
making within the HHs in particular, and society in general, are normally dominated by the 
men.   
4. How do women clients of the MFI in India differ from the women clients of the 
MFI in Pakistan? 
5. Do MFI institutions and their clients face the same set of problems or difficulties 
from within the social and communal milieus in different set ups or countries?  
6. Do MFI clients’ communal, social and domestic circles have the same (or 
different) effect in both countries on their decision making process of opting for a 
microfinance loan or not? 
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  The following section will present a descriptive narrative of the neighbourhoods, the 
client profiles and the family compositions within the two regions. This will be followed by 
the main body of the chapter, Section 6.3 which discusses the socio-political milieus of the 
MFIs and the four components of the Figure 3 model, and brings out the similarities and the 
differences between the two regions across the countries. Section 6.4 concludes. 
6.2 Demographics, households, neighbourhoods and client profiles 
 The survey locations in each country had both similarities and differences. Statistics 
on literacy rates and workforce participation rates of women in UP and Bihar were quite 
compatible with those of Punjab in Pakistan. Any differences in the outcomes of the results 
for MFIs due to demographics regarding the skills and possibilities for economic activities for 
women can therefore largely be ruled out. For example looking at the statistics for the other 
provinces of Pakistan in Appendix 5, it becomes clear that women in Punjab (Pakistan) 
probably have better opportunities for education and gainful employment than their peers in 
other provinces of Pakistan (e.g., Balochistan), but have a similar position as their peers 
across the border in states like UP and Bihar in India. In terms of societal structures, the 
northern states and provinces in both countries are characterized by patriarchal socio-cultural 
norms and gender relations that prescribe segregated roles of women and men. In both 
countries women’s subordination within HHs and society restricts opportunities and choices 
for them.  
Differences in the social composition of the two regions were pronounced, particularly 
along religious or caste lines and the level of poverty in terms of the survey households. The 
dominant religion in Pakistan and Punjab is Islam, whereas in India Muslims represent a large 
minority, comprising about 14.2% of the national population. UP, whose population is 19.3% 
Muslim, and Bihar, with 16.9%, have two of the largest Muslim populations inside the 
country (The Times of India 2015). Segregation along caste and kinship lines was intact in 
both the countries, though relatively stronger in India than in Pakistan. Even among the 
Muslim HHs, where normally Islamic ideology does not allow for such discrimination or 
segregation, historic presence of caste thinking that existed before the advent of Islam in the 
South Asian Sub-Continent is still in place. Whereas in India most of the survey households 
were classified as being from the lower castes and more poor, in Pakistan most of the survey 
households came from higher social castes and were relatively less poor. This is in line with 
the reported levels of poverty headcount ratios, (i.e., the percent of population living below 
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the international USD 1.25 per day measure for both countries). According to the World 
Bank’s Global Monitoring Report for 2014-15 on the Millennium Development Goals, in 
2014 India’s GNI per capita/PPP was $5760.00 in international dollars, and the percentage of 
people living below $1.25 per day made up 23.6% of the population in 2012. In 2014 
Pakistan’s GNI per capita/ PPP stood at $5100.00 in international dollars, but the percentage 
of people living below $1.25 per day stood at 12.7% of the population in 2011 (World Bank 
2015). This means that although Pakistan is poorer than India, it has much lower levels of 
poverty due to its greater equality in income levels (see Chakravarty 2014). Moreover, MFI 
target populations in the two countries varied in terms of income. NEED in India targeted the 
poorest households (where vulnerability and poverty mostly affect the lower castes). KASHF 
was more focussed on serving the economically better-off poor who already had a steady 
income base, even if it was not much. The level of poverty of the clients is also reflected in 
the average loan size in dollars, as loans to Kashf clients in Pakistan is on average 45 USD 
higher than loans in India to NEED clients. In addition, the level of poverty in the states of UP 
and Bihar from personal observations was higher than in Punjab (Pakistan) in terms of access 
to basic amenities like clean water, electricity, sanitation, schools and medical facilities. The 
hygiene levels, in terms of infrastructure for proper drainage, sewerage and cleanliness were 
not much different. Illustration 2 presents three field pictures in Pakistan showing Kashf loan 
officers in neighbourhoods with overflowing open sewers and standing stagnant water due to 
lack of a proper drainage system.  
 
Illustration 2:   Field Pictures in Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loan officers of Kashf, in the neighbourhoods of the districts of Gujranwala and Sheikhupura in Punjab/ Pakistan. 
The open drains and a lack of proper sewerage system in the left and right pictures in the neighbourhoods 
demonstrates the catastrophic state of hygiene and sanitation within the communities. The photo in the middle 
shows a Kashf client who ran a small rabbit farm near her home in rural Sheikhupura. Her farm was initiated years 
ago with a loan and had grown over the years.   
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Illustration 3 shows some field photographs of the Indian neighbourhoods, loan 
officers and clients of NEED in the states of UP and Bihar in India. The differences along 
caste lines and the level of poverty of the survey households might well have an effect on the 
differences in general attitudes and outcome of the results in both regions and therefore it is 
worth noting. 
Illustration 3:   Pictures of Indian neighbourhoods   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1 Household composition 
 On average, the household sizes in Pakistan were much larger than those in India. On 
the average there were 10.12 persons per household in Pakistan, and 6.61 persons per 
household in India. In addition there were more households living in the joint family system 
in Pakistan than in India. It is important to understand that the composition and size of the 
households can have a very important influence, not only on daily household decisions, but 
also on how power and authority within the household is negotiated, endorsed and exercised. 
It is very probable that the joint family system of the households in Pakistan can give the 
immediate family members sharing the same living premises more say in matters of the 
household, such that their positions and opinions can no longer be ignored (as they might be if 
they did not share a space). The immediate family members are members who are first blood 
 
  
 
The first photo is a Sitapur neighbourhood in rural UP, India with some survey respondents and their children. The 
second (middle) photo shows a NEED development manager and a loan officer in Bihar with the green fields of local 
clients of NEED in the background. The third picture shows a poor low caste Dalit family in a village in rural Bihar, 
where poverty was more pronounced and basic amenities like clean water and electricity were as good as non-
existent.  
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relatives who mostly also share living premises. Extended family members are understood as 
all those beyond the immediate family, like aunts, uncles and cousins, who might or might not 
share the same living premises. As an example of how issues must be negotiated among 
complex family constellations, we can imagine that a daughter in law wants to take out a loan. 
In such a scenario, the women in the households will not only have to have their husbands’ 
permission for the loans, but also the approval of other family members and elders who share 
living space with her and her immediate family. Illustration 4 below shows one such large 
joint family from Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan, where only 9 of its 18 members are pictured. 
Illustration 4:   Joint family structures in Pakistan 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 In short the composition of the household structure (joint or not) and the household size 
lends more weight to the relevance of component 2 (the respective family members/ actors 
viewpoints of MFIs), component 3 (their respective actions/ attitude towards the MFIs) and 
component 4 (opposition from the spouse/ close family), elevating their importance in the 
MFI loan decision process from Box 3 (Figure 3). I will come back to this point in the later 
part of the chapter when discussing the power relations within the households. 
 
A large joint family from the 
district Gujranwala, Punjab, 
Pakistan. The head of the 
household (second from left) 
is shown with 2 of his 4 
married sons, one on each 
side, who live with him. His 
daughter-in-law (second 
from right) and 5 
grandchildren (from his sons 
and a daughter) are also 
pictured here. The rest of the 
HH members were either at 
work or did not want to be 
photographed. The daughter-
in-law is a Kashf client, 
whose loan decision was 
hard-won, and achieved 
mostly due to her husband’s 
support within the family. 
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6.2.2 Neighbourhoods and social interactions 
 Of much importance for the analysis here are the milieus or the neighbourhoods, and 
how every day social interactions within the communities are lived and perceived. Having 
visited every household and neighbourhood personally enables me to judge their very distinct 
features. In India, communities and neighbourhoods were very closely knit and there was little 
or no concept of privacy of the families or individuals as such. This was especially the case in 
urban neighbourhoods, where space was very limited and there was hardly enough room 
under the household’s roof for all the family members to simultaneously dwell indoors (see  
Illustration 5). As a result, families tend to occupy much of the public space like the areas 
immediately in front of their houses or streets and even their neighbours homes during the 
day, to go about their daily routines. The only time where all members of the family use the 
family quarters simultaneously is to sleep at night. 
Illustration 5:   Limited household space in the slums of Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 With most of the family’s time spent in the public vicinities of their homes or in their 
neighbours’ houses, hardly any family affairs of the households were shielded from the 
neighbouring community members. Thus when interviewing the men and women within the 
households in the urban slums of UP for example, it was very difficult to find a private space 
where the interviewee could respond to my questions in private without any uneasiness, 
especially when discussing intimate household issues between the family members. Very 
 
A NEED client from a borrower household 
in a Lucknow (UP) slum, shown here in her 
home. The family of 5 had a room, seen 
here, with a total space of about 7-8 m2. In 
the background is an adjoining covered space 
(2-3 m2) where the cooking and washing was 
done, opening directly then into the 
neighbourhood’s street. The household’s 
children are seen in the background together 
with the neighbourhoods’ other children. The 
neighbours are seen coming and going at 
ease, without any reservations. The 
residential quarters were also used as a place 
for economic activity where the client would 
tailor clothes with the help of a machine 
bought from a NEED loan. Her husband had 
a tailoring shop and would bring work home 
for his wife. 
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often at times I had to be quite straightforward and risk giving offense in demanding some 
privacy from the over curious neighbours, who would often insist that there were no family 
secrets between them and the interviewee. The intruding neighbour would then be very 
offended once they were forced to leave on my behalf and did not understand my insistence. 
The interviewee themselves would not dare ask the neighbour(s) to leave for fear of losing 
face, being labelled as inhospitable or fearing retaliation from the neighbour in the future. To 
make sure that the survey respondents maintained good relations with their curious 
neighbours after I had left, I returned to the offended neighbours with a local bag of candy to 
patch things up. It appeared to me that there were no incidents of resentful sentiments before 
my departure.  
 For an illustration of a similar scenario, see Illustration 6 where a scene from another 
slum in UP is pictured. The illustration shows one of the interview probes at the start of the 
survey. The curious neighbours within the household’s yard would simply refuse to leave, so 
that I had to return at a later date again. This depicts the informality, ease and naturalness with 
which the survey households in India interacted on a daily basis with their peers and 
neighbours within their neighbourhoods. The situation got a little better (from the perspective 
of conducting discreet interviews) in the rural areas of UP or Bihar where space was less 
limited and not a big issue 
Illustration 6:   Over-curious neighbours with little sense of privacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A scene from a household in an urban UP 
slum. The female borrower interviewee 
(sitting in the middle on the ground), felt 
rather overwhelmed with all the attention 
that the rest of the neighbourhood women 
suddenly showed in her. The four other 
women sitting about and around are all the 
curious neighbours who gathered as soon 
as they saw me enter her house. The yard 
seen here with the toilet in the background, 
just had another room about 8-9 m2, with 
the cooking done in the open space under a 
covered tin roof that is only slightly visible 
here. The household had 7 members in all 
sharing this space.   
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 The same could not be said for the survey households in Pakistani neighbourhoods, 
regardless of their rural or urban set up. Although the neighbourhoods were closely knit and 
there were a lot of close interactions between neighbouring households, the residents of a 
neighbourhood were more cautious of intruding, and would draw back once I requested some 
privacy with the members of the household that I was interested in interviewing. The sense of 
privacy was more present within the neighbourhoods compared to the Indian neighbourhoods. 
Illustration 7 depicts one such HH from Sheikhupura, Punjab in Pakistan, where the members 
of the borrower HH are shown standing in the street after the interview. During the whole 
interview their main door was open and we were visibly sitting in the yard, but we were not 
approached by any of the neighbours passing by or by those who could see us from their own 
yards or open doors in the semi-urban neighbourhood. 
 
Illustration 7:   Pakistani family in front of their house 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There seemed to be a general scepticism and indifference in the nature of how the 
social life within the communities was formed. This also implied that the HHs in Pakistan 
needed more time to warm up and entertain the whole idea of someone wanting to interview 
them for the sake of a study. Once they were reassured of total anonymity regarding their 
interviews and identities, did they open up and disclose the needed information more 
comfortably. One explanation for this scepticism and wariness could perhaps be the general 
 
A Kashf client, from the 
district of Sheikhupura in 
Punjab with her husband 
and daughter in the street 
after an interview.  
Although clearly visible to 
all their neighbours, no one 
approached or intervened 
to ask them who they were 
talking to or inquire about 
the purpose of a stranger’s 
visit to their house.  
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development of more vigilant and alert characters within the society in the recent years due to 
the instability and insecurity of the political situation in the country. In the wake of drone 
attacks, the restless North-West border with Afghanistan, the entrenchment of the Taliban and 
like-minded organisations, which find support from deeply rooted factions within Punjab, and 
a great deal of unspecified and non-transparent activity of terrorist organisations and security 
agencies are some issues that could explain this wariness on the part of the general population 
against all activities which directly investigate HHs and might arouse unwanted attention (see 
Mullaney and Hassan 2015 in National Geographic and Boone 2012 in The Guardian on how 
this scepticism is fed and grows within the population for all activities, especially health and 
research programmes).   
 It was perhaps this cautiousness or scepticism on behalf of the people in general that led 
many households who were not clients of KASHF or borrowers with any other MFIs (control 
group households) to initially refuse to give an interview. I had to work long and put hard 
effort into convincing such households within the same borrowing neighbourhoods in Punjab 
to voluntarily give an interview. Some needed two or more visits before they were convinced 
that there was no harm for them or their HHs to agree to talk to me. The indifference in the 
attitudes of neighbours and peers was in a way part of the same self-protection mechanism on 
an individual and household level, where minding one’s own business was seen as a way of 
avoiding unwanted and unforeseen trouble from various groups and from the authorities. 
 Comparing the atmosphere of the neighbourhoods, it is quite probable that the survey 
respondents from households in the Pakistani neighbourhoods are less inclined to take into 
serious consideration the standpoints or opinions of their neighbours or community members 
on MFIs. This shifts the balance of the decision process about MFI membership by giving less 
weight to the relevance of component 2 (the perceived viewpoints of other actors within their 
social circles on MFIs) and 3 (their respective attitudes towards the MFIs) and more weight to 
components 1 (personal viewpoints) and 4 (domestic reactions) in Figure 3. In the Indian 
neighbourhoods households and neighbourhoods are intertwined to the point that neighbours 
become as intervening as household members themselves. This is not the case in Pakistan. 
Thus, comparing the two field sites, the sample HHs in Pakistan were more dependent on 
their families and less so on their larger social circles like neighbours, clan or next of kin. On 
the other hand, in India the larger social circles within the neighbourhoods and social ties 
along caste and kin lines were vital to the decision-making processes of the HHs within the 
communities. I will elaborate on this point more in the later sections of this chapter.  
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6.2.3 Client profiles 
 The profiles of all the survey households regarding their banking relationships and 
credit-specific information in Pakistan show that significantly more Kashf households had a 
bank account than their counterparts from the control group. This is not the case in India, 
where borrower households had a much lower rate of being formally banked than the control 
group households. This difference can be attributed to Kashf’s financial literacy programme, 
which propagates and supports individual banking accounts for all households with clients. 
NEED does not require all the clients to have an individual bank account, as loans were a 
joint liability and individualised bank accounts were not an obligation.  In a larger context, 
however, the delinquency crisis of the microfinance sector in 2008-09 in Pakistan was an 
agent of this change, bringing Kashf to push for all client households to open a formal bank 
account so as to enhance the enforcement of legal action against potential defaulters of loans. 
Generally at household level, access to formal banking and credit institutions in Punjab 
(Pakistan) seems to be more commonplace than in India. This can be seen, for example, in the 
fact that more loan applications were refused from formal institutions in Pakistan in India1. 
Many survey respondents in India seemed to have a sense of being overawed or feeling out of 
place when it came to dealing with a formal bank or institution. The general sentiment was 
articulated in the words of a NEED employee in India: 
“The poor feel intimidated when they have to go to a bank for the repayment of 
a(n) [loan] instalment. They feel subjected to the inquisitive and judgemental 
looks of the bank employees who might see them unfit to be served with dignity 
and respect. They [poor] perceive that their appearance and their petty amounts 
will determine their worth and it is this fear that NEED wants to take away via its 
SHG programme where groups of women are encouraged to enter formal banks 
with their collective savings and have service delivered to them” (interview with 
NEED development manager, Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh/ India). 
The same employee, however, also mentioned that NEED was now shifting its focus to joint 
liability lending rather than focussing on further strengthening SHG lending in general (see 
                                                          
1
 The difference was especially significant for control group households in Pakistan, most of whom preferred 
loans from formal banks rather than MFIs. It is also probable that due to a lower level of poverty of the surveyed 
households in Pakistan, the HHs could offer some form of collateral for a formal bank for a loan. In any case, the 
survey households in Pakistan did not seem to have any reservations about approaching a bank to deposit savings 
or to apply for a formal loan. 
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Appendix 6 for differences in the two forms). Thus, not all NEED clients would necessarily 
graduate to having access to formal banking like their peers in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the 
share of women respondents having a personal bank account was twice as high in India as for 
women respondents in Pakistan. This indicates that even if more households were aided in 
getting access to formal bank accounts in Pakistan, it did not translate into women having 
access to these bank accounts. Rather, their male guardians would also suffice for an MFI 
loan disbursement. Moreover, it shows that SHG lending in general effectively facilitates 
women’s direct access to financial institutions, as membership to a SHG is not transferrable.  
 Comparing timely repayment rates, Pakistani MFI clients seemed to be lagging behind 
their Indian peers. This seemed to be associated with a higher level of loan misuse by Kashf 
clients than by NEED clients. This is a very interesting point, as the screening procedures 
were much more stringent for Kashf clients in Pakistan due to individual liability. Loan 
officers were in fact very thorough in making sure that the household had enough income and 
a capacity to pay monthly loan instalments of the loan under consideration. From the data 
available on the sources of income of the households and from conversations with the 
respondents from these households, it is obvious that even stringent screening processes were 
sometimes not effective in identifying such cases. Upon being asked reasons for loan misuse 
and an open instalment a Pakistani borrower stated: 
“I borrowed the amount for my husband’s nephews upcoming wedding but told 
Kashf that the loan was for [expanding] my sewing business which I run from 
home......though we are a joined family with 5 people earning money in the 
household, the cost of living [for a total of 13 people in the household] is also 
high, and due to the wedding I have not had time to look after my sewing 
workload which is still pending and so are the payments” (interview with female 
borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan).  
 Many of the households in Pakistan had multiple sources of income with more than 
one person earning.2 Given a larger family, the enterprise for which the loan was being 
initiated was usually not the main source of income in the Pakistani HHs, although it was for 
their peers in India. For both countries, the major sources of client recruits to the MFIs were 
through the same channels. The local presence and solicitation on behalf of the loan officers 
                                                          
2
 The multiple sources of income increased the chances of having the loan application accepted as the average 
household income was seen as a qualifier for capability to repay, however loans were mostly then misused for 
consumption purposes like on weddings, other household expenses etc. 
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was the main source of MFI client’s motivation for joining or being recruited, followed by 
friends and neighbours as motivating agents for many women and their households to join a 
MFI. Thus, in this respect the role of loan officers and peers within the community seem to be 
equally important for both NEED and Kashf. 
6.3 The socio-political milieus  
 Having presented the empirics for the two regions in the neighbouring countries, I 
expect that certain relevant differences within the communities, like the dominant religion or 
the communal interactive pressures from community groups and neighbours that ensue, would 
affect MFI operations targeting women differently. In Pakistan I expect the dominant religion 
of Islam to play a much larger role in hindering conventional MFIs in reaching out to HHs in 
the communities due to its non-compliance with the Sharia. In contrast, I expect the social 
milieus, neighbours, peers and social ties along caste and kinship lines to play a more 
important role in India than in Pakistan. Furthermore, I expect the role of moneylenders and 
the feudalistic structures to have a much stronger role within the communities in India than in 
Pakistan. Expectations of differences on a more domestic scale include that women in Indian 
communities in general will be less acquiescent in conforming to gendered power positions 
within their HHs and communities. However, I expect a more differentiated pattern of 
behaviour and development for the HHs in Pakistan in general and the women within these 
HHs in particular. From the discussions in Chapter 5, I expect the women from the survey 
HHs of the communities in Pakistan to be more self-regulating in conforming to behaviour 
deemed acceptable within their HHs and societies. Yet I also expect women from borrower 
HHs to be more resilient in their aim of securing a loan from an MFI. 
 The following sections will now compare the four components from Figure 3 to see 
which component is more relevant for MFI clients in the process of the loan take up in both 
the countries. 
6.3.1 Personal standpoint on the relevance of MFIs and other actors (Component 1)  
 The first component of personal opinions on other actors is important to understand 
how the respective opinions and reactions from such actors will impact and (partly) affect the 
respondent’s opinion building process but also the weighting of the second component and 
eventually the outcome of the decision.  
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 The opinions of respondent households, in both regions, on the importance of MFIs 
and other actors, like the religious authorities, community groups and moneylenders, follow a 
relatively similar pattern. The difference in sample means between borrower and control 
group in both countries had a similar result in terms of sign and significance. This was the 
case for all mentioned categories. However, there are differences to be considered between 
the borrower and non-borrower households across the countries. The respondents in both 
regions were asked to express their opinions on the importance of a series of institutions or 
groups in general. In the case of MFIs and moneylenders their explicit importance as service 
providers was questioned. In the case of religious communities, their presence and role for 
rituals or guidance in general, but also as an expression of personal identification with and 
adherence to such institutions, were of much relevance.  
 Women and men from the borrower households in both regions considered MFIs to be 
an important source of credit services. Men and women from the control group in both 
regions were quite divided in their opinions on MFIs. Almost all women respondents were of 
the opinion that MFIs were important and most of the men felt that as service providers MFIs 
were not important at all3. Seeing this similar male-female difference of opinion pattern in 
both regions, and considering the obligation to secure male nomination in both the countries, 
MFI membership of women is most likely to be affected. Given the male opposition within 
the HH to MFI loans, as well as male domination in all important HH decisions, this 
difference in opinion can be detrimental to MFI loan take-up by the women in India and 
Pakistan likewise. 
 The majority of the respondents in both regions felt that religious institutions are 
important for personal or collective social reasons. Yet, more respondents in India tended to 
find them unimportant or irrelevant to their decision than their counterparts in Pakistan. 
Pakistan has seen a surge in the growth, role and importance of religious institutions and 
groups in the past decades. They have gained considerable power, both in smaller private 
circles and within the larger political arena.4 Upon being asked why religious institutions were 
                                                          
3
 The control group households in India were in principal not borrowing with any MFI, that is, they had no 
accounts open with any institution. The control group in Pakistan included households that were not clients of 
Kashf, but who were borrowing from other MFIs or were members of credit associations such as ROSCAs.  
4
 For a history of gradual and instrumental insertion of religion (Islam) into the republic and the growth of 
politico-religious groups see Shaheed 2010; for a general overview of the history and development of religious 
orthodoxy and interplay within the political arena, see Pakistan Country Report 2012. 
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so important for him in particular and the community in general, a Pakistani respondent 
replied: 
“.... because for all matters that confront us all in our everyday lives and we are 
at a loss as to how to proceed...we should all be committed to seek the guidance 
of these religious institutions that are there to give us counsel on what is the 
right path to follow according to the guiding principles of the Quran and 
Sunnah5” (interview with male borrower, Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan). 
Since men are more present in the public spaces where interactions with religious groups take 
place, like Friday prayers or public sermons, they are also more easily influenced by them. 
The dispositions of such religious institutions on social and personal issues can become 
crucial when the respondents find these institutions important and seek their imperative 
guidance.  
 Opinions on the importance of services provided by the moneylenders were similar 
among the respondents from both countries: they are important but at best should be avoided6. 
According to one Indian respondent expressing his opinion of moneylenders: 
“Nobody would go to a moneylender for a credit if they had a better choice, 
however, people also know that they run a business and when no one else lends 
to you, then they [the moneylenders] do. When your need is pressing, then the 
[conditions of the] loan is not what you would think of....moneylenders are 
aware of this and make sure they have the upper hand in the matter....at best 
may God place no one in such a dilemma” (interview with male borrower, 
Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh) .  
It was obvious that in times of financial crunch for individual families, moneylenders are the 
only source of fast cash. However, loans from moneylenders came with draconian conditions, 
such as a 300-500% interest rate per annum, or working off the loans in the form of hard 
labour on the moneylender’s fields (at a wage that was half or less the prevailing rate for day 
labour). For many of the survey respondents who were mostly daily wage earners, this meant 
earning less and paying more over a longer period of time. Thus, borrowing from 
moneylenders can not only leave a long-lasting financial strain on the borrowers, but also 
                                                          
5
 “Sunnah” is the way of life of the holy prophet of Islam, Mohammad, peace be upon him, based on all the 
teachings, practices and Islamic traditions of his time.   
6
 Only 11% of all respondents in India and 15% of all respondents in Pakistan were of the opinion that 
moneylenders were not important (see Tables 4.3 and 5.3 respectively). 
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force them into other unpleasant life situations. All of this is why these individuals were seen 
as best avoided. According to one Kashf employee’s account, related in the previous chapter: 
“A desperate person in need of money and on top of that illiterate is an easy 
prey for moneylenders to exploit at will. Such victims are then made to put their 
thumb prints7 on blank stamp papers which the moneylenders can then use to 
blackmail the borrowers on any terms they wish. I have seen many cases of 
victimisation ....in one particular case a poor borrower having no other outlet 
after years of servicing just the interest on the loan, had to marry off her young 
daughter to the moneylender as a second wife, because she could not pay off the 
entire amount of the long outstanding usurious loan” (interview with Kashf loan 
officer, Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan).   
It is obvious from such statements that moneylenders are always approached with caution and 
as the lender of last resort. Nonetheless, they provide a service for the credit needs of people 
that MFIs will not necessarily cater to (e.g., consumption purposes). This would suggest that 
since MFIs usually give out loans for economic activities, MFIs served a particular target 
group or market, whereas moneylenders are normally indifferent to what the money was 
being lent for, widening the scope of their market. Thus, the MFIs were competition for the 
moneylenders in taking away clients, but not vice versa; this would then explain the 
moneylenders’ contemptuous attitude towards the MFIs, as will be discussed in the sections to 
follow. Furthermore, the MFIs also served as a channel of funds for the moneylenders’ 
clientele, making it possible for their clients to pay back loans and get out of a crushing 
financial contract, designed to benefit the moneylender and leaving the borrowers vulnerable 
to exploitative situations. 
 In both regions the MFIs, religious groups and moneylenders were regarded with 
generally the same sentiments, with slight differences. Whereas MFIs were highly rated in 
importance for services in Pakistan, in India this was to a lesser degree. Likewise the religious 
faction’s importance in Pakistan was viewed much more strongly than in India. Moneylenders 
seemed to strike a similar chord of opinion in both the regions: they are important, should be 
avoided. However, in Pakistan the moneylenders were not necessarily of a higher social 
standing in terms of caste or family. In addition, within the society, they were less respected 
due to what was considered their dishonourable business of earning interest on loans.  
                                                          
7
 A thumb print is equivalent to a signature, representing consent to the terms and conditions of a contract that 
can be used as a legal document in a court. 
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6.3.2 Perceived opinions of respondents of other actors on MFIs and 
membership (Component 2); and Attitudes and actions of external actors 
towards (potential) MFIs and clients (Component 3)  
 
There are statistically significant differences among the borrowing and non-borrowing 
households in both regions concerning their views about the opinions and attitudes of other 
actors regarding MFIs and membership. However, the reception of these opinions and actions 
from the various communal actors and the way they were dealt with were very different 
indeed in both regions.  
 Exchange of views with the respondents revealed that the opinions and the ensuing 
attitude of family members, religious and communal groups and members of the larger kin 
regarding a loan take up from an MFI was very relevant for the households in general (and the 
women in particular) in both regions. Which actors were considered more important varied 
for the respondents of both countries. In general within the Pakistani neighbourhoods, 
everyone seemed concerned primarily with his or her own business, and less intrusive 
concerning the affairs of peers or community members. This can be confirmed by the fact that 
the general sentiment or opinion about MFIs (as perceived by all respondent households), 
tended to settle around that of indifference8 in contrast to India, where general opinions of 
different stakeholders were very diverse in their stance on MFIs. However, having said that, 
in Pakistan the respondents from the borrower households seemed less influenced by the 
opinions and attitudes of their neighbours, community members, the religious groups, 
moneylenders or even extended family members to a certain extent. This is depicted by the 
fact that despite a higher incidence of threatening and provocative attitudes from actors within 
their social networks, like their extended families, neighbours, peers, religious factions, 
moneylenders and even MFI loan officers, their borrowing relationship with the MFI had 
sustained (for a comparison see Tables 5.5 and 4.5 for Pakistan and India respectively). 
 Yet for the respondents in Pakistan, particularly those living in joint families, the 
opinions and attitudes of the family members, in particular the elders within the family 
(usually the eldest male members) played a decisive role and could not be ignored. The 
women of the households in most joint families would not only be at the mercy of her 
                                                          
8
 However such indifferent behaviours can suddenly turn into active animosity or polarised behaviours when 
there are personal interests or gains at hand, as was depicted by the delinquency crisis in 2008-09, where a mass 
of borrowers and all kinds of groups and individuals demonstrated active participation in exacerbating the whole 
situation for their personal interests. 
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husband’s (male guardian’s) approval, but would also have to take into consideration what her 
in-laws, who might be living with her, think of such issues as loans from MFIs. This can be 
an uphill battle, as usually the reasons to oppose such decisions have nothing to do with the 
loans or the MFIs. Rather, opposition to a loan became a proxy for issues of domination over 
the women, or dissension over commonplace household or familial rivalries. In addition, a 
higher proportion of the borrowing households were seen to have the approval of their 
immediate families for an MFI membership. Whereas households in the Indian 
neighbourhoods were more concerned with the opinions and attitudes of their neighbours, 
caste members, peers and extended families, this was not the case in Pakistan. Their receptive 
behaviour to their peers, neighbours and community was more pronounced due to the 
congested spaces and close proximity of the HHs in the urban slums in India. In contrast, 
interventions from the immediate family were much less of a problem for the Indian HHs than 
for their counterparts in Pakistan. Most of the actors within the social milieus of the survey 
HHs in India had a positive opinion of MFIs and at worst were indifferent, which resulted in 
fewer confrontations or threats to the households who decided to join MFIs. 
 Thus, returning to the composition of families and neighbourhoods as discussed earlier 
in section 6.1.2, this means that in India where social interactions among peers and 
neighbours play a much more central role in the daily lives of the households, their opinions 
and attitudes become indispensable for the households concerned. Communal relationships 
also need care and maintenance. The peers and neighbours are not only an important system 
of support for a poor household, but can also become very cumbersome when not handled 
with care. To avoid the wrath of a pestering neighbour, many go a long way to be diplomatic 
in their daily interactions, whether out of courtesy or a desire to maintain their good 
reputation. To demonstrate this, I will discuss one such case below, from one of the first 
neighbourhoods that I visited in a slum in Lucknow.  
 Among the first five households I picked in this site, I encountered one very suave 
female borrower, Mrs. M., who was a group leader for her joint liability group (JLG) loan 
with NEED. JLGs always have an informal group leader who may take up the responsibility 
of collecting the monthly instalments from all members of the group to return to the MFI on 
their behalves. Such group leaders are normally selected by the group members themselves or 
are initiators for a group in the first place. Being one of the first women to have taken up a 
loan in the neighbourhood, Mrs. M. was seen by many of her peers as a kind of “agent” for 
prospective borrowers, or as someone who helped others get easy access to loans from NEED. 
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Although loan screenings were only strictly conducted by loan officers personally and 
supervised by NEED managers before being processed further, many expected Mrs. M. to 
initiate a group for them and to put up a good word for them with the loan officers. Mrs. M. 
shared a tiny one-room shack with her husband and two adult sons on the top floor of a 
broken down building. This small space overflowed with pestering women day in and day 
out. Women even from neighbouring slums would harass her to help them with their group 
formation or loans, over which she had no power. Yet she would not tell them off and put up 
with the fussy situation. When first attempting to interview her, I had to return the following 
day, as the women were outright brazen and refused to leave her house for me to have a talk 
with her. The next day was the same and we had to escape to the house of another neighbour 
two blocks down for some privacy for the interview. I asked Mrs. M. about why she did not 
simply banish the women from her house rather than having herself being pushed out of her 
house, and she explained that she just could not ask the women to leave. If she were to do so, 
they might think that she was rude or perhaps even envious of their potential success from the 
loans and therefore unwilling to help them. She explained that the women would not 
understand that she could not help them and she feared that some of the women could sour 
and damage her reputation in the neighbourhood if she was not diplomatic. This was a risk 
that she did not want to take. 
 Mrs. M’s story helps to demonstrate, among other things, the larger cultural and social 
context of the interactions and relationships of peers within South Asian communities. In 
general these relationships go far beyond their short-term daily interactions, and usually have 
religious or historical aspects. The relationships between community and caste members in 
India have a strategic importance for future prospective familial ties, as marriages of children 
or family members are usually arranged by recommendations from family, caste members, 
community members or simply acquaintances. Such prospective ties usually are brought 
about through references from these familial and community or caste members. Unlike 
Muslims, Hindus (and Sikhs) do not marry within the family, village or the caste, commonly 
with the same surname. Thus, finding a match for a son or daughter becomes a task in which 
many friends, peers and acquaintances are involved. For these reasons, the maintenance of 
good relationships within communities and with one’s caste members takes a front seat, and 
this cultural practice or tradition is then cultivated further. In contrast, marrying within family, 
including marriages to first cousins, are very common and sometimes preferred among South 
Asian Muslims, as family ties are considered to be strengthened by this practice. The 
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information from the survey data also shows that kinship marriages were more prevalent 
among Muslims, and in Pakistan in general. Of the 17 kin marriages reported in Pakistan, 15 
were Muslim households, while of the 4 kin marriages reported in the Indian survey data, all 
were Muslim households.  
 Thus, considering this larger contextual aspect, it may well be possible that such 
differences in social practices or norms can explain why in one social setting interactions and 
relationships with a particular set of peers from the community or family may be more 
important than others. For example, the maintenance and care of the social ties within the 
larger communal circles in Hindu or Sikh communities plays a far more vital role than with 
familial structures, compared to Muslim communities. This can explain why peers were seen 
as more important in India where the majority are Hindus, while familial ties are far more 
important in Pakistan where the majority are Muslims. The case at hand is only one example, 
and it is important to note that these differences in the practices or norms within communities 
are not only associated with religion, but can also be of a cultural or a regional nature. For 
example, one finds differences between matriarchal and patriarchal societies, such as the 
divergence between South and North India for example. These cultural forms will have their 
own set of dynamic phenomena that can affect norms and practices differently and result in a 
totally different pattern of social interactions among peers and community at large. 
 In Pakistan, immediate families were a more permanent force, with much inclination 
toward a collective course of action even when the individual is concerned. For example, 
women have to woo not only their male guardians, but also family members (who are usually 
in-laws) to win support for a decision for loan take-up. If the women are lucky and have the 
backing of either their husband or the family, convincing the others will be easier. For 
example if the husband supports her for an MFI loan, then the task of convincing the 
immediate or larger family will be taken up by the husband. When the husband needs 
convincing, backing from the family can support her decision and help her in winning over of 
the husband. The sentiment can best be represented by the testimony of a long-time borrower 
from Pakistan, who reported how despite initial disapproval for her loan by her husband, she 
had won the battle over his support because his family supported her decision, although in this 
case the family was not a joint one.  
“My husband was initially strongly against my desire of a loan [which she 
needed to open up a beauty salon]. I was afraid to argue with him, so I took to 
convincing him through his parents who were supportive of the idea that I 
 175 
 
should supplement the family income. It took a whole year to gradually have him 
agree to a loan from Kashf, even then very reluctantly. I have now been a 
borrower for 4.5 years and my husband is a changed man. He would never have 
supported the loan if his family had not backed the idea,” (interview with female 
borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Another respondent from Lahore related an opposing scenario when she was asked why she 
did not take up a loan to expand the shoemaking business that she ran together with her 
husband. She lived in a joint family system comprising herself, her husband and their three 
children, along with her father-in-law and two married elder brothers of her husband and their 
families. According to the respondent: 
“My husband backs me in my decision of opting for a loan from an MFI, but 
cannot decide against the will of his family, especially his father and also his 
elder brother, both of whom do not support it. They are against borrowing but 
we have to share certain costs of living within this household for such a large 
family [16 in all] and therefore will never be able to save enough for expanding 
the business. My husband will never go against his family’s wishes and I hope 
there was some way that my father-in-law would agree to a credit, as we can 
earn much more from taking more [shoe] orders from the factory” (interview 
with female non-borrower, Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan).  
The local shoe factory from which the respondent and her husband got their shoe orders 
offered seasonal bids every 6 months for the orders. The bidder who was given the deal, had 
to pay a lump sum to get the deal, part of which was retained by the shoe factory and a small 
part of it returned along with the payment for the shoe orders. The loan was supposed to be 
used for this advance payment for the shoe orders. While family consent played an important 
role in all such household decisions, larger communal circles like neighbours and caste 
members were not the immediate cause of concern and were dealt with rather pragmatically, 
at least by the borrower HHs in Pakistan. Although harmonious relations within the 
communal circles and biradari were also regarded as important and their decisions could not 
be completely ignored, HHs still had ways to maintain ties and skilfully avoid interference in 
all matters from their larger societal circles. This was mostly done by prioritising and 
strategically placing issues of concern out for the larger circles to endorse or advise on and 
equally keeping a low profile on matters that they did not deem necessary for endorsement 
from these actors in their larger circles. The control group households, on the other hand, 
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were more observant of, and receptive to, what the larger community or their peers had to say, 
especially regarding the religious faction.  
 Interrelated perhaps to the character of the neighbourhoods and the general attitude 
within the communities is also why the joint liability lending did not work in Pakistan for 
Kashf, whereas in India it has for NEED. The delinquency crisis in Punjab, Pakistan, for 
Kashf resulted in a total failure of group lending that became dysfunctional when the 
members became indifferent to their responsibilities as a group. Supported and influenced by 
all kinds of external pressure groups, among others moneylenders, local politicians and their 
supporters, some of the defaulting borrowers then tempted and pressurised the reluctant group 
members to default en masse, hoping to get away with it if everybody joined in (as discussed 
in Chapter 5). Although there were many who did not default despite the pressure, it does 
show that interactions are less cohesive among peers, and temptations of a personal gain of 
the individual can be a major incentive to ignore the well-being of the group. Kashf has had to 
adopt a new lending method and opt for individual loans. On the other hand, joint liability 
lending works well for NEED in the northern states of India, as peers within the 
neighbourhoods are less individualistic in this regard and stick together for the benefit of all.  
 The fact that households in Pakistan are less compliant towards group sovereignty was 
also demonstrated as groups appeared to be unanimous in defaulting en masse during the 
crisis. There were defiant attitudes from some members within the defaulting groups and 
communities. This was expressed, for example, by a respondent from Sheikhupura (the 
district where the whole crisis began). She was part of a joint liability group, three out of five 
members of whom defaulted: 
”We were under enormous pressure from the [defaulting] group members to not 
return our monthly instalments. They had the support of local politicians and all 
other borrowers too who were defaulting, but my family and another member in the 
group just did not see why this would benefit any of us in the long term and it was 
simply unethical. When my family decided not to comply with the wishes of the 
defaulting members, we were threatened and intimidated.....we maintained our 
stand and went on paying back our monthly instalments....today we have 
progressed to a bigger loan because we did not give in to the group and community 
pressure,” (interview with female borrower, Sheikhupura, Punjab, Pakistan).  
Thus even when there were short term gains to be had by defaulting, without the stigma of 
being labelled as a defaulter because everyone else was doing the same, there were 
 177 
 
households within mass defaulting communities (where not only borrowers of Kashf, but also 
those of other MFIs were defaulting) who were concerned more about the households’ long 
term benefits and about moral principles.  
 Another difference was observed concerning the moneylenders and their interactions with 
the households in both regions. While the sentiment on the moneylenders’ stance toward 
MFIs and their attitudes towards the respondent households were similar in both countries, in 
India there was a significant difference in attitudes towards the moneylenders between the 
borrower and non-borrower households. Responses significantly differed between the two 
sample groups and the threat of not having access to this source of credit was a real fear that 
could not be simply ignored. In Pakistan, though, this threat seemed to be perceived as less 
important by the respondents, and there was no significant difference between borrower and 
non-borrower households in fearing threats from the moneylenders, as was the case in India. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, households in Pakistan had a rather cautious and low-
profile attitude in their public interactions, and assumed a rather more sovereign approach 
over their own affairs. Moreover, the threats of moneylenders in Punjab, Pakistan were not 
always about blacklisting MFI borrowers. Some respondents who had multiple loans from 
MFIs and moneylenders informed me that they just did not acknowledge their loans with the 
MFI when confronted by the moneylender.  
 Furthermore moneylenders in Pakistan had a rather ambivalent relationship towards the 
MFIs. Some of the moneylenders I met in Punjab were also interested in loans from MFIs. 
One particular moneylender in Sheikhupura, agreed to give me an interview thinking I was a 
senior MFI manager in the area looking for potential clients in need of bigger loans. I was 
introduced to this moneylender by one very resourceful loan officer of Kashf, who mentioned 
that the moneylender had contacted him some time earlier for a loan from Kashf. The 
moneylender said he needed liquid cash for the expansion of his rice business, as most of his 
own money was given out to borrowers as loans. Still other smaller moneylenders I 
interviewed, who acted as of middlemen and middlewomen for the larger moneylenders, 
informed me that some moneylenders used loans from MFIs to lend out again, charging a 
much higher interest. Since only those with a profitable small enterprise qualify for a loan 
from an MFI, this is seen as an opportunity by moneylenders to use their poorer middlemen 
and middlewomen to pledge for loans in their names. These loans could then be lent at higher 
interest rates further to borrowers. In any case, moneylenders were interested in MFI loans for 
furthering their own moneylending businesses. The middlemen and middlewomen received a 
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small commission, and some of them have now prospered as moneylenders themselves on a 
smaller scale. Thus it was not clear if MFIs were really serving as a source of lending capital 
for moneylenders of the area as well, making the moneylenders’ attitudes towards MFIs rather 
irresolute. 
 Both the regions also differed on the scale, range and type of external influences on MFI 
operations. Whereas in India moneylenders were the major group specified as troublemakers 
for the NEED employees and clients, the list of actors causing trouble for Kashf operations 
was long. Moreover, the strength and intensity of these external agents and groups influencing 
Kashf operations was much stronger. However most of these intrusions or troubles were 
specifically during the times of the delinquency crises, especially those from government 
agencies and employees, including police, lawyers, councillors and local politicians. 
Contrastingly, the religious factions were an everyday irritant to the MFI employees in 
Pakistan, harassing them for their practice of interest-based loans and its contravention of 
Islamic teachings. This seemed to be less of an issue for NEED employees in India, where 
threats from the religious factions reported by control group households were also from 
Muslim groups. 
 In sum, while the second and third components in the decision process to take out an MFI 
loan played an important role, the actors and the weighting of their roles are very different 
between the two regions. Whereas in Pakistan household structure and immediate family play 
a major role in weighing the decision of loan take up, in India the larger neighbourhoods, 
peers and caste relations have a stronger role to play. Furthermore, the dominant religion 
seems to matter. In Pakistan the religious factions were a cause of much nuisance and trouble 
in the neighbourhoods, while in India this was relatively weaker due to the multi-faith set up 
within the communities.  
6.3.3 Domestic & household reactions to women’s MFI membership (Component 4) 
Of all the components specified for a loan take up decision to materialise, the fourth 
component, domestic interpersonal power relations, is the most important in both regions. The 
fact that no loan is possible without a male guardian’s consent is explicitly pinned down by 
both NEED and Kashf. Beyond this fact, responses on household dynamics show that the 
attitudes of both men and women vary quite a bit on issues of conflict and violence in their 
relationships. The power positions and attitudes toward decision-making within the household 
take quite a different pattern in the two regions across the border. 
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 Based on many of the interviews with the respondents, exchanges revealed that the 
form of patriarchy differed in both the regions. The differences in means of the two sample 
groups in India regarding power positions in the household were significant on all counts. 
Whether it was the fear of a male guardian, decision making within the household, freedoms 
enjoyed by the women or attitudes of men towards women in general and independence of 
women in particular, the women of borrower HHs varied from their counterparts in control 
group HHs on all these counts (as depicted in Table 4.8 in Chapter 4). This was not the case in 
Pakistan, where almost none of these differences were significant between the borrower and 
control group households, with the exception of the male guardian’s consent for the female 
protégé to improve her education  (see Table 5.8 in Chapter 5 for details). Despite this fact, 
women in India were less willing to be complaisant regarding the situation. For example, 
figures show that more of the women from control group households in India, who wished to 
opt for a loan, were openly advocating or negotiating their desire and right to do so with their 
male guardian. Of the thirteen women who wished to opt for an MFI loan, seven reported 
domestic conflicts, and five others reported deterioration in relationship with the male 
guardian due to their persistence in wanting to opt for a loan (see Tables 4.7 and 4.9 in 
Chapter 4 for details). The men from these households also acknowledged the existence of 
this tension that resulted mostly due to the fears that arose because the women were 
challenging the “natural order of things” that their male status granted them. According to one 
male respondent from Bihar, who was questioned on his reaction to his wife’s desire for an 
MFI loan: 
“.....I do not support her idea of a loan from an MFI as my personal opinion is that 
women’s first priority should be her household........the children and household 
both are neglected with all these meetings and obligations that come with the 
loan.....my wife however does not [agree] and keeps pestering me for wanting to 
join [a group of lenders] and we have had many fights over it...... I wish I could 
have more peace on this matter,” (interview with male non-borrower, Muzaffarpur, 
Bihar). 
Perhaps women in the Indian communities were more hands on than their peers in the 
Pakistani communities when it came to financial contribution and independence for their 
households or themselves, given the poverty levels. But it could also be that women were 
simply refusing to take the back seat in conservative (and mostly rural or semi-rural) 
landscapes where poor women have moved not only toward economic strengthening, but also 
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toward addressing inequality of basic rights in the past years. Of considerable relevance here 
is the role of the self-help groups in India over the past decades, which in addition to financial 
access, has also explicitly targeted poor women to raise awareness and has advocated for their 
rights as individuals.9 As pointed out in a study on the inter-linkages between citizenship, 
gender and development in India, “The SHG groups provide a ‘space’ for raising of gender 
issues and concerns regarding gendered citizenship rights when the ideas of the women’s 
political movement is feminist and engages critically with the nation state on issues of power 
and authority,” (Chari-Wagh 2009: 11) 
It could be that in India, the SHG women within communities are perceived as a source 
of hope for many other women who have not so far joined their ranks. As mentioned in the 
earlier quote from the male-borrower in Muzaffarpur, taking part in the weekly meetings 
where matters, however small, are decided upon solely by women, brings a realisation of self-
determination that they can gradually also apply within their households. It is quite possible 
that women from the control group households see this as a means to have more leeway in 
their daily lives and so pursued the issue with more fervor.   
However, I got an entirely different impression while talking to the women in Pakistan, 
particularly those from the control group households, who seemed to be more complaisant in 
their attitudes within their marital relationships than the women in India. One such woman 
who wanted to start a small tailoring school at her home and wanted a start-up loan for the 
project, confided in her interview of her defeated attitude towards the issue: 
“I once expressed my desire for a loan to start up a small vocational tailoring 
school at home to my husband. He got very angry at the idea and said never ever to 
mention such a thing again. That was two years ago, to this day I have not dared to 
raise the question again, as I know that things can escalate... things are 
harmonious in this house as long as I make sure that nothing contrary to what my 
husband likes happens... I have to compromise as I have children who are now 
almost grown-ups and I will not want to disturb them with such issues” (interview 
with female non-borrower, Gujranwala, Punjab, Pakistan)  
                                                          
9
 SHGs in India date back several decades. However, most significant developments came in the 1970s with the 
SHGs set up by the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and then in the 1990s with the bank loan 
linkage programmes for SHGs in India by NABARD. 
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Similarly, many women from the control group households, who wanted to opt for a loan, 
acknowledged the fact that they did not dare to raise the issue within their households because 
they felt that it would only backfire on them. In many cases, it was understood intuitively to 
be a natural course of action of what was permissible and what was not. Women had a pretty 
good idea of what would be met with outright hostility and what would not. There seemed to 
be little appetite to try something that would endanger this delicate balance between harmony 
and hostility. Many opted, therefore, not to raise matters which were not welcome and tried to 
be content with matters that they did have a say in. In cases where there was discussion of an 
MFI loan between two contesting opinions within the household, it would never escalate to 
the level of being detrimental the relationship with their male guardian, as the women were 
always wary to stop before it got out of hand. For example, of the 8 women from the control 
group households who had considered taking a loan from an MFI, only 2 acknowledged 
household disharmony due to this desire for a MFI membership (see Tables 5.7 and 5.9 in 
Chapter 5 for details). No one amongst these women reported that the relationship with the 
male guardian had deteriorated due to their persistence in arguing for a loan from an MFI. 
On a similar note, it is plausible that this attitude of self-regulation or cautiousness on the 
part of the women in Pakistani communities reflects a (comparatively speaking) less 
aggravating stance of the men towards women’s independence and freedom. Perhaps men 
then felt less inclined to push the women within their HHs for a more compliant behaviour 
because they had already internalised the conformity that is expected of them. For example, 
comparing responses of men in both the regions, particularly those from the control group 
HHs, power positions and personal attitudes of men were more favourable toward women in 
Pakistan than in India (see Tables 4.8 and 5.8). Fewer men reported having a restrictive 
attitude towards women, which was also reflected in the responses of the women. Derogatory 
behaviour or physical violence towards women was not considered normal and women’s 
mobility was less restricted in Pakistan than in India. However, the responses from many of 
the women in Pakistan, especially those from the borrower households, confirmed the fact 
that such a development – women being less controlled by their men – came about after initial 
years of violence that had subsided over time. Many of the women confessed that they had to 
endure both physical and verbal violence, which gradually evolved into a relationship of more 
trust and confidence of the husbands towards their wives. The sentiment of this self-regulation 
and men’s relatively relaxed attitude can be well captured in the words of a female borrower 
from the district of Kasur in Pakistan who went on to describe her early marital relationship as 
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plagued with extreme violence that had eventually given in to a more bearable relationship 
due to her “husband-compliant decision making” on all important matters of the household a 
decade later: 
“My husband and my in-laws were stricter in the earlier years of my 
marriage...violence was commonplace and I was very much intimidated by my 
husband.... but after a couple of years they realised that I have learned their 
ways and will not go against their wishes..... I realised I had more to gain from 
their support and therefore tried my best to abide by the rules.... today there is 
little or no violence in my relationship.... I am free to decide on all matters of 
household and only need to inform my husband and he supports it...because he 
knows I will never do something that he will not approve of” (interview with 
female non-borrower, Kasur, Punjab, Pakistan). 
Thus even though the fourth and final component is the most crucial of all components in the 
decision process to an MFI loan, the ways of dealing with the male guardian’s authority and 
the interplay of power positions within the households vary considerably across the regions. 
In India authority within the households was more contested and women were less likely to be 
obliging or compliant in giving in to male authority than their counterparts in Pakistan. On the 
other hand, women in Pakistan were more likely to win over their husband’s support due to 
their self-regulated behaviours, which reassured their male counterparts within the households 
and caused them to be less controlling of women’s attitudes. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 The comparative analysis across the regions in neighbouring India and Pakistan 
reveals that there are important differences not only in respondent households, but also in the 
milieus and their dealings and interactions within these. The relevance and importance of the 
four respective components in the model depicted in Figure 3 will vary accordingly to the 
placement of the respective actors within each oval.  
 Regarding the first component, namely the personal standpoints of respondents on 
MFIs and other actors within society, Pakistan and India have relatively much in common 
concerning the opinion barometer on MFIs, religious groups or moneylenders. Relatively 
speaking, Pakistani households seem to place a higher importance on MFIs for services and 
show a higher inclination of attachment to religious institutions or groups. This has resulted in 
giving the respective religious institutions in Pakistan higher leverage in influencing opinions 
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or even enforcing decisions against a loan from an MFI, given their openly negative stance on 
interest-based loans.  
 The second component, viewpoints of other actors within society on MFIs, and the 
third component, the societal actor’s attitudes towards a membership with MFI, does seem to 
be of importance in both India and Pakistan. The difference is in the scale, range and type of 
actors within these components that vary for both regions. Here the composition, size and 
structure of the household and the nature and character of the neighbourhoods play a central 
role. In Pakistan, household sizes are bigger and the joint family system is more prevalent, so 
that the immediate family plays a major role in weighing the decision of loan take-up. In India 
the larger neighbourhoods, peers, caste relations and even moneylenders have a stronger role 
in influencing loan take-up decisions from MFIs.  
 The most dominant of all the four components in the whole decision making process 
in both regions was the fourth component, namely of household relations and power positions 
of the male and female respondents regarding MFI loans. The women and men in both 
regions have their own distinct notions of power and authority, and distinctive ways of 
dealing with situations of conflict and disharmony within the household. In India authority 
within the households was more contested and women were less likely to give in to male 
authority than their counterparts in Pakistan. This may also be due to the fact that there has 
been more community intervention on behalf of social organisations and the government’s 
policy of supporting self-help groups (which have brought about a change in the role that 
women should play). Women in Pakistan, due to their self-regulated behaviours, were more 
likely to reassure their male counterparts within the households and convince them to be less 
controlling of women’s attitudes and gradually support decisions of loan take ups from MFIs. 
Nonetheless, both in India and Pakistan, gendered roles and their perceptions remain deeply 
engraved. This is one reason why MFIs like NEED and Kashf have to rely on conditions of 
male nomination in the first place: to ensure that loans are not defaulted against in case that 
the male household heads do not back them.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
 In this last section, I present a brief summary of my findings and the contribution of 
this thesis to the literature.  
 I began this project with the quest of wanting to find out if, how and to what extent 
MFIs were hindered or supported in their operations by the familial and socio-political 
milieus of clientele from the lower economic classes that they target. From this overarching 
question, I derived several research questions. The first three of these questions are as 
follows: 
1. Is the fear of persecution/stigma or sanctions from various actors within a community 
dissuading potential clients from MFI membership? 
2. Do interventions from various local actors within the working areas of MFI affect the 
MFIs’ operations?  
3. Is the opposition to MFIs at domestic level from male guardian and family a deterrent 
for women who want to opt for MFI membership?  
!
There is empirical literature that presents how the demand for microfinance and the 
sector’s success is increasingly shaped by factors like social institutions, cultures, norms and 
the social life of microcredit. Morvant-Roux et al. 2013, Fernando 2006 and Taylor 2011 
depicts how various social actors within MFIs’ milieus engage with microcredit. Others show 
that, taking into consideration a world of diverse cultural backgrounds and ideological values, 
there is no single universal meaning of economics and finance (Hann and Hart 2011 and 
Shipton 2007). According to the emerging empirical evidence, MFI programmes can be 
replicated, but to achieve success they must take into account the regional and cultural 
contexts, norms and the social lives of their targeted clientele. 
Household survey data and interviews from MFI staff and moneylenders from the two 
north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in India, and from four different districts of the 
north-eastern province of Punjab in Pakistan were conducted to find answers for the above 
questions. These questions are analysed using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods to 
investigate the households’ decisions for the uptake of an MFI loan. I have developed a 
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systematic methodology which helps organise information and understand the decision of a 
household to take up a loan or not. I outline and define several components that are essential 
to the decision of loan take up from an MFI.  
A comparison across the regions would be relevant to see if the outcomes of MFI 
memberships are the same or not for the two regions, given their relatively similar settings 
and external inputs with the exception to the communal interactions, the cultural norms and 
the ideological base of the society within the MFIs operation areas. This leads us to the next 
three questions: 
4. How do women clients of the MFI in India differ from the women clients of the MFI in 
Pakistan? 
5. Do MFI institutions and their clients face the same set of problems or difficulties from 
within the social and communal milieus in different set ups or countries?  
6. Do MFI clients’ communal, social and domestic circles have the same (or different) 
effect in both countries on their decision making process of opting for a microfinance 
loan or not? 
In analysing differences and similarities in the two regions I find which components are 
most relevant in affecting the operations of MFIs. 
The household surveys in the two regions led to the following main findings. 
1. The familial, communal and political milieus of the targeted women borrowers seem to 
have a significant effect on the outreach and operations of the MFIs.  
Findings in both countries reveal that without a male loan nominee, loan issuance is not 
possible. This reflects the tension generated in the HH due to the challenges to male 
authority entailed by women’s wanting to opt for a loan for more financial independence. 
Opposition from male guardian and family (both immediate and extended) was found to 
be a deterrent that kept many women and HHs from opting for a loan from an MFI, even 
when women themselves clearly wanted to opt for a loan.  
Thus relationships of power embedded in gender hierarchies resulted in domestic strife 
that hampered MFI operations. These findings contribute to the literature on gender 
relations, which investigates women’s financial independence and household decision-
making. Moreover they have implications for microfinance accompanied by programs 
aimed at women’s emancipation, affecting their household position and allocation of their 
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work time. They suggest that measures that challenge the patriarchal hold on the family’s 
productive assets, such as making credit conditional on asset transfers in favour of 
women within the household, could be expected to bring a more durable change in 
women’s status within the HH.  
 
2. Beyond the family, the age-old gendered perceptions of the men in the community about 
women’s obligations to their families, and how MFI loan membership is the cause of 
distracting women from their obligations, seem to affect MFI loan take up. Furthermore 
religious decrees from the Muslim religious factions were also a major force in hindering 
potential Muslim HHs from MFI membership. The basic point of conflict between the 
supporters of the religious faction and the operations of contemporary MFIs is the 
concept of interest on loans, which is considered to be counter to the Sharia.  
Findings also reveal a strong negative attitude toward lending or loans in general within 
the communities. Many felt that this would result in being publically shamed if the loan 
instalments were not returned on time, and could mean a loss of face for the family, 
which might harm the social standing of the family and lead to their ostracism from their 
communities or families. 
These findings contribute to the literature on market forms, social institutions and 
conventions within communities. The study shows that designing microfinance 
programmes that target different populations of clients within communities with varying 
preferences can lead to different outcomes, depending on resistance within these 
communities. Given the relevance of such preferences for various social aspects 
regarding traditional gendered roles, religious ideology or taboo practices for example, 
these designs are potentially important steps in effective MFI programmes.  
 
3. Moneylenders (who are usually also rich landowners) in India showed a strong negative 
stance and a rather aggressive attitude towards MFIs and their clients, which can 
negatively impact the MFIs outreach. Other actors within the communities were groups 
of individuals like money lenders, local politicians and their devotees, local traditional 
physicians and midwives or government officials, all of whom would potentially face 
accountability for their actions due to the presence of MFIs within the communities or 
from their operations. Most MFIs, including NEED, run social awareness programmes 
for their clients in addition to providing credit services. The services and advocacy can 
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help the (potential) borrowers within the communities to avoid many vulnerable 
situations from which more powerful actors in the community, like the groups mentioned 
above, can benefit.  
Moneylenders, local influential elites and feudal lords were less of a problem in Pakistan. 
Moneylenders were relatively less aggressive, but did not have an amicable stance toward 
MFIs in general. Though feudal structures were just as frequent and remained entrenched, 
they did not pose a direct threat to MFI operation. In contrast to NEED in India, Kashf 
had little or no involvement in programmes that exhort the poor against such feudalistic 
structures, and therefore has not incurred strong opposition from the feudal elites and 
other local influential figures. However, during the microfinance delinquency crisis in 
Pakistan in 2008/9, interventions of all sorts from external actors (mostly individuals or 
groups representing members of the religious faction, moneylenders, rival MFIs, local 
influential elites and politicians, government officials, groups of professionals like 
lawyers and clients families) massively hampered Kashf’s and the microfinance sectors’ 
operations all over Pakistan. During this delinquency crisis, interference from all sorts of 
agencies (private and government), groups and individuals emerged, as various actors 
were trying to turn the Kashf crisis into an opportunity to gain political, professional or 
economic benefits. 
These findings are in line with existing literature on interventions in the MFI sector that 
have caused immense harm to MFIs in many regions (Yerramilli 2013, Banerjee and 
Duflo 2011, Bajaj 2011, Gonzalez 2011 and Burki 2009). This study not only contributes 
to the literature on stakeholder behavior in the informal financial sector, but allows 
insights into a range of uncontrollable and damaging developments in the informal 
financial sector that has been the focus of much debate in the past decade in many 
countries. 
 
The comparative analysis across the regions in neighbouring India and Pakistan reveals 
that there are important differences not only in respondent households, but also in their 
milieus and the household’s dealings and interactions within these.  
 
4. Pakistani households seem to place a higher importance on the MFIs for providing 
financial services. Moreover, households in Pakistan show a higher inclination toward 
attachment to religious institutions or groups. This has resulted in giving the respective 
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religious institutions in Pakistan a higher leverage in influencing opinions or even 
enforcing decisions against a loan from an MFI, given their openly oppositional stance 
toward interest-based loans. 
The study thus adds to the growing literature on Sharia-compliant microfinance products 
for populations living in Muslim-dominant areas. Moreover, it has important implications 
for replicating and learning from models of successful MFIs that operate cost-effectively 
through religious places (like Akhuwat in Pakistan) and lessons for conventional MFIs. 
5. The several components like the opinions of other actors within the society on MFIs and 
the social behaviour and attitudes of these actor’s towards a membership with MFI, does 
seem to be of importance in both India and Pakistan. The variance lies, however in the 
scale, range and the type of actors within these components, which vary for both regions. 
For example the composition, size and structure of the household and the nature and 
character of the neighbourhoods play a central role.  
In Pakistan household sizes are bigger and a joint family system is more prevalent, so that 
the role of the immediate family gains much weight in the decisions of the women in 
these HHs for loan take up. In India, the larger neighbourhoods, peers, caste relations and 
even moneylenders have a stronger role to play in influencing loan take-up decisions 
from MFIs.  
These findings of the study reveal the complex nature of power hierarchies within the 
HHs and how HH composition and size matters in HH decision making. The study is one 
of a few of this kind that provides insights into the world of domestic power struggles 
over microfinance, drawing on testimonies of not just the women, but also the men from 
within the HHs. It therefore adds considerable value to the microfinance literature and 
has important policy implications, such as the importance of more gender-friendly loan 
qualification criteria for MFIs in order to truly advance women’s empowerment. 
In addition, there was a clear distinction in notions of power and authority between the 
men and the women and in their respective ways of dealing with situations of conflict and 
disharmony within the household.   
In India, authority within the households was more contested and women were less likely 
to be acquiescent to male authority than their counterparts in Pakistan. In Pakistan, 
women were more self-regulating, with individuals carefully adhering to expected gender 
roles and behaviours. Most likely, this was to reassure their male counterparts within the 
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households, who seemed less controlling of women’s attitudes and gradually came to 
support decisions of loan take ups from MFIs.  
These differences in women’s attitudes, between two regions with a relatively similar 
patriarchal set-up, has important implications for MFI programmes that offer 
complimentary services in addition to microcredit. Community intervention on behalf of 
MFIs as social organisations, and the government’s policy of supporting self-help groups 
in India, has brought about a change in women’s perceptions of the role that they should 
play. 
!
The most important finding of this thesis is that MFIs can be hindered in reaching out to their 
targeted populations when they do not take into account the various pressures that their clients 
have to confront within their HHs, families and local communities. Their success depends 
quite a lot on their ability to adapt and come up with solutions to deal with these pressures, 
even if it means shifting away from their initial operational practices, as the empirical 
evidence from the two South Asian neighbours has shown. In the case of the two Grameen 
replication programmes that were studied here, their adjustment strategies were a reaction to 
their environmental frameworks. However, these adjustments make little sense in serving 
their missions or goals of empowering the poor working women when male nomination is 
obligatory for a loan. Though familial structure and household composition is an important 
factor in affecting the women’s loan decisions in the microfinance sector, there needs to be a 
contextual consensus on how such gender biases are to be confronted and tackled in 
patriarchal set ups. How these issues of gendered relations with the HHs and interventions 
from the larger social circles are to be addressed needs further analysis and should be 
explored in further research. 
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APPENDIX 1 Types of financial institutions providing microfinance services 
Financial 
Institutions 
Type Characteristic features and composition 
Public 
development banks 
Formal (a) Large centralised government owned banks that enjoy 
financial support from foreign and international organisations 
and lending mostly to specific sectors (e.g. agriculture). 
Subsidized interest rates emphasis with a broad network of 
branches offering both savings and lending products. Lending 
is either direct or through intermediaries like NGOS or self 
help groups (SHGs). 
Private 
development banks 
Formal Similar to commercial banks with two basic differences:  
- fill capital gaps in the productive sector considered too risky 
by commercial standards, for which they enjoy certain 
exemptions like tax breaks or reduced reserve requirements 
- Lower capital requirements than commercial banks  
Saving banks and 
postal savings 
banks 
Formal Mixture of public and private ownership – typically not 
owned by the central government. They are decentralized and 
rooted in local communities with large network operating 
from post office counters enabling them to mobilise savings 
and provides money transfer but no credit services. Deposits 
are either invested in government securities or simply 
transferred to the treasury 
Commercial banks Formal Not mainstream for microfinance. However, some ventures of 
commercial banks with smaller loans have been successful in 
South America like Colombia or Bolivia and in South East 
Asia.  
Nonbank financial 
intermediaries  
Formal Specialized regulated institutions (private financial / mutual 
funds) which do not have a banking license. They channel 
equity fund, retain earnings and other borrowed capital to 
small unsecured short term loans. They are often not allowed 
to mobilise savings, however their activities vary from 
country to country. Examples are “Caja da Ahorro y Prestamo 
Los Andes” in Bolivia and  “Accion Comunitaria del Peru” in 
Peru 
Credit unions and 
financial 
cooperatives 
Semi-formal 
(b) 
A whole variety of them varying in form and range of 
services. These unions mobilise savings and provide credit 
services, they are registered and regulated (however not as 
banks). No external stakeholders and loan resources remain in 
the communities from where the savings were mobilised, 
making them user owned schemes. The FINCA model is a 
good example of such types of unions. 
(Financial) Non-
governmental 
organisations 
(NGOs)  
Semi-formal The most common business model for MFIs – around 75% of 
all MFIs comprise of NGOs. Very diverse  - defined mostly 
by what it is not – namely neither government related nor 
profit oriented – however different from SHG and 
cooperatives as they are registered but may not mobilise 
savings  
Self-help groups 
(SHGs) 
Both semi-
formal and 
informal 
Self employed women who informally support the economic 
activities of peers via mutual guarantees that facilitate access 
to bank loans by borrowing and lending among themselves 
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and encouraging regular saving. Many NGOs support SHGs 
in their activities and market/ credit access. 
Moneylenders, 
traders, landlords 
Informal (c) Private individuals who lend money usually at exorbitant 
rates, usually operating on the market from their primary 
business space not necessarily related to their credit provision 
services. 
Rotating savings 
and credit 
associations 
(ROSCAs)  
Informal Self organized group of individuals who pool money on a 
regular basis and use it on a rotating basis usually interest 
free. They are not registered and private. 
 
Sources: Armendáriz and Morduch (2007) and Ledgerwood (1998) 
 
 
(a) Formal Institutions are subject to general laws and regulations, in addition to banking specific regulation 
and supervision 
 
(b) Semiformal Institutions are registered entities subject to general laws including commercial law but not 
in terms of bank regulation or supervision 
 
(c)  Informal Institutions are subject to neither bank law nor commercial law (in this sense not referred to 
as an institution at all)  
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APPENDIX 2 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
 
No. UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
1 Eradicating extreme poverty and 
hunger 
1. Halve the number of poor whose income is less that 
$1 a day between 1990 and  
2. Achieve full and productive employment and decent 
work for all, including women and young people 
3. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger  
2 
 
Achieving universal primary 
education 
Ensure that all children of the world will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling by 2015 
3 Promoting gender equality and 
empowering women  
 
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of 
education no later than 2015 
4 Reducing child mortality rates  
 
Reduce the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds 
between 1990 and 2015 
5 Improving maternal health 
 
1. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, 
the maternal mortality ratio 
2. Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive 
health 
6 Combating HIV/Aids, malaria, 
and other diseases 
1. Halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the spread of 
HIV/AIDS 
2. Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for 
HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
3. Halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the incidence of 
malaria and other major diseases 
7 Ensuring environmental 
sustainability 
 
1. Integrate the principles of sustainable development 
into country policies and programs and reverse the loss 
of 
environmental resources 
2. Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a 
significant reduction in the rate of loss 
3. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation 
4. Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 
8 Developing a global partnership 
for development 
1.Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, 
non-discriminatory trading and financial system 
2. Address the special needs of least developed 
countries, landlocked countries and small island 
developing states 
3. Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ 
debt 
4. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, 
provide access to affordable, essential drugs in 
developing countries 
5. In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available benefits of new technologies, especially ICTs 
 
Source: United Nations Millennium Development Goals (2012): http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 
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APPENDIX  3A – 3G    
 
QUESTIONNAIRES 1 
 
Preliminary remarks 
The development of financial markets, go hand in hand with the economic development of a country/ 
region etc. For less developed countries with lower purchasing power per head, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) play an important role in the financial market, as they meet the financial needs of 
the majority. 
The Goal of my study is to interrogate and analyse the interaction between the MFIs and other 
institutions and stake holders. What benefits do the MFIs provide and how can this be linked to not 
only the general conditions/ framework within which these MFIs operate but also how is the whole set 
up influenced given the social and cultural context. 
Therefore a sample of some 100 people would be interviewed to check for the familial life/ habits and 
social customs and norms.  In addition the employees and senior executive MFI officers will be 
interviewed to check for institutional adjustments to the demands of the environment in which they 
operate. I will be asking you and the other respondents many questions, some very personal but let me 
assure you that the conversation/ interview that I would be having here with you would be absolutely 
anonymous and the identities of all respondents would not be disclosed to anyone. 
 
I would like to express my deep gratitude that I may take your time to conduct this interview that 
would help me analyse and study the results later for my project. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERVIEW 
The interview is structured into two parts/ levels. 
Level I: addresses the general questions on the occupational activity, MFI services and the impact it 
has for the enterprise or the household respectively. 
Level II: addresses the more specific socio/ intra household dynamics, on which you would be asked 
many personal questions regarding your family and private life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 For technical details and all questionnaires, I have mostly taken inspiration from and relied on survey questionnaires from 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) and  Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) 
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APPENDIX  3A  Individual questionnaire: Borrower (women) 
 
 
Village     ________ 
 
District/ block     ________ 
 
Household number    ________ 
 
Full name of respondent   ________ 
 
Gotra (Surname)    ________ 
 
Gender      ________ 
 
S.No. of respondent    ________ 
 
Date      ________ 
 
Time started interview                                    ________ 
 
Time finished interview    ________ 
 
Additional details    ______________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
NOTES: (Living conditions of the respondent and the neighbourhood in general)  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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LEVEL I: Entrepreneur, enterprise, microfinance services and Impact 
 a) Entrepreneur and Enterprise profile 
 
1. Age (in years)          __________  
  
2. Marital Status 1. Married   4. Widow 
    2. Single   5. Separated 
    3. Divorced 
           
3. How long have you been living in this locality    __________  
 
4. Socio-cultural group:  1. Hindu: Caste/ sub-Caste ____________________ 
      2. Muslim: Caste ___________________________ 
      3. Jain: Caste _____________________________ 
     4. Sikh: Caste _______________________________ 
5. Christian: Caste __________________________ 
      6. Other: Specify ____________________________ 
 
5. Educational status:  
A) Literacy level: Can you  1. Write your name 
      2. Operate/ handle a mobile 
      3. Read a book or a newspaper 
      
B) Did you complete  1. Primary 
    2. Secondary: lower_____, upper______ 
     3. Tertiary 
     4. Few years of schooling without formal primary completion: 
                Specify: No. of years:______ 
     5. No formal schooling, but some informal education 
         Specify how long and by whom: _____________________ 
     6. No schooling at all 
 
6. Loan disbursed is an: 1. Individual loan 2. Group loan (SHG)     3. Amount _____ 
 
7. If a group loan, when was the SHG that you currently belong to started? __________ 
 
8. What was the purpose of the loan? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. To start or support or expand an economic activity/ enterprise 
2. For household expenses; specify _____________________________________ 
3. Education 
4. Health expenses 
5. Any other, specify___________________________________________________ 
 
Q 9 to 20, to ask if the loan was for economic activity and where relevant 
9. Type of enterprise supported by credit    
1. Production    3. Trade 
2. Service     4. Other: specify ______________  
   
10. Is the loan assisted enterprise your main source of income?  
    1. Yes   2. No   3. Don’t know  
11. If NO, specify main source of income? _______________________________ 
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12. How old is the enterprise  Years ______________ + Months ______________ 
 
13. What is the ownership structure of the enterprise?  
  1. Sole proprietor 
  2. Family partnership: if so who in the family is co-owning:_____________________ 
  3. Non-family partnership 
  4. Cooperative/ group 
  5. Other ______________ 
 
14. What is the location of the business?     
  1. Rural (countryside)   3. Peri-Urban      
  2. Rural (town)    4. Urban     
 
15. Is your enterprise located at the same place as your home? 1. Yes  2. No 
 
16. What is the nature of the business premises? 1. Own (family) premises and land 
        2. Leased land 
        3. Rented premises  
        4. Informal/ uncertified use of site   
        5. Fully mobile 
        6. Other: _________________________ 
 
17. How many people (paid and unpaid) are there in your business?      _________________ 
 
18. Is the enterprise seasonal?  1. Yes  2. No 
 
19. Have you been successful in getting more customers / business over the period of the present loan 
and has the business in general prospered?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
20. What is the general reaction of the business success/ failure from the following groups: 
1. Immediate family______________________________________________________________ 
2. Extended family_______________________________________________________________ 
3. Neighbours___________________________________________________________________ 
4. Competitors___________________________________________________________________ 
5. Previous sources of capital_______________________________________________________ 
6. Religious faction/ community ____________________________________________________ 
7. Others: Specify ________________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Income: Savings/ credit; impact on household 
 
21. What was the main source of your start up funds?   
  1. Project loan   4. Personal savings  
  2. Other loan   5. Gifts; if so by whom: __________________________ 
  3. Household savings  6. Other ______________ 
 
22. Other sources of credit in the past:  
 1. Bank: ________________________________________________________________ 
 2. Other lending Institutes: ________________________________________________ 
 3. Local traders /Money lenders /Landlords (big men) ____________________________ 
 4. Family/ friends______________________________________________________ 
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 5. None. 
 
23. Who could possibly be profiting directly from the current loan and its disbursement and explain 
how they benefit: (give relevant examples for illustration in brackets)  
1. MFI employee (e.g.: because they work on provision basis)_______________________________ 
2. Trade partners/ suppliers (More business; easy payments/ transfer of money) _________________ 
3. Co-owner/ business partner (capital inflow in the business) _______________________________ 
4. Children (dowry etc) ______________________________________________________________ 
5. Other: Specify ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Who could possibly be profiting indirectly from the loan and its disbursement and explain how they 
benefit: (give relevant examples for illustration in brackets)  
1. Children (due to increased family income) ___________________________________________ 
2. Husband (reduces economic burden) ________________________________________________ 
3. Extended family and friends (gifts, employment in the business with salary) ________________ 
4. Neighbours (marriage of daughter gifts etc. or employment etc) __________________________ 
5. Other: specify ____________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. All those who directly or indirectly benefit from the loan disbursement, are they aware of the source 
of this benefit being the MFI and what are their reactions? (illustrate with the help of examples like 
envy, thankful, anger (in case family members have to work and get no payment for it etc.) but not 
ask directly) _____________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Has a bank or a lending Institute ever refused you a loan application?  
   1. Yes    2. No    3. Never applied 
 
27. Are any of your previous loans outstanding?     1. Yes  2. No 
 
28. Are there arrears (Is the respondent behind in her loan repayments)?  1. Yes   2. No 
 
29. If YES; why and what are the reasons for the arrears?  
1. Social reasons: specify __________________________________________________ 
2. Business failure 
3. Natural disaster 
4. Consumption requirements 
5. Other _____________________ 
 
30. Have you obtained any other loan during the lifespan of the present loan? 1. Yes  2.No 
 
31. If yes: specify by source (whether bank, microfinance institute, money lender, landlord, trader  
etc., family or friends), the purpose and total amount borrowed: 
Name of source Number of loans and purpose  Total amount borrowed 
_____________ _______________________  _____________________ 
_____________ _______________________  _____________________ 
32. Would you still be able to rely on these sources if required? 
 1. Yes   2. No: why__________________________________________ 
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33. Are you a member of a borrower group?    1. Yes  2. No 
 
 If yes; 1. For how long:  Years ___, months ___; and 
    2. How many members does this group have? ____ 
 
34. How were you recruited to join the SHG? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. I wanted to join – my own motivation   5.    NGO/ Bank approached me to join 
2. Friends asked me to join    6.    Animator approached me to join 
3. Relatives asked me to join   7.    Any other, specify.  
4. Husband asked me to join 
 
35. Besides dealing with loans and savings, does your group have any other activities? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Household size?      __________ 
 
37. Who is the head of the household? 1. You  4. Mother 
       2. Spouse 5. Other: Specify______________ 
       3. Father  
38. Household Structure 
S.No. Name Sex Age Relation to 
head of 
household 
Marital 
status 
Education 
level 
Residence 
(in/out of the 
village) 
  
 
     
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
      
 
  
  
 
      
  
 
      
  
 
      
  
 
     
 
 
 
 
       
 
39. Is this a   a) Joint family?  b) Nuclear family? 
 
40. How many in your household have wage employment?  
  1. now _______________   2. before Loan _______________   
41. How many dependents within the family would be affected if you were not to have an income and 
why?  Those affected from loss of respondents income   Reason 
    _______________________________________________  _____________________ 
    _______________________________________________  _____________________ 
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    _______________________________________________  _____________________ 
 
42. How many members of your household are employed in your enterprise at the moment and before 
the loan?  Number employed   Now  before Loan 
1. Full-time    ____  ____ 
2. Part-time    ____  ____ 
3. Casual    ____  ____ 
   
43. Do you pay these family employees?    1. Yes  2. No 
 
44. What other economic activities are you and members of your household engaged in? 
       You   Spouse Others 
1. Wage employment    ___  ____  _____ 
2. Agriculture     ___  ____  _____ 
3. Livestock     ___  ____  _____ 
4. Other (self-employment)   ___  ____  _____ 
 
45. Which of the following is true for your income (before any loan from the MFI): “your income...: 
  1...  allowed you to build your savings” 
  2...  allowed you just to save a little” 
  3...  only just met your expenses” 
  4...  was not sufficient so you used to use your savings to meet expenses” 
  5...  was really not sufficient, so you needed to borrow to meet expenses” 
 
46. How has this income situation changed with the MFI loan (own assessment)? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
47. How did your neighbours assess your household status (relative to neighbourhood) before the loan: 
  1. Relative wealthy   3. Relatively poor 
     2. Just average   4. Very poor 
 
48. What has changed with/ after the loan (neighbours assessment)? ___________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
LEVEL II: Details on the Socio / intra-household dynamics 
c) Marriage details (in case married)/ Natal family; dependence and care 
 
49. What is your husband’s name?  __________________________________________ 
 
50. What was your age at your current marriage?     ________________ 
 
51. Is this your first marriage?    1. Yes    2. No 
 
52. If NO, how many times have you been married before?   ___________ 
 
53. Have you married within your kin group?  1. Yes: a) Blood relative 2. No 
            b) Clan/ caste   
    
54. If married within kin group (1. (a)), specify:   1.  Cross cousin marriage 
         2. Maternal/ Paternal cousin 
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         3. Any other kin member______________ 
55. Marriage distance, specify:  
1. In-village marriage  
2. Outside the village; If outside village, indicate place and distance_______________ 
 
56. Were your preferences ascertained before finding a husband for you?  1. Yes  2. No 
  
57. How would you rank the relative status of your family versus your husband´s at the time of your 
marriage?         
      1. Same as your family  3.  Lower than your family 
2. Higher than your family  4. Don´t know  
 
58. What is/was your father’s main occupation? 
1.Wage employment in agriculture 
2. Wage employment in non-agricultural  
activities 
3. Self- employed in agriculture 
4. Self- employed in non-agricultural  
activities 
5. Salaried job 
6. Any other, specify 
 
59. Number of siblings: Brothers:    Sisters: 
    _____ Younger Brother(s)  ____Younger Sister(s) 
    _____ Elder Brother(s)  ____ Elder Sister(s)  
 
Old age support  Only if one or both parents are alive 
 
60. When your parents fall sick or are disabled, who takes care of them?  
1. Myself 
2. My brothers and their wives 
3. Other relatives 
4. Neighbours 
5. No one 
6. Any other, specify 
 
61. Before you were married, did you work  
1. on family land, with or without wages? 
2. for wages/ income, in cash or in kind?  
3. Did not work 
 
62. If yes, what did you do with the income?  
1. Gave it to parents    3. Savings 
2. Spent it on yourself   4. Any other, specify 
 
63. Before your marriage if you were an earning member of the family, how much did your earnings 
contribute to the total income of your natal family?  
1. Almost none  3. About half    5.  All 
2. Less than half  4. More than half  
 
64. Are there members of your family beyond the household who are dependent on you? 
      1. Yes   2. No 
65. If yes, how many members of the family beyond the household are dependent on you? 
    1. now _______________   2. before loan _______________ 
 
66. After your marriage, do you give money to your parents?  
1. Regularly remit     4. Rarely 
2. Occasionally (on festivals, events, illness)  5. Not at all 
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3. If they ask, if there is a crisis 
 
67. If regular remittance, then what is amount of regular remittance? ______________ 
 If in kind, provide approximate value in Rs.:    ______________ 
 
68. If yes, do you give money (or in kind support) with your husband’s knowledge?    
    1. Yes  2. No 
 
69. If you do not give money (or in kind support) to your parents, why not?  
1. Married daughters do not give; parents will not accept from married daughters 
2. Parents do not need 
3. Husband objects 
4. Cannot afford 
5. Any other, specify 
 
70. If you regularly remit, why?  
1. Parents cannot support themselves  3. My brothers do not support/ no brother 
2. It is my responsibility    4. Any other, specify _________________ 
 
71. In your community, are married daughters expected to take care of/ support their parents?  
      1. Yes   2. No 
 
d) Details on respondent, her husband/ Father/ Guardian and intra-household  
dynamics; Violence (verbal, physical, emotional) 
 
(For married respondents with husbands who are alive. For single women/ widowed respondents, 
substitute husband with Father/ other male figure, having authority within the household, where 
applicable)       Husband          Father   Other; specify _________ 
 
72. What is your opinion on the importance of the following institutions/ people and who makes them 
up respectively: (probe whether socially important or feared or threat to faith (interest in Islam for 
example) and/ or customs or norms? 
1. Banks (commercial, agricultural etc.) ____________________________________________ 
2. MFIs (NGOs, micro credit banks etc.) ___________________________________________ 
3. Money lenders/ traders (other credit sources) ______________________________________ 
4. Big important men/ groups within the locality _____________________________________ 
5. Religious/ community affiliated groups __________________________________________ 
6. Public officials/ employees ____________________________________________________ 
7. Others who might be influential in any way, specify ________________________________ 
 
73. Ever since your membership/ association with the MFI, have you been encountered/ threatened or 
provoked in any way (physical or verbal) by the following groups, give details if so: 
 1. Public officials/ servants (bureaucracy) _________________________________________ 
 2. Other local money lenders/ traders_____________________________________________ 
 3. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit _____________________________________ 
 4. Feudal / Landlords/ big men __________________________________________________ 
 5. Other rural Banks/ MFIs etc.: specify ___________________________________________ 
 6. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat ______________________________________ 
 7. Other family members: specify _______________________________________________ 
 8. Neighbours _______________________________________________________________ 
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 9. The (loan officers/ employees of the) MFI you are with now ________________________ 
 10. Others: specify ___________________________________________________________ 
 
74. What is the opinion of the following people/ groups, about the operations of the MFI, from which 
you get your loan, in your area? 
1. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat________________________________________ 
2. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit _____________________________________ 
3. Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area__________________________________________ 
4. Local money lenders/ traders__________________________________________________ 
5. Senior Men/ members of the caste you belong to__________________________________ 
6. Family members ___________________________________________________________ 
7. Neighbours _______________________________________________________________ 
   
75. Does your husband know of your borrower status that helps you earn money? 
   1. Yes   2. No   3. Don’t know____________________ 
 
76. Do you know your family income?    1. Yes   2. No 
 
77. How much do your earnings contribute to the total household income? 
1. Almost none   3. About half   5. All 
2. Less than half   4. More than half  
 
78. When you earn money, do you 
1. Give all to husband/ other family member 
2. Gives some to husband/ other family member, keeps some for self 
3. Keeps all of it 
4. Any other, specify 
5. No answer  
 
79. If part of the income is retained, is that   1. With your husband’s knowledge? 
            2. Without your husband’s knowledge? 
 
80. If your husband were unable to support you, would you be able to support yourself and your 
children?    
       1. Yes   2. No   3. No answer 
 
81. Is there someone else you could rely on for support?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
82. If yes, please provide details. ____________________________________ 
 
83. Does your household have a bank account?   1. Yes  2. No  
 
84. If yes, in whose name?     ________________________________ 
 
85. Do you have a bank account that you yourself use?  1. Yes  2. No  
86. Regardless of who keeps the money you earn, do you have a say in how your earnings are used or 
does someone else decide this? 
1. Respondent has a say   3. Someone else has a say 
2. Husband has a say   4. No answer 
 
87. Does your husband ever drink alcohol?    1. Yes   2. No 
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88. If yes, can it happen that he gets drunk? 
1. Never      4. Several times a week 
2. Rarely     5. Every day     
3. Sometimes (Social events, festivals) 
 
89. Are you afraid to disagree sometimes with your husband because he will be angry with you?  
    1. Yes   2. No   3. No answer 
 
90. How often do you and your husband disagree on the following issues?  
             Frequently     Not very often        Never        Varies  
1. Moral and religion          _______  _______ ______        _____ 
2. Spending money/ financial preferences  _______  _______ ______        _____ 
3. Education of children               _______  _______ ______        _____ 
4. Use of alcohol          _______  _______ ______        _____ 
5. SHG/ MFI association         _______  _______ ______        _____ 
 
91. Would he permit you to improve your education if you wanted to?   1. Yes 2. No 
 
92. I am going to ask you about some situations which happened to some women. Please tell me if 
these apply to your relationship with your husband. 
 
i) He (is/was) jealous or angry if you (talk/talked) to other men.  a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
ii) He frequently (accuses/accused) you of being unfaithful.  a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
iii) He (does/did) not permit you to meet your female friends.  a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
iv) He (tries/tried) to limit your contact with your family.  a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
v) He (insists/insisted) on knowing where you (are/were) at all times a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
vi) He (does/did) not trust you with any money.  
 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
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e) No answer 
vii) Ho would have problems to let you go alone to the market/ outside a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
viii) Your husband does not allow you to travel to a nearby town alone. a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
 
93. Does your husband mistreat/ abuse you (give e.g. of emotional abuse as degrading remarks against 
herself/ loved ones, personal attacks on character, threatening with divorce etc.; and physical abuse as 
in actions causing physical pain via slapping, hitting, pushing, pulling of hair, kicking etc.):  
           Yes                   No 
1. emotionally/ verbally   _______ ________ 
2. physically     _______ ________ 
 
94.  Has he recently, 
 
1. Physically hurt/  threatened or mistreated you 1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
2. Said or done something to humiliate you in front of others?  1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
3. Threatened to hurt or harm you or someone close to you or himself?  1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
4.  Made you feel bad about yourself?  1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
5.  Ignored/ been indifferent 1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
6.  Been finding fault with you 1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
7.  Any other, specify. 1. Often 
2. Sometimes 
3. Not at all 
 
 
95. What was the reason for the conflict/ abuse? (Tick all relevant options) 
 
Reason Emotional/verbal 
abuse 
Physical 
abuse 
1. Not attending to household chores/ children/ 
in laws properly 
2. Talking to neighbours/other men 
  
 204 
 
3. Dowry issues 
4. Frustration due to economic problems 
5. Because there is disagreement on decisions 
regarding spending of family income 
6. Any other, specify 
 
96.  Whom do you seek support from when you are mistreated?  
 
Support Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. No one 
2. My parents 
3. My relatives 
4. Friends and neighbours 
5. Co-workers 
6. Peer group (loan) 
7. Any other, specify 
  
 
97. Do you think that your association with the MFI and the change in your income from the loan is 
responsible for a deterioration in your relationship (if any) with husband/ father/ guardian 
Elaborate (probe): ________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________::::::::::::_____________ 
 
98.  Did you join the SHG or become a member of (group) lending as it may help you deal with 
marital abuse and (marital) violence?  1. Yes  2. No 
 
99.  Does your husband/ father/ male guardian approve of you joining the SHG or being provided a 
loan?      1. Yes   2. No 
 
100.  Due to your membership with the MFI, has anyone (apart from your husband/ father/ guardian) 
abused you?     1.  Yes   2. No 
 
101. If yes, who abused you?  
 
 Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. Father-in-law 
2. Mother-in-law 
3. Son 
4. Daughter 
5. Other relatives 
6. Any other, specify 
  
 
102. If yes, how frequently does this happen? 
 
Frequency Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. Every day 
2. At least once in a week (but 
not every day) 
3. At least once in a month 
4. Occasionally 
5. Cannot tell 
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103. Ever since your membership with the MFI, have you been able to defend yourself actively against 
the mistreatment/ abuse from your husband / other family members (be it emotional/ verbal/ 
physical)  
 1. Yes, specify against whom and how__________________________________________  
_____________________________________________________________________________  
 2. No 
 
104. If yes, how frequently have you had to defend yourself?  
 
Frequency Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. Every day 
2. At least once in a week 
(but not every day) 
3. At least once in a month 
4. Occasionally 
5. Cannot tell 
  
 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the survey 
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APPENDIX  3B Individual questionnaire: Husband/ Father/ Guardian of borrower 
 
 
Village      ________  
 
District/ block      ________ 
 
Household number:    ________  
 
Full name of respondent    ________ 
 
Gotra (Surname)     ________ 
 
Gender       ________ 
 
S.No. of respondent:    ________ 
 
Family relationship to Female respondent ________ 
 
Date      ________ 
 
Time started interview                                     ________ 
  
Time finished interview     ________ 
 
Additional details    ________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
NOTES: (Living conditions of the respondent and the neighbourhood in general)  
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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a) Husbands/ Fathers/ Male Guardians profile and credit background 
 
1. Age          __________  
  
2. Main occupation   __________________________________________ 
 
3. Whether work undertaken is seasonal   1. Yes  2. No 
 
4. Any other sources of income  1. None 
      2. Wage employment  
      3. Livestock 
      4. Agriculture 
      5. Other production / service / trade enterprise 
      6. Other combination: Specify ____________ 
 
5. Socio-cultural group:  1. Hindu: Caste/ sub-Caste  _____________________ 
     2. Muslim: Caste _____________________________ 
     3. Jain: Caste ________________________________ 
     4. Sikh: Caste ________________________________ 
     5. Christian: Caste ____________________________ 
     6. Other: Specify _____________________________ 
 
6. Educational status:  
 A) Literacy level: Can you 1. Write your name 
     2. Operate/ handle a mobile 
     3. Read a book or a newspaper 
      
 B) Did you complete  1. Primary 
     2. Secondary: lower_____, upper______ 
     3. Tertiary 
     4. Few years of schooling without formal primary completion: 
             Specify: No. of years:______ 
     5. No formal schooling, but some informal education 
         Specify how long and by whom: _____________________ 
     6. No schooling at all 
 
7. Have you ever applied for a loan with a credit institute in your life ?  1. Yes       2. No 
 
8. If yes, has a bank or a lending Institute ever refused you a loan application?    1. Yes       2. No  
 
9. Have you ever had anything to do with a bank/ financial institute/ money lenders or others 
regarding financial matters?    1. Yes  2. No 
 
10. If yes with whom and in which context:   Savings   Credit 
   1. Bank/ finance Institute   ________  ________ 
   2. Money Lenders/ Traders   ________  ________ 
   3. MFI’s     ________  ________ 
   4. Others, specify________________ ________  ________ 
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11. What is your opinion on the importance of the following institutions/ people and who makes 
them up respectively: (probe whether socially important or feared or threat to faith (interest in 
Islam for example) and/ or customs or norms? 
1. Banks (commercial, agricultural etc.) ___________________________________________ 
2. MFIs (NGOs, micro credit banks etc.) __________________________________________ 
3. Money lenders/ traders (other credit sources) _____________________________________ 
4. Big important men/ groups within the locality ____________________________________ 
5. Religious/ community affiliated groups _________________________________________ 
6. Public officials/ employees ___________________________________________________ 
7. Others who might be influential in any way, specify _______________________________ 
 
12. Do your neighbours assess your household as:    
  1. Relative wealthy     3. Relatively poor 
  2. Just average     4. Very poor 
 
13. In your opinion, women who are clients of the MFIs are (tick all relevant options): 
1. Benefiting from the loan economically 
2. Helping their families and improving her own and their families lives 
3. Are more confident and emancipated because of their economic power 
4. Not benefiting at all  
5. Are thought and spoken bad of in the community/ neighbourhood 
6. Are having trouble dealing with confrontations within the family, society and communal life by 
peers or other groups because of their membership with the MFI; specify___________ 
7. Causing problems and disharmony for their husbands and family due to the change in income 
and their status within the family; specify___________________________________ 
8. Personal opinion; if any _____________________________________________________ 
 
b) Marriage details; dependence and care  
 
14. What is your wife’s name?     ______________________________ 
(Note: If respondent is Muslim, ask if he has any ‘other’ wives; if yes, note all details for ‘others’ as 
well) 
 
15. What was your age at your current marriage?    ______________ 
 
16. Is this your first marriage?    1. Yes    2. No 
 
17. If no, how many times have you been married before?   ______________ 
 
18. Were your preferences ascertained before finding a wife for you?   1. Yes 2. No 
  
19. How would you rank the relative status of your family versus your wife’s at the time of your 
marriage?  1. Same as your family 
     2. Higher than your family 
     3. Lower than your family 
     4. Don’t know 
 
20. What is/was your father’s main occupation? 
1. 1.Wage employment in agriculture 
2. 2. Wage employment in non-agricultural  
3. activities 
5. 4. Self- employed in non-agricultural  
6. activities 
7. 5. Salaried job 
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4. 3. Self- employed in agriculture 8. 6. Any other, specify 
21. How much agricultural land does your natal family own?  _______________ 
 
22. Number of siblings:  Brothers:    Sisters: 
    _____ Younger Brother(s)  ____Younger Sister(s) 
    _____ Elder Brother(s)  ____ Elder Sister(s)  
 
Old age support Only if one or both parents are alive   
 
23. When your parents fall sick or are disabled, who takes care of them? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. 1. Myself 
2. 2. My brother(s) and his/ their wife(ves) 
3. 3. My sister(s) and her family(ies) 
4. 4. Other relatives 
 
5. 5. Neighbours 
6. 6. No one 
7. 7. Any other, specify 
 
24. What is the major source of financial support for your parents? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. Sons 
2. Daughters  
3. Other relatives 
4. Savings 
5. Land 
1. 6. Rent, dividends, interest, pension 
2. 7. Own earnings 
3. 8. Government support 
4. 9. Any other, specify 
 
 
25. Does your wife give money to / financially support her parents?  
1. Regularly remit 
2. Occasionally (on festivals, events, illness) 
3. If they ask, if there is a crisis 
4. At other very rare occasions 
5. Not at all 
26. If no, why not?  
1. Married daughters do not give; parents will not accept from married daughters 
2. Parents do not need 
3. I don’t like it 
4. Cannot afford 
5. Any other, specify 
 
27. In your community, are married daughters expected to take care of/ support their parents?  
      1. Yes   2. No 
 
c) Details attitude towards wife; social/ intra-household dynamics; Violence (verbal/ physical/ 
emotional) 
 
28. Does your wife know your and the overall family income?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Other: specify____________________ 
 
29. How much do her earnings contribute to the total household income?  
1. Almost none   4. More than half 
2. Less than half   5. All 
3. About half 
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30. When she earns money, does she usually:  
1. Give all to you / other family member: specify________________________ 
2. Give some to you/ other family member, keeps some for herself: specify_____________ 
3. Keep all of it 
4. Other specify 
5. No answer 
 
31. When you earn money, do you usually:   
1. Give all to wife/ other family member: specify________________________ 
2. Give some to wife/ other family member, keeps some for yourself: specify___________ 
3. Keep all of it 
4. Other specify 
5. No answer, refusal  
 
32. If you retain a part of your income, is that   1. With your wife’s knowledge? 
         2. Without your wife’s knowledge? 
 
33. Does your household have a joint bank account?   1. Yes  2. No  
 
34. If yes, in whose name?  ________________________________________________ 
 
35. Does your wife have a bank account that she herself uses?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
36. Has she herself ever taken a loan—cash/ kind—from any programme to start or to expand a 
business or is she part of a SHG?      1. Yes  2. No 
 
37. If yes, please provide details. __________________________________________ 
 
38. Regardless of who keeps the money she earns, do you have a say in how her earnings are used?
   1. Yes; specify in which way______________________________   
  2. No 
 
39. Does someone else have a say apart from herself, in how her earnings are used? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
40. Regardless of who keeps the money you earn, do you have a say in how your earnings are used 
or does someone else decide this?   
1. Wife has a say   3. Someone else has a say 
   2. The respondent has a say  4. No answer 
 
41. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements below:   
Some people say:   
           Agree     Disagree 
a) Women are not made for business, therefore, their husbands   ________   _________ 
should handle all financial issues and keep control of the money.    
b) Women should get more education so that they can better handle ________     _________ 
 financial issues. 
c) It is OK if a wife earns more than her husband.    ________    _________ 
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42. Do you ever drink alcohol?     1. Yes   2. No 
 
43. If yes, can it happen that you get drunk 
4. Never       4. Several times a week 
5. Very rarely      5. Every day 
6. Sometimes (Social events, festivals etc.)   
 
44. Does anyone mind, if your wife goes out without your or a senior family member’s permission?  
 
45. Does anyone mind, if your wife goes out without informing you / a senior family member? 
 
46. Do you find it normal/ OK if        Yes No  
a). If (married) women work outside?       ___ ___ 
b). If (married) women talk to other men?      ___ ___ 
c). If (married) women often dress well?      ___ ___ 
d).Women improve their education if they want to?      ___ ___ 
 
47. Is there something wrong with a man who does not hit or beat his wife?     
     1. Yes   2. No 
 
48. If yes, what is wrong? (Probe)____________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
49. What is the opinion of the following people/ groups, about the operations of the MFI, from which 
many women get loans, in your area? 
1. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat________________________________________ 
2. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit _____________________________________ 
3. Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area__________________________________________ 
4. Local money lenders/ traders__________________________________________________ 
5. Senior men/ members of the caste you belong to__________________________________ 
6. Your family _______________________________________________________________ 
7. Your neighbours/ colleagues __________________________________________________ 
 
To the market 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
Meet 
friends 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
 
Meet 
relatives/ 
parents 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
 
To the 
fields 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowe
d 
 
To a place  
of worship 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
 
To travel to 
a nearby 
Town 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
 
Local Health 
Centre 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
To the market 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
Meet 
friends 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
Meet 
relatives/ 
parents 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
To the 
fields 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowe
d 
To a place 
of worship 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
To travel to 
a nearby 
Town 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
 
Local Health 
Centre 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not 
allowed 
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50. Have you been encountered/ threatened or provoked in any way (physical or verbal) because 
your wife works/ earns money by the following groups: 
 1. Public officials/ servants (bureaucracy) ___________________________________________ 
 2. Other local money lenders/ traders _______________________________________________ 
 3. Landlords/ big men ___________________________________________________________ 
 4. Other rural Banks/ MFIs etc.: specify _____________________________________________ 
 5. Village heads ________________________________________________________________  
 6. Other family members: specify___________________________________________________ 
 7. Neighbours/ Colleagues ________________________________________________________ 
 8. The (loan officers/ employees of the) MFI you wife is with now ________________________ 
 9. Others: specify _______________________________________________________________ 
 
51. If YES, give details: _____________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
52. Do you and your wife have disagreements/ fights/ loud arguments and how often? 
Specify: ____________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
53. I will now be making some situations relating to attitudes of husbands towards their wives. I 
would like to know, if you know anyone among your friends/ peers/ neighbours/ family who 
finds such behaviour/ way of thinking (about their wives/ women) normal? 
 
a. A husband says or does something to humiliate his wife in front of others?    
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
b. A husband threatens to hurt or harm his wife or someone close to her/ himself?  
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
c. A husband insults his wife or makes her feel bad about herself?   
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
d. A husband can and may ignore or be indifferent to his wife?    
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
e. A husband finds fault with his wife just to have a reason for a provocation?  
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
f. A husband is (frequently) violent towards his wife physically for whatever reason? 
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
 
g. A husband can abuse his wife emotionally and verbally?  
1. Nobody 2. A few people 3. Many people 4. Almost everyone 
   
54. Have you ever conducted such behaviour towards your wife?  
1. Rarely  2. Sometimes  3. Never 
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55. If and when there is a conflict in your household what is the main reason? (Tick all relevant 
options) 
Reason Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. Not attending to household chores/ children/ in 
laws properly 
2. Talking to neighbours/other men 
3. Dowry issues 
4. Frustration due to economic problems 
5. Because there is disagreement on decisions 
regarding spending of family income 
6. Any other, specify 
  
 
56. Does your wife maltreat/ provoke you emotionally/verbally when you are not already 
emotionally/ verbally hurting her?   1.  Yes   2.  No 
 
57. Does your wife physically maltreat you when you are not already physically hurting her? 
    1.  Yes    2.  No 
 
58. If yes, how frequently does this happen?  
Frequency Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
1. Every day 
2. At least once in a week 
(but not every day) 
3. At least once in a month 
4. Occasionally 
5. Cannot tell 
  
 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the survey 
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APPENDIX  3C  Individual questionnaire: Non-Borrower (women) 
 
Village     ________ 
 
District/ block     ________ 
 
Household number    ________ 
 
Full name of respondent   ________ 
 
Gotra (Surname)    ________ 
 
Gender      ________ 
 
S.No. of respondent    ________ 
 
Date      ________ 
 
Time started interview                                    ________ 
 
Time finished interview    ________ 
 
Additional details    ________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
NOTES: (Living conditions of the respondent and the neighbourhood in general)  
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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LEVEL  I: Profile, Stand on MFI and household 
 
a) Respondents Profile 
1. Age (in years)      _____________________  
  
2. Marital Status    1. Married   4. Widow 
       2. Single   5. Separated 
       3. Divorced 
             
3. How long have you been living in this locality    __________  
 
4. Socio-cultural group:   1. Hindu: Caste/ sub-Caste  ____________________ 
       2. Muslim: Caste    ___________________________ 
       3. Jain: Caste  _______________________________ 
       4. Sikh: Caste________________________________ 
       5. Christian: Caste ___________________________ 
       6. Other: Specify _______________________________ 
  
5. Educational status:  
 A) Literacy level: Can you  1. Write your name 
       2. Operate/ handle a mobile 
       3. Read a book or a newspaper 
      
 B) Did you complete  1. Primary 
      2. Secondary: lower_____, upper______ 
      3. Tertiary 
      4. Few years of schooling without formal primary completion: 
                 Specify: No. of years:______ 
       5. No formal schooling, but some informal education 
          Specify how long and by whom: _____________________ 
      6. No schooling at all 
 
6. Are you working or employed (paid) in any way?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
7. If Yes, specify:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
b) Stand on Microfinance; Income and financial position of the household 
 
8. Which credit possibilities do you have on the market?   
  1. Banks (commercial/ agriculture etc.) 
  2. Microfinance Institutes/ organisations 
  3. Money Lenders/ Traders 
  4. Others, specify: _______________________________________________ 
 
9.  In addition to other means of credit (money lenders/ traders/ feudal lords etc.), how long has the 
possibility of small loans from an MFI existed in your locality/area?  ______________________ 
 
10. Has a bank or a lending Institute ever refused you a loan application?  
    1. Yes   2. No    3. Never applied 
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11. Have you ever had anything to do with a bank/ financial institute/ money lenders or others 
regarding financial matters?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
12. If yes with whom and in which context:   Savings   Credit 
  1. Bank/ finance Institute    ________  ________ 
  2. Money Lenders/ Traders    ________  ________ 
  3. Others, specify________________  ________  ________ 
 
13. What is your opinion on the importance of the following institutions/ people and who makes 
them up respectively: (probe whether socially important or feared or threat to faith (interest in 
Islam for example) and/ or customs or norms? 
 
 1. Banks (commercial, agricultural etc.) ____________________________________________ 
 2. MFIs (NGOs, micro credit banks etc.) ___________________________________________ 
 3. Money lenders/ traders (other credit sources) ______________________________________ 
 4. Big important men/ groups within the locality _____________________________________ 
 5. Religious/ community affiliated groups __________________________________________ 
 6. Public officials/ employees ____________________________________________________ 
 7. Others who might be influential in any way, specify ________________________________ 
 
14. Is there a women’s SHG in your village supported by an MFI?   a) Yes  b) No 
 
15. Are you a borrower with/ member of an/ a MFI/ SHG?    
 1. Yes; which one __________________________ since when: ________________________ 
 2. No; why __________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. If no, have you ever considered taking a loan from an MFI and/ or joining a SHG?  
     1. Yes   2. No   3. No answer 
 
17. If yes (but is still not with any MFI), why have you then not opted for it? __________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Are there other women in your family, neighbourhood, community, village etc. who are active 
borrowers of an MFI?   1. Yes  2. No   
  
19. What does your husband/ head of the household/ other family members think of the idea of 
getting a loan from the MFI?(Note: mention which answer refers to whom within the family)  
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. In case of an economic emergency/ financial need who do you turn to: 
 1. Rely on own savings 
 2. Borrow from family and friends 
 3. Lend from clan members/ neighbours 
 4. Lend from Money lenders/ traders/ land lords/ big men etc. 
 5. Others; specify_____________________________________________________________  
 
21. In your opinion, women who are clients of the MFIs are (tick all relevant options): 
 1. ...benefiting from the loan economically? 
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 2. ...helping their families and improving her own and their families live 
 3. ...more confident and emancipated because of their economic power 
 4. ...not benefiting at all  
 5. ... thought and spoken bad of in the community/ neighbourhood 
6. ...having trouble dealing with confrontations within the family, society and communal life by 
peers / other groups because of their membership with the MFI; specify__________________ 
7. ...causing problems and disharmony for their husbands and family due to the change in income 
and their status within the family; specify__________________________________________ 
 8.  ...personal opinion; if any _______________________________________________________ 
 
22. Household size?      ________________ 
 
23. Who is the head of the household?  1. You  4. Mother 
        2. Spouse 5. Other: Specify_________________ 
        3. Father 
24. Household Structure 
S.No. Name Sex Age Relation to 
head of 
household 
Marital 
status 
Education 
level 
Residence 
(in/out of the 
village) 
  
 
     
 
 
  
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
  
 
      
  
 
      
  
 
      
      
 
  
  
 
     
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
 
 
25. Is this a   a) Joint family?  b) Nuclear family? 
 
26. How many in your household have wage employment? _________________________ 
       
27. What other economic activities are you and members of your household engaged in? 
          You   Spouse Others 
5. Wage employment   ___  ____  _____ 
6. Agriculture    ___  ____  _____ 
7. Livestock     ___  ____  _____ 
8. Other (self-employment)  ___  ____  _____ 
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28. If economically active, then how many dependents within the family would be affected if you 
were not to have an income and why?  
  
  Those affected from loss of respondents income    Reason 
   ___________________________________  _____________________________ 
   ___________________________________  _____________________________ 
   ___________________________________  _____________________________ 
 
29. Are there members of your family beyond the household who are dependent on you? 
    1. Yes, specify how many: _____________  2. No 
 
30. Which of the following is true for your income: “your income...: 
  1...  allows you to build your savings” 
  2...  allows you just to save a little” 
  3...  only just meets your expenses” 
  4...  is not sufficient so you need to use your savings to meet expenses” 
  5...  is really not sufficient, so you need to borrow to meet expenses” 
 
31. Do your neighbours assess your household (relative to neighbourhood) as: 
    1. Relative wealthy  3. Relatively poor 
    2. Just average   4. Very poor 
 
LEVEL II: Details on the Socio / intra-household dynamics 
 
b) Marriage details (in case married otherwise male guardian), dependence & care 
 
32. What is your husband’s name?  __________________________________________ 
 
33. What was your age at your current marriage?     ___________________ 
 
34. Is this your first marriage?    1. Yes    2. No 
 
35. If NO, how many times have you been married before?    ___________ 
 
36. Have you married within your kin group?  1. Yes:    a) Blood relative  2. No 
              b) Clan/ caste    
   
37. If married within kin group (1. (a)), specify:  1.  Cross cousin marriage 
           2. Maternal/ Paternal cousin 
           3. Any other kin member_____________ 
 
38. Marriage distance, specify:  
1. In-village marriage  
2. Outside the village, If outside village, indicate place and distance_____________ 
39. Were your preferences ascertained before finding a husband for you?  1. Yes  2. No 
  
40. How would you rank the relative status of your family versus your husband´s at the time of your 
marriage?    1. Same as your family  3. Lower than your family 
      2. Higher than your family  4. Don´t know  
41. What is/was your father’s main occupation? 
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1. Wage employment in agriculture 
2. Wage employment in non-agricultural  
 activities 
3. Self- employed in agriculture 
4. Self- employed in non-agricultural activities 
5. Salaried job 
6. Any other, specify __________________ 
42. Number of siblings:   Brothers:    Sisters: 
      _____ Younger Brother(s)  ____Younger Sisters(s) 
      _____ Elder Brother(s)  ____ Elder Sister(s)  
 
Old age support  Only if one or both parents are alive 
 
43. When your parents fall sick or are disabled, who takes care of them?  
8. 1. Myself 
9. 2. My brothers and their wives 
10. 3. Neighbours 
11.  
12. 4. No one 
13. 5. Other relatives_______________  
14. 6. Any other, specify 
15.  
44. Before you were married, did you work   1. On family land, with or without wages? 
        2. For wages/ income, in cash or in kind?  
         3. Did not work 
 
45. If yes, what did you do with the income?    1. Gave it to parents  
         2. Spent it on yourself  
         3. Savings  
         4. Any other, specify 
  
46. Before your marriage if you were an earning member of the family, how much did your earnings 
contribute to the total income of your natal family?  
1. Almost none  3. About half   5. All 
2. Less than half  4. More than half 
47. After your marriage, do you give money to your parents?  
1. Regularly remit      4. Rarely 
2. Occasionally (on festivals, events, illness)  5. Not at all 
3. If they ask, if there is a crisis 
 
48. If regular remittance, then what is amount of regular remittance?  ______________          
If in kind, provide approximate value in Rs.:   ______________ 
 
49. If yes, do you give money with your husband’s knowledge?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
50. If you do not give money to your parents, why not?  
(a) Married daughters do not give; parents will not accept from married daughters 
(b) Parents do not need 
(c) Husband objects 
(d) Cannot afford 
(e) Any other, specify: _____________________________________ 
 
51. If you regularly remit, why?    1. Parents cannot support themselves 
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        2. It is my responsibility 
        3. My brothers do not support/ no brother 
      4. Any other, specify 
 
52. In your community, are married daughters expected to take care of/ support their parents?   
        1. Yes   2. No 
 
d) Details on husband/ Father/ Guardian; intra-household dynamics; violence (verbal, physical, 
emotional) 
(For married respondents with husbands who are alive. For single women/ widowed respondents, 
substitute husband with Father/ other male figure, having authority within the household, where 
applicable)       Husband          Father      Other; specify  _________ 
 
53. What is the opinion of the following people/ groups, about the operations of the MFI, from 
which many women (or the respondent) get loans, in your area? 
 1. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat________________________________________ 
 2. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit _____________________________________ 
 3. Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area__________________________________________ 
 4. Local money lenders/ traders__________________________________________________ 
 5. Senior Men/ members of the caste you belong to__________________________________ 
 6. Family members ___________________________________________________________ 
 8. Neighbours _______________________________________________________________ 
 9. Others of importance: specify _________________________________________________ 
   
54. Have any of the following groups ever approached/ warned  you (or other community/ clan 
members) with negative details/facts/views/opinions etc. about the MFIs/their employees/clients  
1.   Public officials/ servants (bureaucracy) __________________________________________ 
2.   The Village/ community head/ Panchayat_________________________________________ 
3.   The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit ______________________________________ 
4.    Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area___________________________________________ 
5.    Local money lenders/ traders___________________________________________________ 
6.    Senior Men/ members of the caste you belong to___________________________________ 
7.    Other rural Banks/ MFIs (employees) etc. specify __________________________________ 
8.    Other family members: specify ________________________________________________ 
9.    Neighbours ________________________________________________________________ 
10. Others: specify ____________________________________________________________ 
 
55. Does your husband know of your borrower status (if any) that helps you earn money (if at all) 
1. Yes  2. No  3. Don’t know 
 
56. Do you know your family income?    1. Yes   2. No 
 
57. How much do your earnings (if any) contribute to the total household income? 
1. Almost none 4. More than half 
2. Less than half 5. All 
3. About half 
58. When you earn money, do you 
1. Give all to husband/ other family member 
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2. Gives some to husband/ other family member, keeps some for yourself 
3. Keeps all of it 
4. Any other, specify 
5. No answer  
59. If part of the income is retained, is that:   
 1. With your husband’s knowledge___________ 
   2. Without your husband’s knowledge_________ 
 
60. If your husband were unable to support you, would you be able to support yourself and your 
children?     1. Yes   2. No   3. No answer 
61. Is there someone else you could rely on for support?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
62. If yes, please provide details. ____________________________________ 
 
63. Does your household have a bank account?     1. Yes  2. No  
 
64. If yes, in whose name?     ________________________________ 
 
65. Do you have a bank account that you yourself use?   1. Yes  2. No  
 
66. Regardless of who keeps the money you earn, do you have a say in how your earnings are used or 
does someone else decide this?    
    1. Respondent has a say  3. Someone else has a say__________________ 
   2. Husband has a say                                            4. No answer  
  
67. Does your husband ever drink alcohol?    1. Yes   2. No 
 
68. If yes, can it happen he gets drunk? 
7. Never     3. Several times a week 
8. Social events, festivals 4. Every day 
 
69. Are you afraid to disagree with your husband because he will be angry with you?  
     1. Yes   2. No   3. No answer 
 
70. How often do you and your husband disagree on the following issues?  
              Frequently     Not very often        Never        Varies  
1. Moral and religion            _______  _______ ______        _____ 
2. Spending money/ financial preferences  _______  _______ ______        _____ 
3. Education of children                 _______  _______ ______        _____ 
4. Use of alcohol            _______  _______ ______        _____ 
5. SHG/ MFI association           _______  _______ ______        _____ 
71. Would he permit you to improve your education if you wanted to?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
72. I am going to ask you about some situations which happened to some women. Please tell me if these 
apply to your relationship with your husband. 
i) He (is/was) jealous or angry if you (talk/talked) to other men.  a) Yes 
b) No 
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c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
ii) He frequently (accuses/accused) you of being unfaithful.  a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
iii) He (does/did) not permit you to meet your female friends. a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
iv) He (tries/tried) to limit your contact with your family.  f) Yes 
g) No 
h) Sometimes 
i) Don’t know 
j) No answer 
v) He (insists/insisted) on knowing where you (are/were) at all 
times 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
vi) He (does/did) not trust you with any money. a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Sometimes 
d) Don’t know 
e) No answer 
vii) He would have problems to let you go alone to the market/ 
outside 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
c)  Sometimes 
d)  Don’t know 
e)   No answer 
viii) Your husband does not allow you to travel to a nearby town 
alone. 
a)  Yes 
b)  No 
c)   Sometimes 
d)  Don’t know 
e)   No answer 
  
73.  Does your husband mistreat/ abuse you (examples of emotional abuse: as degrading remarks against 
herself/ loved ones, personal attacks on character, threatening with divorce etc.; physical abuse: as 
actions causing physical pain via slapping/hitting/pushing/ pulling of hair/kicking etc.):  
            Yes                   No 
1. emotionally/ verbally   _______ ________ 
2.  physically      _______ ________ 
74. Has he recently 
1. Physically hurt/ threatened or mistreated you? a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
2. Said or done something to humiliate you in front of others?  a)  Often 
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b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
3. Threatened to hurt or harm you or someone close to you or himself?  a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
4. Made you feel bad about yourself?  a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
5. Ignored/ been indifferent a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
6. Been finding fault with you a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
7. Any other, specify. a)  Often 
b)  Sometimes 
c)   Not at all 
 
75. What was the reason for the conflict/ abuse? (Tick all relevant options) 
Reason Emotional/verbal  
abuse 
Physical abuse 
a.  Not attending to household chores/ children/ in 
laws properly 
b. Talking to neighbours/other men 
c. Dowry issues 
d. Frustration due to economic problems 
e. Because there is disagreement on decisions 
regarding spending of family income 
f. Any other, specify 
  
 
76. Whom do you seek support from when you are mistreated?  
Support Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
a. No one 
b. My parents 
c. My relatives 
d. Friends and neighbours 
e. Co-workers 
f. Peer group (loan) 
g. Any other, specify 
  
 
NOTE: Question to be asked if not with an MFI and not economically active 
77. Do you think that the violence in your relationship (if any) with husband/ father/ guardian will 
improve if you had more economic strength? Elaborate (probe): _____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
NOTE: Following question(s) to be asked if with respondent is with another MFI and/or 
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economically active 
78. Do you think that your association with the MFI and the change in your income from the loan is 
responsible for a deterioration in your relationship (if any) with husband/ father/ guardian 
Elaborate (probe): ________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
79. Did you join the SHG or become a member of (group) lending as it may help you deal with 
marital abuse and (marital) violence?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
80.  Does your husband/ father/ male guardian approve of you joining the SHG or being provided a 
loan?        1. Yes   2. No 
 
81.  Due to your membership with the MFI, has anyone (apart from your husband/ father/ guardian) 
mistreated you in any way?    1.  Yes   2. No 
 
82.  If yes, who mistreated/ abused you?  
 Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
7. Father-in-law 
8. Mother-in-law 
9. Son 
10. Daughter 
11. Other relatives 
12. Any other, specify 
  
 
83.  If yes, how frequently does this happen? 
Frequency Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
6. Every day 
7. At least once in a week (but not every day) 
8. At least once in a month 
9. Occasionally 
10. Cannot tell 
  
 
84.  Ever since your membership with the MFI, have you been able to defend yourself actively against 
the mistreatment/ abuse from your husband / other family members (be it emotional/ verbal/ physical)  
 1. Yes, specify against whom and how__________________________________________  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 2. No 
 
85.  If yes, how frequently have you had to defend yourself?  
Frequency Emotional/verbal abuse Physical abuse 
6. Every day 
7. At least once in a week (but not every day) 
8. At least once in a month 
9. Occasionally 
10. Cannot tell 
  
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the survey 
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APPENDIX  3D Individual questionnaire: Husband/ Father/ Guardian of non-borrower 
 
 
Village     ________  
 
District/ block     ________ 
 
Household number:    ________  
 
Full name of responde   ________ 
 
Gotra (Surname)    ________ 
 
Gender      ________ 
 
S.No. of respondent:    ________ 
 
Family relationship to Female respondent ________ 
 
Date      ________ 
 
Time started interview                                    ________ 
 
Time finished interview    ________ 
 
Additional details    ________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
NOTES: (Living conditions of the respondent and the neighbourhood in general)  
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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a) Husbands/ Fathers/ Male Guardians profile, credit background and stand on 
Microfinance 
1. Age          __________  
  
2. Main occupation   __________________________________________ 
 
3. Whether work undertaken is seasonal   1. Yes  2. No 
 
4. Any other sources of income  1. None 
       2. Wage employment  
       3. Livestock 
       4. Agriculture 
       5. Other production / service / trade enterprise 
       6. Other combination: Specify ____________ 
 
5. Socio-cultural group: 1. Hindu: Caste/ sub-Caste  __________________ 
     2. Muslim: Caste ________________________ 
     3. Jain: Caste _________________________ 
     4. Sikh: Caste _________________________ 
     5. Christian: Caste _______________________ 
     6. Other: Specify _______________________ 
 
6. Educational status:  
A) Literacy level: Can you  1. Write your name 
      2. Operate/ handle a mobile 
      3. Read a book or a newspaper 
      
B) Did you complete  1. Primary 
     2. Secondary: lower_____, upper______ 
     3. Tertiary 
     4. Few years of schooling without formal primary completion: 
                 Specify: No. of years:______ 
     5. No formal schooling, but some informal education 
             Specify how long and by whom: _____________________ 
     6. No schooling at all 
 
7. Which credit possibilities do you have on the market?   
  1. Banks (commercial/ agriculture etc.) 
  2. Microfinance Institutes/ organisations 
  3. Money Lenders/ Traders 
  4. Others, specify: ____________________________________ 
 
8. In addition to other means of credit (money lenders/ traders/ feudal lords etc.), how long has the 
possibility of small loans from an MFI existed in your locality/area?  ___________________ 
 
9. If yes, has a bank or a lending Institute ever refused you a loan application?  
   1. Yes   2. No    3. Never applied 
 
10. Have you ever had anything to do with a bank/ financial institute/ money lenders or others 
regarding financial matters?    1. Yes  2. No 
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11. If yes with whom and in which context:  Savings   Credit 
  1. Bank/ finance Institute   ________  ________ 
  2. Money Lenders/ Traders   ________  ________ 
  3. Others, specify________________ ________  ________ 
 
12. What is your opinion on the importance of the following institutions/ people and who makes 
them up respectively: (probe whether socially important or feared or threat to faith (interest in 
Islam for example) and/ or customs or norms? 
1. Banks (commercial, agricultural etc.) ___________________________________________ 
2. MFIs (NGOs, micro credit banks etc.) __________________________________________ 
3. Money lenders/ traders (other credit sources) _____________________________________ 
4. Big important men/ groups within the locality ____________________________________ 
5. Religious/ community affiliated groups _________________________________________ 
6. Public officials/ employees ___________________________________________________ 
7. Others who might be influential in any way, specify _______________________________ 
 
13. Is there a women’s SHG in your village supported by an MFI?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
14. Is your wife a member of a SHG or an active borrower with an MFI? 1. Yes  2. No 
 
15. Has your wife ever wanted to become an active borrower of the MFI or a SHG? 
    1. Yes  2. No  3. Don’t know 
16. If she were to opt for a loan with an MFI, would you 
 1. Support her all the way 
 2. Not allow it/ oppose the idea strongly 
 3. Be indifferent to the whole thing 
 4. Be against the idea but still let her go ahead 
 5. Discuss it with other family/ clan members and accordingly take the decision 
 6. Other _______________________________________________________ 
 
17. Are there any other women in your family, neighbourhood, community, village etc. who are 
active borrowers of the MFI?    1. Yes  2. No   
  
18. In your opinion, women who are clients of the MFIs are (tick all relevant options): 
1. ...benefiting from the loan economically? 
2. ...helping their families and improving her own and their families live 
3. ...more confident and emancipated because of their economic power 
4. ...not benefiting at all  
5. ... thought and spoken bad of in the community/ neighbourhood 
6. ...having trouble dealing with confrontations within the family, society and communal life by 
peers / other groups because of their membership with the MFI; specify__________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
7. ...causing problems and disharmony for their husbands and family due to the change in income 
and their status within the family; specify__________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
8.  ...personal opinion; if any ______________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. What does your wife/ other family members think of the idea of getting a loan from the MFI? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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20. In case of an economic emergency/ financial need who do you turn to: 
 1. Rely on own savings 
 2. Borrow from family and friends 
 3. Lend from clan members/ neighbours 
 4. Lend from Money lenders/ traders/ land lords/ big men etc. 
 5. Others; specify_________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Do your neighbours assess your household (relative to neighbourhood) as:   
  1. Relative wealthy   3. Relatively poor 
  2. Just average   4. Very poor  
      
b) Marriage/relationship to female counterpart; dependence & care 
 
22. What is your wife’s name?     ______________________________ 
(Note: If respondent is Muslim, ask if he has any ‘other’ wives and if yes, note all details for 
‘others’ as well) 
 
23. What was your age at your current marriage?    ______________ 
 
24. Is this your first marriage?        1. Yes   2. No 
 
25. If no, how many times have you been married before?   ______________ 
 
26. Were your preferences ascertained before finding a wife for you?     1. Yes 2. No 
  
27. How would you rank the relative status of your family versus your wife’s at the time of your 
marriage? 1.  Same as your family 
2. Higher than your family 
3. Lower than your family 
4. Don’t know  
 
28. Is your wife economically active (earning money/ employed)?  1. Yes  2. No 
 
29. Does your wife know your and the overall family income?  
   1. Yes  2. No  3. Other: specify____________________ 
 
30. How much do her earnings contribute to the total household income?  
1. Almost none 4. More than half 
2. Less than half 5. All 
3. About half 
31. When she earns money, does she usually:  
1. Gives all to you / other family member: specify________________________ 
2. Gives some to you/ other family member, keeps some for herself: specify_____________ 
3. Keeps all of it 
4. Others specify 
5. No answer 
32. When you earn money, do you usually:   
1. Gives all to wife/ other family member: specify________________________ 
2. Gives some to wife/ other family member, keeps some for yourself: specify___________ 
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3. Keeps all of it 
4. Others specify 
5. No answer, refusal  
 
33. If you retain a part of your income, is that:  1. With your wife’s knowledge? 
   2. Without your wife’s knowledge? 
34. Does your household have a joint bank account?    1. Yes  2. No  
 
35. If yes, in whose name?    ___________________________________ 
 
36. Does your wife have a bank account that she herself uses?   1. Yes  2. No 
 
37. Has she herself ever taken a loan—cash/ kind—from any programme in the past, to start or to 
expand a business or is she part of a SHG?     1. Yes  2. No 
 
38. If yes, please provide details. __________________________________________ 
 
39. Regardless of who keeps the money she earns, do you have a say in how her earnings are used?
  1. Yes; specify in which way______________________________________ 
  2. No 
 
40. Does someone else have a say apart from herself, in how her earnings are used? 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
41. Regardless of who keeps the money you earn, do you have a say in how your earnings are used 
or does someone else decide this? 
1. Respondent has a say 
2. Wife has a say 
3. Someone else has a say_______________________________________________ 
4. No answer 
 
42. What is/was your father’s main occupation? 
1. Wage employment in agriculture 
2. Wage employment in non-agricultural 
activities 
3. Self- employed in agriculture 
4.Self- employed in non-agricultural activities 
5.Salaried job 
6.Any other, specify 
  
43. How much agricultural land does your natal family own?  _______________ 
 
44. Number of siblings:  Brothers:    Sisters: 
    _____ Younger Brother(s)  ____Younger Sister(s) 
    _____ Elder Brother(s)  ____ Elder Sister(s)  
 
Old age support   Only if one or both parents are alive 
 
45. When your parents fall sick or are disabled, who takes care of them? (Tick all relevant options) 
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1. Myself 
2. My brother(s) and his/ their wife(ves) 
3. My sister(s) and her family(ies) 
4. Other relatives 
5. Neighbours 
6. No one 
7. Any other, specify 
 
  
46. What is the major source of financial support for your parents? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. Sons 
2. Daughters  
3. Other relatives 
4. Savings 
5. Land 
6. Rent, dividends, interest, pension 
7. Own earnings 
8. Government support 
9. Any other, specify 
 
  
47. When your parents fall sick or are disabled, who takes care of them? (Tick all relevant options) 
1. Myself and my wife 
2. My brothers and their wives 
3. Other relatives 
4. Neighbours 
5. No one 
6. Any other, specify 
 
48. Does your wife give money to her parents?  
1. Regularly remit     4. At other rare occasions 
2. Occasionally (on festivals, events, illness)  5. Not at all 
3. If they ask, if there is a crisis 
 
49. If no, why not?  
1. Married daughters do not give; parents will not accept from married daughters 
2. Parents do not need any financial help 
3. I don’t like it 
4. Cannot afford 
5. Any other, specify 
 
50. In your community, are married daughters expected to take care of/ support their parents?  
     1. Yes    2. No 
 
c) Details on attitude, intra-household dynamics; Violence (verbal/emotional/physical) 
 (Note: questions for wife’s/ female counterpart’s income to be asked only when she’s economically 
active) 
 
51. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements below:   
Some people say:          Agree         Disagree 
 
a) Women are not made for business; therefore, their husband’s    ______ _______ 
 should handle all financial issues and keep control of the money.  
b) Women should get more education so that they can better   ______         _______  
 handle financial issues. 
c) It is OK if a wife earns more than her husband.     ______          _______   
52. Do you ever drink alcohol?     1. Yes   2. No 
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53. If yes, can it happen that you get drunk 
1. Never       4. Several times a week 
2. Very rarely     5. Every day 
3. Sometimes (Social events, festivals etc.) 
 
54. Do you find it normal/ OK if         Yes   No  
a). If (married) women work outside?        __     __ 
b). If (married) women talk to other men?       __     __ 
c). If (married) women often dress well?       __     __ 
d). Women should be permitted to improve their education if they wanted to?   __     __ 
 
55. Does anyone mind, if your wife goes out without your or a senior family member’s permission?  
To the 
market 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.   Not 
allowed 
Meet 
friends 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
Meet 
relatives/ 
parents 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To the 
fields 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To a place  
of worship 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To travel to 
a nearby 
Town 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
Local 
Health 
Centre 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed 
 
56. Does anyone mind, if your wife goes out without informing you or a senior family member? 
To the 
market 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed 
Meet 
friends 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
Meet 
relatives/ 
parents 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To the 
fields 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To a place  
of worship 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
To travel to 
a nearby 
Town 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed  
Local 
Health 
Centre 
1.  Yes 
2.   No 
3.  Not 
allowed 
 
57. Is it okay for your wife to work outside?    1. Yes  2. No 
 
58. Is there something wrong with a man who does not hit or beat his wife?       
         1. Yes            2. No 
 
59. If yes, what is wrong? (Probe)__________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
60. Have you been encountered/ threatened or provoked in any way (physical or verbal) because 
your wife works/ earns money by the following groups: 
 1. Public officials/ servants (bureaucracy) 
 2. Other local money lenders/ traders 
 3. Landlords/ big men 
 4. Other rural Banks/ MFIs etc.: specify ____________________________ 
 5. Village heads /other family members : specify _____________________  
 6. Others: specify _____________________________________________ 
 
61. If YES, give details: _______________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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62. What is the opinion of the following people/ groups, about the operations of the MFI, from 
which you get your loan, in your area? 
1. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat________________________________________ 
2. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit _____________________________________ 
3. Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area__________________________________________ 
4. Local money lenders/ traders__________________________________________________ 
5. Senior Men/ members of the caste you belong to__________________________________ 
   
63. Have any of the following groups ever approached or warned you (or other community/ clan 
members) with negative details/ facts/ views/ opinions etc. about the MFIs or their employees/ 
clients? 
1. The Village/ community head/ Panchayat_________________________________________ 
2. The Religious faction/ Mullah/ priest/ pandit ______________________________________ 
3. Feudal/ Landlords/ Big men in the area___________________________________________ 
4. Local money lenders/ traders___________________________________________________ 
5. Senior Men/ members of the caste you belong to____________________________________ 
 
64. Do you and your wife have disagreements/ fights/ loud arguments and how often? 
Specify: ______________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
65.  In your opinion, is it normal / a husbands acceptable behaviour if:       Yes     No 
a. ..a husband, were to say or do something to humiliate his wife in front of others?      ___    ___ 
b. ..a husband threatens to hurt or harm his wife or someone close to her/ himself?      ___    ___ 
c. ..a husband insults his wife or makes her feel bad about herself?        ___    ___ 
d. ..a husband can and may ignore or be indifferent to his wife?        ___    ___ 
e. ..a husband finds fault with his wife just to have a reason for a provocation?     ___    ___ 
f. ..a husband is (frequently) violent towards his wife physically for whatever reason?  ___     ___ 
g. ..a husband can abuse his wife emotionally and verbally?        
 
66. Do you know anyone among your friends/ peers/ neighbours/ family who finds such behaviour/ 
thinking (as above) normal?       1. Yes  2. No 
 
67. Have you ever conducted such behaviour towards your wife?  1. Yes  2. No 
 
68. If and when there is conflict in your household what is the main reason? (Tick all relevant 
options) 
 
Reason Emotional/ 
verbal abuse 
Physical 
abuse 
1. Not attending to household chores/ children/ in laws 
properly 
2. Talking to neighbours/other men 
3. Dowry issues 
4. Frustration due to economic problems 
5. Because there is disagreement on decisions regarding 
spending of family income 
6. Any other, specify 
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69. Does your wife maltreat/ provoke you emotionally/verbally when you are not already 
emotionally/ verbally hurting her?    1.  Yes  2.  No 
 
70. Does your wife physically maltreat you when you are not already physically hurting her? 
         1.  Yes  2.  No 
 
71. If yes, how frequently does this happen?  
Frequency Emotional/ verbal abuse Physical abuse 
6. Every day 
7. At least once in a week (but not every day) 
8. At least once in a month 
9. Occasionally 
10. Cannot tell 
  
 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the survey 
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APPENDIX  3E  Individual questionnaire: MFI Loan officers/ Employees 
 
 
Preliminary remarks 
  
The development of financial markets, go hand in hand with the economic development of a 
country/ region etc. For less developed countries with lower purchasing power per head, 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) play an important role in the financial market, as they meet 
the financial needs of the majority. 
The Goal of my study is to interrogate and analyse the interaction between the MFIs and other 
institutions and stake holders. What benefits do the MFIs provide and how can this be linked 
to not only the general conditions/ framework within which these MFIs operate but also how 
is the whole set up influenced given the social and cultural context. 
Therefore a sample of some 100 people from the locality the MFI serves would be 
interviewed to check for the familial life/ habits and social customs and norms.  In addition 
the employees and senior executive MFI officers will be interviewed to check for institutional 
adjustments to the demands of the environment in which they operate. 
I would like to express my deep gratitude that I may take your time to conduct this interview 
that would help me analyse and study the results later for my project. 
Let me assure you that the conversation/ interview that I would be having here with you 
would be absolutely anonymous and the identities of all respondents would not be disclosed 
to anyone. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERVIEW 
 
 
I will be asking you some fifteen questions regarding your work with the clients/ borrowers of 
the MFI. If you feel that something worthwhile from your experience in this context is not 
being covered by the questions please feel free to relate any comments/ stories that you want 
to at the end. 
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APPENDIX  3E 
 
 
Microfinance Study 
 
Individual questionnaire: MFI Loan officers/ Employees 
 
Village covered    ________ 
District/ block     ________ 
Full name of respondent   ________ 
MFI Employee since    ________ 
Gender      ________ 
Date      ________ 
Time started interview                                   ________ 
Time finished interview    ________ 
Additional details    ________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
NOTES:  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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1. Do you face any difficulties while in the field for loan disbursement/ collection activities 
from and of the following groups   
1. People of the locality 
2. Family members of the borrower 
3.  Local money lenders/ traders 
4.  Land/ feudal lords (big Men) or their supporters/ devotees 
5. Officers/ employees of other rural banks and/ or MFIs 
6. Members of the religious faction 
7. Others: specify________________________________ 
 
2. If so explain what these difficulties were: _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Have members/ borrowers ever indicated difficulties in either the efficient use of the loan 
or repayment due to the influence of third parties (family members or others)?  
1. Yes  2. No 
 
4. If so, can you provide some details: ____________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In your opinion, are there women borrowers who would not disclose/ or must keep secret 
their membership with the bank and or SHG openly to their family members (husband, in 
laws, parents etc.) and/ or others in their immediate surroundings (neighbours, caste/ clan 
members etc.)? ____________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Have their also been cases of clients who have had it easier to make efficient use of their 
loans because of family support? 
1. Yes, specify: _________________________________________ 2. No 
 
7. While in the village/ town/ district on duty is there anything that you have to be wary of? 
1. Yes   2. No 
 
8. If yes specify what: 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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9. In your area, is the MFI in competition with any other organisation/ person also providing 
similar services? __________________________________________________________ 
 
10. If so, which and how do your services differ from theirs (e.g. target group, lending/ interest 
rates, loan durations, special mechanisms like group lending etc.)? ___________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Have you had problems collecting instalments because SHG members were hindered in 
attending the weekly/ fortnightly/ monthly meetings?  1. Yes  2. No 
 
12. Are there any government agencies and/ or employees who have unnecessarily caused 
you trouble or supported you out of the way in any way?   Yes 
 No 
1. Caused trouble    ____  ____ 
2. Supported out of the way   ____  ____ 
 
13.  If yes, specify how________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.  In your opinion, are there any specific community characteristics/ attributes that are 
different from other communities you know or have worked in, which have an impact on 
the MFI success or its failure? 
Specify:_________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15.  Additional Comments /remarks (if any) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the Interview 
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APPENDIX  3F Individual questionnaire: CEO/ Senior Officers MFI 
 
Full name of respondent   ________ 
Designation within the MFI   ________ 
Holding this post since   ________  
Date      ________ 
Time started interview                                ________  ended  _________ 
Additional details    ________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1. What do you feel is the biggest hurdle in serving more of the poorer borrowers than you 
currently do? ______________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Are there any specific government regulations that hinder or facilitate the work of your 
bank/ insttute? (Examples for illustration: interest rate regulations for smaller loans, or 
high reserve requirements by the state bank etc.)    
Yes    No  
Government regulations Facilitates work   _____   _____  
Government regulations Hinders work   _____   _____ 
  
3. If yes specify:_____________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Are there any difficulties/ hindrances faced by your institute from the legislative bodies? 
1. Yes    2. No 
 
5. If yes specify: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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6. Are there competing Institutions?  (let the respondent count and list first)   
1. Government Rural Banks 
2. Traditional Money lenders 
3. Other Microfinance Institutions 
4. Commercial Banks 
5. Other: Specify________________________________ 
 
7. For each mentioned institution describe in detail the area of competition and respective 
(dis-) advantages (e.g. target group, lending/ interest rates, loan durations, special 
mechanisms like group lending etc.)? 
1. Government Rural Banks _________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Traditional Money lenders _________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Other Microfinance Institutions _____________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
4. Commercial Banks ______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
5. Others _________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Do you think that your competitors on the market also providing small loans have it easier 
than your bank?  
         Yes   No 
1. Government Rural Banks     ______ _______ 
2. Traditional Money lenders    ______ _______ 
3. Other Microfinance Institutions    ______ _______ 
4. Commercial Banks     ______ _______ 
5. Other       ______ _______ 
 
9. If so, specify why; 
 
1. Government Rural Banks ____________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Traditional Money lenders ___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Other Microfinance Institutions _______________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Commercial Banks _________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Others ___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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10. How do you finance/ fund  your Institute/ loan portfolio? (tick all relevant ones and circle 
by relevance with 1 the most important/ greatest and 6 least important  etc.) 
 
1. Own profits     1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. Grants/ Donations    1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. Government subsidies   1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. Other Investor banks    1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. Savings of the borrowers   1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. Other, specify:______________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11. Who do you think is your main competitor in the areas where you operate and lend? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. How is your professional relationship with your main rival? 
1. Friendly and professional 
2. Indifferent 
3. Animus/ that of animosity 
4. Extremely hostile 
5. Other, specify________________________________________ 
 
13. Which experiences do you base this assertion on? _______________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Within the areas that you operate, have you had any problems/ threats/ confrontations 
with the any of the following groups: 
1. People of the locality 
2. Local money lenders/ traders 
3.  Land/ feudal lords (big Men) or their supporters/ devotees 
4. Other rural banks and/ or MFIs 
5. Members of the religious faction 
6. Others: 
specify_____________________________________________________________ 
 
15. If so, how did these problems come up, what did you do about it and what were the 
effects? ____________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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16. Have you had any experiences of appreciation/ support/ acknowledgement from any 
faction of the society/ government and or communal groups, regarding your work/ operation? 
If so specify? ________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. What were your major problems (if any) while you were still setting up the MFI? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the Interview 
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APPENDIX  3G Individual questionnaire: Money Lenders/ Traders/ Competitors 
 
Full name of respondent    ________ 
 
Village      ________  
  
District/ block      ________ 
 
Major number of clients come from (area)  ________  
 
Gotra (Surname)     ________ 
 
Date       ________ 
 
Time started interview                                     ________ 
 
Time finished interview     ________ 
 
Additional details     __________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES:  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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1. What is your main occupation? ______________________________________ 
 
2. Other than your main occupation, are there any others, and if so specify? 
1. Yes; ____________________________________________   
2. No 
 
3. Since when are you into this money lending business? _____________________ 
 
4. How big is your current business (loan portfolio)?  ______________________ 
 
5. What kind of clients do you serve, please answer the following attributes for most of 
the clients:   
   1. Income class ____________________________________________ 
   2. Occupation _____________________________________________ 
   3. Gender _________________________________________________ 
   4. Socio-cultural group ______________________________________ 
 
6. Most of the loans that you give out are for what purpose, please specify: __________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Are there any main competitors on the market? If yes, specify: 
1. Yes _______________________________________________ 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
 
8. What is your opinion about the MFIs operating in the area where most of your clients 
come from? ___________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Have any of your previous clients been won over by your main competitors and are 
you losing business to them? Specify: 
1. Yes: _______________________________________________ 
2. No 
 
10. What have you done to help avoid this loss of business?  _______________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Who is/ are your main rival(s) on the market? ________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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12. How is your professional relationship with your main rival? 
1. Friendly and professional 
2. Indifferent 
3. Animus/ that of animosity 
4. Extremely hostile 
5. Other, specify________________________________________ 
 
13. Which experiences do you base this assertion on? ____________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Do you think that your competitors on the market also providing small loans have it 
easier than you?      Yes   No 
1. Government Rural Banks    ______ _______ 
2. Microfinance Institutions    ______ _______ 
3. Commercial Banks     ______ _______ 
4. Other      ______ _______ 
 
15. If so, specify why; 
1. Government Rural Banks _____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
2. Microfinance Institutions _____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
3. Commercial Banks __________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
4. Others ____________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Thank the respondent and conclude the survey 
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APPENDIX 4  Comparative demographic figures for Indian states (2011) 
!
Source"#!$%!&'(")"!*+!,(-./!01$$/2!0%!&'(")"!*+!,(-./!01$$32!4%!&'(")"!*+!,(-./!01$$5!
!
$A/$B--C-4&5&01- 6'7/8'!8/3*)9!+*95'!
:/9;.5.:/;.*(!9/;'!<=>!$!
6'7/8'!8.;'9/5?!
9/;'!<=>!0!
@*:)8/;.*(!:'9!!";/;'!*9!
/-7.(.";9/;.A'!)(.;!!4!
B/(C.(D!:'9!
:*:)8/;.*(!
National 25.5 64.6 100  - 
Uttar Pradesh 16.7 57.2 16.49 1 
Maharashtra 31.1 75.9 9.29 2 
Bihar 19.1 51.5 8.58 3 
West Bengal 18.1 70.5 7.55 4 
Andhra Pradesh 36.2 59.1 7 5 
Madya Pradesh 32.6 59.2 6 7 
Tamil Nadu 31.8 73.4 5.96 6 
Rajasthan 35.1 52.1 5.67 7 
Karnataka 31.9 68.1 5.05 8 
Gujarat 23.4 69.7 4.99 9 
Odisha 27.2 64 3.58 10 
Kerala 18.2 92.1 2.76 11 
Jharkhand 29.1 55.4 2.72 12 
Assam 22.5 66.3 2.58 13 
Punjab 13.9 70.7 2.29 14 
Chhattisgarh 39.7 60.2 2.11 15 
Haryana 17.8 65.9 2.09 16 
NCT of Delhi 10.6 80.8 1.38 17 
Jammu & Kashmir 19.1 56.4 1.04 18 
Uttarakhand 26.7 70 0.84 19 
Himachal Pradesh 44.8 75.9 0.57 20 
Tripura 23.6 82.7 0.3 21 
Meghalaya 32.7 72.9 0.24 22 
Manipur 38.6 72.4 0.22 23 
Nagaland 44.7 76.1 0.16 24 
Goa 21.9 84.7 0.12 25 
Arunachal Pradesh 35.4 57.7 0.11 26 
Puducherry 17.6 80.7 0.1 27 
Chandigarh 16 81.2 0.09 28 
Mizoram 36.2 89.3 0.09 29 
Sikkim 39.6 75.6 0.05 30 
D & N Haveli 25.3 64.3 0.03 31 
A & N Island 17.8 82.4 0.03 32 
Damu & Diu 14.9 79.5 0.02 33 
Lakshadweep 11 87.9 0.01 34 
 246 
 
APPENDIX  5      Comparative demographic figures for Pakistani provinces (2012-13) 
 
Indicators* 
 
Pakistan 
National Punjab Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa 
Sindh Balochistan 
Islamabad/ 
FATA** 
Female literacy rate (%) 
 
48 53 37 48 26 - 
Male literacy rate (%) 
 
71 70 72 73 69 - 
Female labour force 
participation rate (%) 
 
22 26 14 16 10 - 
Male labour force 
participation rate (%) 
 
69 70 60 71 69 - 
1998 population per 
province or 
administrative unit (%) 
- 56 13 23 5 3 
Population density per 
square Kilometre 
 
166 359 238 216 19 - 
Ranking per population 
density 
 
- 1 2 3 4 - 
 
* Combined for both rural and urban 
** Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
 
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2014a, b and c. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
 
APPENDIX  6  Self Help Groups (SHGs) and Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) 
 
Group name Description 
Self Help Groups (SHGs) SHGs are formed by a group of 10-25 women, coming 
together for the purpose of supporting their peers in matters of 
not only financial intermediation but also very basic skills like 
keeping accounts, disciplining savings and keeping track of 
their expenses etc. Usually the initiation for the group 
formation comes from an NGO, and the activities of the SHGs 
vary widely accordingly, ranging from advocacy on 
reproductive health to hygiene and sanitation. However SHGs 
are mostly initiated for financial mainstreaming of the women 
and other marginalized groups within the society and may be 
registered or unregistered. Members make small regular 
savings contributions over a few months until there is enough 
capital in the group to begin lending. Funds may then be lent 
back to the members or to others in the village for any purpose 
for a small amount of interest. The members elect a president, 
a general secretary and a treasurer from among the group 
members who keep a record of the accounts and decide upon 
matters of the members via consultation within the group. A 
good functioning SHG is then linked to a bank and operate an 
account as a group with the deposits of the members and 
where they can also access loans for their members for income 
generating activities and the group backs the loan as a 
guarantor.  
SHGs basically have a bigger purpose than just financial 
intermediation. The social dimension is much stronger and 
women are brought together to build up on their weaknesses 
usually within a wider anti-poverty agendas from the NGOs 
like increasing school enrolments, improving nutrition and the 
effective use of birth control etc. 
Joint Liability Groups 
(JLGs) 
JLGs are an informal group of individuals, usually 4-10, who 
get together for the sole purpose of getting a loan from an MFI 
either singly or through the group mechanism against mutual 
guarantee. The JLG members would offer a joint undertaking 
to the bank/ MFIs that enables them to avail loans. The 
management of the JLG is to be kept simple with little or no 
financial administration within the group.  Usually the 
members of the group come from a more or less similar social 
economic background, and may or may not necessarily know 
one another in advance. The group formation is also initiated 
partly by animators of the NGOs or MFIs and partly by the 
group members themselves.  
 
Source: Author with basic information from NABARD (2007) 
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APPENDIX  7 Key definitions and explanations of terms 
 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Sceduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are historically disadvantaged and marginalized people 
that are given special recognition in the Constitution of India. Usually comprising of lower 
castes like Dalits (Harijans), Adivasis (aboriginals) or the Sudras (also referred to as the 
untouchables), these castes and tribes are entitled for positive discrimination by the Indian 
central government policy (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment India 2012). 
According to the 2011 Indian Census, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, make up 
around 16.2% and 8.2% of the Indian population respectively, or around 24.4% together.  
 
Kin marriages 
Kin marriages are marriages or alliances between blood and affinity relations. Such relations 
range from marrying within first or second cousins on both the maternal and paternal sides of 
the family. Though uncommon in Hindu religion, it is quite common in Muslim and Christian 
communities in South Aisa. 
 
Joint family system 
It is a system of household in which close relatives in addition to the nuclear family live 
together within the same premises.  Usually joint families refer to family units in which 
several generations live together but sometimes also close relatives like uncles, aunts and 
cousins living under the same roof.  
 
Living conditions/ standard 
The classification is a subjective one from an onsite observation of the living quarters, 
hygienic conditions, basic facilities available like electricity, running water, toilet, heating and 
cooling possibilities etc., the household size, living space available per person, the condition 
of residential premises and the ownership status.  
 
Source of recruitment to MFI 
This basically means how the loan with the MFI (NEED) came about and who initiated the 
first contacts, information or motivation etc. MFIs rely mainly on their loan officers, clients 
and other local associates within the communities like mediators or group leaders (more 
active members of the neighbourhoods) to act as ‘animators’ who then market, urge or 
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recommend potential clients to apply for a loan from the MFI. NEED clients were likewise 
motivated by one source or another as listed in table 5.2 for a loan with NEED. 
 
Community or caste headman/ chief/ biradari 
The society in South Asia generally and in India particularly is mostly structured and divided 
into social sub-classes along castes lines. A social class is separated from others by 
distinctions of hereditary rank, profession, or wealth. Such that all social practices, 
interaction, marriages and socializing can often be defined and confined according to which 
caste one belongs to. The community or caste head would then usually be a group of (senior) 
male kin (the patrilineage) who play a significant role in all social relations, thus in practice 
the honour and shame of individual members affects the general standing of the whole caste 
or ‘biradari’ within the community (adapted from Blood, 1994) 
 
Restrictive attitude towards women 
Much of the information in the study  on the ‘restrictive attitude towards women’ have been 
gathered from responses of both men and women respondents via a number of questions that 
relate to general sentiments and attitudes among the men as they see themselves and as this is 
perceived by the women. The questions ranged from attitudes to women making their own 
decisions, to humiliating behaviour and/ or violence (physical, verbal and emotional) against 
women within the HHs, and also in their communities and how this behaviour was perceived 
or seen by men. Also question on the freedoms that women enjoyed of movement or of seeing 
friends and family or talking to male acquaintances etc. For details see the questionnaires for 
both men and women for borrower households and the control group.    
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